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SUMMARY
The problem of mistake and its impact on the formation of contract is a central issue in the
law of contract of all legal systems. The thesis investigates this area by considering the
manner in which il has been dealt with in Germany and South African law. Although both
legal systems are of the civilian origin. the German law is a codified system. whereas South
African law is an uncodified one. in which. in the absence of legislation. legal problems are
resolved by decisions of the High Court operating under a strict doctrine of legal precedent.
German law does not. in a formal sense acknowledge that judges can make law. but the thesis
demonstrates the considerable weight that is nevertheless attached to judicial decisions in
practice.
The impact of differences in legal methodology on substantive law is a principal theme of the
investigation. It is addressed by means of a systematic comparison between the manner in
which the two systems deal with concepts such as theiuristic act and declarations of will. the
notion of contract and the relevance of offer and acceptance as its constituent elements.
Thereafter the broad topic of mistake as a circumstance that vitiates agreement and other
defects of wi II such as deceit. duress and undue intl uence are considered.
Whereas German law as a codified system presents a comprehensive regulation of the issues.
a case law system such as that of South A frica can only deal with matters brought before the
courts by parties engaged in a dispute. Because judges also tend to frame decisions as
narrowly as possible. such a system characterised by gaps in the law in relations to issues that
have not been authoritatively determined. The resultant uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact
that different courts might decide the same issue differently and that a considerable period of
time might elapse before the issue is settled by the highest court in the judicial hierarchy.
In regard to matters of substance. both systems proceed from a common conceptual
framework. but often tend to emphasise different aspects in coming to solutions. German law
places great store on the notion of the declaration of will. a concept which is analysed in
considerable detai I in relation to its treatment in South A frican law. A Ithough South African
law recognises the notion of a juristic act. there is no sign of the refined and systematic
discussion of the concept along the lines of German law. In consequence. concepts such as
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offer and acceptance playa less important role in South African law. In relation to the
treatment of mistake as well. the greater emphasis of German law on the declarations of will
is in marked contrast to the more subjective approach of South African law and its resort to a
theory of reliance as a corrective liability in cases of disagreement. Both systems adopt an
approach with subjective and objective elements. but with a different mix of these elements in
each instance.
An overriding conclusion is that both systems might have erred in placing too great an
emphasis on objective elements in the determination of when contractual liability should be
imposed. It is contended that renewed attention to the doctrine of culpa 111 contrahendo might
enable both South African and German law to deal more satisfactori ly with the problem of
cl isagreement iIl contract.
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OPSOMMING
Die probleem van dwaling en die uitwerking daarvan op kontraksluiting is 'n sentrale
vraagstuk van die Kontraktereg van alle lande. Die proefskrif ondersoek hierdie problernatiek
deur die hantering daarvan in sowel die Duitse as die Suid-Afrikaanse reg te oorweeg.
Alhoewel beide hierdie stelsels van romanisriese oorsprong is, is die Duitse "n gekodifiseerde
en die Suid-Afrikaanse 'n ongekodifiseerde stelsel. In die afwesigheid van wetgewing, word
regsprobleme in Suid-Afrika aan die hand van die gemenereg deur middel van beslissings van
die Hoë Hof opgelos ingevolge "n strenge presedentestelsel. Alhoewel die Duitse reg nie
formeel erken dat regterlike beslissings regskeppend kan werk nie, toon die proefskrif aan dat
daar tog in die praktyk groot gewig aan regterlike uitsprake geheg word.
Die uitwerking van hierdie metodologiese verskille is 'n hooftema van die ondersoek, Dit
geskied by wyse van 'n sistemariese vergelyking van die hantering in die twee stelsels van
begrippe soos die regshandeling en die wilsverklaring. die kontrak en die rol van aanbod en
aanname as konstituterende elemente van .n kontrak. Hierna kom die breë vraagstuk van
dwaling aan die orde as "n omstandigheid war wilsooreenstemming ondermyn, asook die
samehangende kwessies van bedrog. dwang en onbehoorlike beïnvloeding.
Alhoewel beide stelsels in substantiewe aangeleenthede uitgaan van 'n gemeenskaplike
konseptueie raamwerk. word aangetoon dat by die bereik van oplossings, die klem dikwels
heel verskillend geplaas word. Van sentrale belang is vir die Duitse reg is die
wilsverklaringsbegrip. wat in vergelyking met die behandeling daarvan In Suid-Afrika in
groot besonderhede ontleed word. Alhoewel die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, soos die Duitse reg.
uitgaan van die begrip regshandeling. ontbreek die genuanseerde en sisremariese behandeling
van die Duitse reg. As gevolg hiervan speel die begrippe aanbod en aanname 'n relatief
mlnder belangrike rol In die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Met betrekking tot die
dwalingsproblematiek ook is die groter klem op die Duitse reg op die wilsverklaring van die
partye opvallend en in skerp teenstelling Tot die meer subjektiewe benadering van die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg en die aanwending van die vertrouensteorie as 'n korrektiewe
aanspreeklikheid in gevalle van 'n gebrek aan wilsooreesntemming. Alhoewel albei stelsels
erkenning gee aan subjektiewe en objektiewe elemente, is daar verskille vir sover dit die
relatiewe klem op elkeen aangaan.
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Die oorkoepelende gevolgtrekking is dat albei stelsels miskien te veel gewig gee aan die
objektiewe element by die bepaling van aanspreeklikheid. Die voorstel is dat daar weer met
vrug na die leerstuk van culpa in contrahendo gekyk sou kon word
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1 Introduction
By reason of his consciousness and ability to retlect upon himself and his actions.
man is in a position to establish his own will. and thus to determine his own actions
and their consequences. The formation of will is a complex and multi-phased
process, intluenced by heterogeneous intluences. often not consciously exam ined by
the individual.
The point may be illustrated by the apparently simple example of a person (let us call
him P). who decides to buy a new pair of sunglasses. The process which culminates
in a definite decision to act originates in an awareness that he is no longer satisfied
with his old sunglasses. This may have been set in motion by a variety of impulses
ranging from considerations of fashion to a concern for the need for protection against
ultra-violet radiation. Be this as it may. at some point P will make the decision to buy
a new pair at a certain price. P will generally have definite expectations of the new
glasses. and will only be prepared to pay for a product that satisfies these
expectations.
These expectations may. of course. be far removed from reality. Since beauty is in
the eye of the beholder and beyond objective assessment. this may be impossible to
verify with reference to the question of fashion. As regards the question of ultra-
violet protection. however. it will be possible to establish objectively whether the
expectations of the buyer are met by the actual characteristics of the product. And
since. in our example. P has a definite opinion regarding the new glasses. it may be
fairly assumed that he obtained information from some source or other.
It might. for example. be the case that P had asked the shopkeeper about the measure
of protection offered by the sunglasses. and that he had been assured that this was of
the highest standard. If we now assume that P associated the concept "highest
standard" with a particular level of protection (derived. perhaps, from a scientific
journal he had previously consulted), but that the shopkeeper was only expressing his
personal opinion. we find ourselves facing a situation in which there is a discrepancy
7
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between the expectations of P and the actual quality of the glasses. Should P purchase
the glasses with the expectation that they will offer him the desired protection against
certain levels of radiation. it may come to pass that. when he begins to experience
problems with his eyes. he might want to revoke the sale on account of their defective
quality and even contend that he had been cheated by the shopkeeper.
Inevitably. it seems. the process of contract formation entails a process of
communication between the parties on the basis of information regarding the needs of
the parties. external circumstances and the qual ities of the performances bargained
for.
The example illustrates the extent to which a simple procedure. like the purchase of a
pair of sunglasses. can be riddled with problems arising from the risks that the
information relied on and the process of communication between the parties may be
detective.
Some further examples of problematic cases may help to iIIustrate the d ifficu Ities that
may arise during the process of contract formation.
Case I:
Case 2:
S offers to sell B a tractor for the sum of R I I 000.00. Whilst
pencilling down his offer he accidentally writes RIO 000.00. B
receives the erroneous offer and promptly accepts. He is. however.
fully aware of S' s intention to sell the tractor for R I I 000.00 but does
not trouble to enquire. S delivers the tractor to B and demands R I I
000,00 in return. B is only willing to part with RIO 000.00.
T desires to rent one of L's holiday homes for the month of June. In
his written offer. which was immediately accepted by L. he
erroneously writes July instead of June. L has no knowledge of T's
actual vacation plans. When T arrives laden with suitcases on I June.
L points to the former's letter and refuses him accommodation. He
does, however. insist on collecting rental for the month of July In
which T cannot occupy the premises because he has to work.
8
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Case 3:
Case 4:
Case 5:
Case 6:
B buys a painting from S. Both are convinced that it is a genuine
Rembrandt and the price paid is determined accordingly. Later it
becomes evident that the painting is a forgery of exceptional quality.
B is outraged and demands to be reimbursed. S refuses to do so. Does
it make a difference that S knew it to be a replica although he never
asserted it to be an original')
B sends a written offer of R 500 000.00 per post to S in return for his
race-horse "Storm". S is delighted because "Storm" has performed
dismally in recent races. After posting his acceptance "Storm" regains
its former qual ities as a horse of exceptional abi Iity and S regrets
having accepted B's offer. S would like to withdraw his acceptance.
Is this possible or is he already legally bound ')
An 88-year old B orders a brand-new Porsche from his local dealer.
Shortly after posting his letter to this effect. he passes away. The
Porsche-dealer accepts the order and confirms such per return post.
Some days later he delivers the vehicle to the house of the recently
deceased B where he finds only the mourning family. not his client.
He demands payment - he does not care who pays.
P. in need of a lift to the airport. phones his acquaintance D. 0
declares himself willing to assist and promises to collect P punctually
at the agreed time. Because his attention is captured by the television
broadcast of a thri IIing cricket match. 0 arrives late both at P's
residence and subsequently the airport. P misses his plane. Can P
raise a contractual claim against D? Does the outcome differ if the
parties agreed on a fair remuneration for the shuttle service?
These instances reveal that various factual constellations may deviate from the ideal
case of agreement. It goes without saying that the Law of Contract needs to be
equipped to deal with such problems. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate. by
9
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means of a systematic presentation. differences and common features in the approach
of German and South African law to problems of th is order. the questions raised by
them relating to the nature of agreement and its status as a legally binding contract
and. in particular. the question of what the outcome would be when the understanding
of one of parties differs from that of the other.
Since this thesis envisages a comparative approach. it is in the main dedicated to a
systematic description and. where necessary. elaboration of the position of the
systems. In order for the problem of mistake and defects of will and their effect on
contracts to be investigated. it will be necessary to provide some elaboration of the
basic underlying principles of the two legal systems. Only if one understands the
fundamental concepts governing the respective systems can one understand the
treatment of problems such as those raised here.
Chapter 2 deals with the German legal system. and the South African approach is
discussed in Chapter 3. The very classification and labelling of the topic in both
systems reveal significant differences of approach. to some extent ascribable to the
fact that German law. in contrast to South African law. is a codified system. I have
nevertheless attempted to portray both systems according to the same systematic
scheme.
Both chapters begin with a brief historical perspective followed by a discussion of the
significant preconditions for the existence of a contract and the circumstances which
preclude effective conclusion ofa contract. Only thereafter is the approach of the two
systems to the problems that typically arise during the process of contract formation
addressed. The focus is exclusively on problems relating to the formation of contract.
Apart from the need to limit the scope of this thesis. related issues such as that of a
fai lure to perform and that of a warranty of performance are excluded so as to enable
a more concentrated focus on the underlying foundations of "contract".
Chapter 4 compares the effective conclusion and formation of contracts. which
operate under similar principles in both systems. The minor differences revolve
10
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around exceptions made in both systems to the demand for consensus. and thus reveal
the (equitable) theoretical inconsistencies which have arisen in both systems. The
primary difference lies in the fact that. in Germany. an offer is binding once made.
and thus even where mental illness occurs prior to acceptance. This is not so in South
A frica, where offers are not binding prior to acceptance - despite the appl ication of
the postal rule.
An examination of the approach taken in both systems to the interpretation of
contracts also reveals a significant overlap. In Germany. the demand that contracts be
interpreted in the light of good faith and business custom means that the most
"reasonable" interpretation will be applied. South African courts favour a similarly
objective approach. The rubric of mistake. on the other hand. exposes the most
fundamental difference between the systems. The categories of mistake provided by
the BGB supply a balanced solution for each possible permutation. so that results are
fairly consistent. In South African courts. on the other hand. objective and subjective
criteria are weighed in individual cases. and resort may be made to the doctrine of
estoppel. so that results are unpredictable. a situation which has found SpUriOUS
resolution in the case of So nap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) v Pappadogianis. I
Chapter 5 deals with the erratic results of the emphasis. observable In both legal
systems. on objective criteria for the interpretation of contract, and suggests that an
increased reliance on the principle of culpa in contrahendo might provide a functional
bulwark against the erosion of the basic principle of consensus - especially in the
more adaptable South African system of case-law.
1992:; SA 422 (A)
"
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2.1 Introduction to the German legal system
2 Germany
Before discussing the subject matter of this thesis in detai I. it is necessary to consider
briefly the origins and nature of German private law and how historical developments
in Europe have influenced the present system of private law in Germany.
2.1.1 Germany as a civil law country
Germany belongs to the realm of the civil law. Its private law and its method of legal
thinking have been enormously influenced by the law of ancient Rome and the legal
tradition to which it gave rise." Of importance for present purposes is not the full
sweep of 2000 years of Roman legal history. but rather developments over the last
1000 years. during which Roman law has made its way into the German legal system.
In the centuries after 1 100 when the Corpus Juris Civilis (A 0 529-35) of the Emperor
Justinian began to be studied in Bologna. the legal learning of the Glossators (1100-
1250) and the Commentators (1250-1500) spread throughout Europe. This was the
beginning of the so-called second life of Roman law.' In the same era Canon law
developed as the law of the Catholic Church. and this law itself was strongly marked
by the ways of Roman law. The practice of going to university to obtain basic
training in law and to acquire the style of lawyerly dispute typical of the civilian
tradition has been followed in Europe ever since ..J
In the course of the th irteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Roman law of the
medieval scholars came to be recognised in the territory now known as Germany as a
secondary source of law. which was applied parallel to the local law. The main
reason for this reception was that German kings and emperors allowed the indigenous
Larenz Allgemeiner Teil des BUrgerlichen Rechts 14 15: Hom/Këtz/Leser German Private and
Commercial Law: An Introduction 8 9 I (J.
Van Mehren & Gordley The Civil Law System: An Introduction to the Comparative Stud) nr L3I\
41 42: Thomas/Van der Merwe/Stoop Historical Foundations or South African Private Law 45-56.
Foster German Legal System and Laws 12.
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Reichskammergerichtsordnung laid down that the imperial court
inhabitants of the regions in Italy to continue to use Roman law for dispute settlement.
Because Roman law was also favoured by some of these emperors. they decreed that
Roman law should also apply to the German tribes.' In 1495 the
(Reichskammergericht). half of whose members were jurists. was. in the absence of
special statues and customs. to base its judgments on imperial and common law (nach
des Reiehes und Gemeinen Rechten). In practice. this meant Roman law as it had
been received in Germany.
The second source of German law was Germanic law. the unwritten legal customs of
the regions and localities." It is of some importance that some of these laws. such as
the Sachsenspiegel (1221-7) and the Schwabenspiegel (1275). were collected and
written down at an early stage.'
During the sixteenth. seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. legal scholars on the
Continent attempted to adapt the Roman legal tradition to the requirements of modern
practice while remaining faithful to it. But during this period the Law of Reason or
the Law of Nature took root in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. In the manner
typical of the classical and Christian tradition of natural philosophy. the adherents of
this view sought to present legal material as a logical and orderly progression of
concepts and principles." Two of the most important authors of this tradition at the
beginning of its development were the Dutchman Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and the
German Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94). Later proponents of this school of thought
were Christian Thornasius (1655-1728) and his pupil Christian Wolf (1679-1754).
Scholars such as these were concerned not only with clarifying the concepts of
Horn/Kotz/Leser 9 10: Foster 12,
Foster I I
Horn/Kotz/Leser 9,
Ebke & Finkin Introduction to German Law 3: Horn/Këtz/Leser l O.
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Roman law as refined by the medieval jurists. but also with presenting the law in a
logical manner and basing legal argument on deduction from its axioms."
Apart from circumstances such as economic development and the needs of the
market. this development was undoubtedly inspired by the Enlightenment. which led
civilisation from the Middle Ages into modernity. and made concepts of human
freedom and reason of central importance. The Law of Reason (or Law of Nature).
having as its aim the establishment. within a comprehensive and logical framework.
of laws that could apply to every citizen and every aspect of Iife. prepared the way for
the cod ification movement of the eighteenth centuries.
Bavaria. as one of the German states. enacted a civil code in 1756 (Codex
Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis). and Prussia enacted its General Law of the
Prussian States in 1794.10 At this time. however. Germany was not a unified state. but
comprised a number of independent entities. In spite of the fact that. at the end of the
Napoleonic Wars. many Germans desired a national code of private law such as the
French had obtained with their code civil in 1804. political and econorn ic conditions
led to the Congress of Vienna of 1815 leaving Germany in a state of pol itical disunity.
Although the HGB as a commercial code had by this time already been promulgated.
the time was not ripe for a German Code. I I Germany therefore remained a mere
federation of states until the formation of the German Empire as a true federal state in
1871 under Otto Bismarck. By then. the need for a uniform legal system was
indisputable.
The task of preparing the draft of a Civil Code embodying the basic principles of
German private law was entrusted in 1874 to a special commission composed of
eleven members.l ' The commission completed its work in 1887. when its draft was
1(1
Horn/Kotz/Leser 10: Van Mehren/Gordley The Civi I Law System An Introduction to the
Comparative Study of Law 3R-42.
Horn/ Këtz/Leser 10.
Horn/Kotz/Leser 10.
Milnehener Kommemar zum BGB Allgerneiner Teil 7: Palandt Burgerfiches Gesetzbuch-
Kommemar Band 7. 2.
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published and submitted for consideration by legal experts and other interested
parties. Cogent criticism of the first draft resulted in the appointment of a second
commission to revise it. The second draft was competed in 1895. and. after the
introduction of numerous modifications. the final product became law at the 18th of
I'August 1896. and entered into force on the Ist of January 1900 . .) more than twenty-
five years after the foundation of the German Empire. Because of the dominant
position of Prussia within the German Empire. the Prussian Code supplanted all other
laws applicable in Germany during the process of the drafting of the C ivi I Code."
2.1.2 The BGB - an effective code
After more than a century. the BGB remains the centrepiece of German private law.
It is considered very abstract and technical and. although for some too steeped in the
Roman juridical mould. is nevertheless valued for its consistency and precision.
especially in its use of legal concepts. I:'
A continuing criticism has been that in spite of a changing economic and political
climate in Europe in the late nineteenth century. the provisions of the code did very
little to address the social and economic concerns of the day and paid little heed to
notions of social responsibility." This assertion leads to one of the principal
arguments against legal codification. namely that a code is too rigid and static a
system of law to allow the flexibility required to reflect changes in social conditions
and values.17
The BGB has. nevertheless. proved itself to be a flexible and dynamic code. able to
survive more than a century of enormous societal upheaval and change in Germany.
Over the years of its existence it has survived the era of the Third Reich and was for
I~
Munchener Kommentar zum BGB Allgemeiner Teil 7.
Milnehener Kommentar zum BGB Allgemeiner Teil 8: Palandt Burgertiches Gesetzbuch 2.
MUnchener Kommentar zum BGB Allgemeiner Teil 13. 14 and 15.
Brox Allgemeiner Teil des Burgertichen Gesetzbuchs 17 18: Larenz 16 17.
But one should bear in mind that the system is open for reformation and modification. At present
the Schuldrechtreform is of relevance. However. it wil] be not discussed in this study since it does
not concern the subject matter of this thesis.
15
17
15
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
more than twenty years effective under the communist rule of the GDR. despite the
fact that neither of these regimes adhered to the doctrine of laissez-faire which
provided the initial underpinning for the code. Quite clearly. therefore. the Code has
been responsive to the demands of changing societal and econom ic circumstances.
and in particular to the imperatives more recently enshrined in the German
Constitution tGrundgesetzi. I R
The code's longevity is in the main attributable to the fact that it relies on a relatively
limited number of rules of quite general impact. for example those contained in §§
133. 134. 138. 157. and 242 of the BGB. These provisions have enabled German
judges to lead the law in new directions by means of innovative acts of judicial
lawmaking. These provisions. and especially their applications. are of paramount
importance for a full understanding of German law_!9
Because judges are able. and sometimes compelled. to interpret the articles of the
code. and because the results reached by different judges are not invariably consistent.
the important role of case law is well recognised. Although judges are not formally
bound to follow prior decisions. as under the system of precedent of English law. it is
nevertheless customary. in practice. for lower courts to consider and follow the
judgments of the BGH pertaining to matters requiring decision . .Judicial decisions are
therefore. in practice. a source of German law. and one cannot understand the
provisions of the Code in the abstract without regard to the case law. which in many
instances has developed solutions praeter legem. ie even contrary to the statutory
rules. ='0
The importance of the code itself and of the decisions of superior courts. however.
ought not to obscure the impact of academic jurisprudence on the development of
IS MUnchener Kornrnentar zum 13GB Allgerneiner Teil 23 26: Palandt BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch 4.
Erman 13GB Handkornmentar I.Band 214 215 221 222 223 226: MUnchener Kommemar zurn
13GB Allgemeiner Teil 1318-1328: Milnehener Kommernar zum 13GB Schuldrecht Allgerneiner
Teil 97-122.
131'0\ 183839. Some examples are: RGl 120.249 ff: RGZ 78. 239tT: BGHZ 21. 319 IT: BGHl
23. 249/261: LG Bremen. N.lW 1966.2360 I.: BGHl 21.319 et seq.
:0
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German law. German courts fequently cite academic writers in their judgments and
there is an active exchange between judicial opinion and the prevailing academic
doctrine. Because judges are required to focus on practical concerns and academic
authors often concentrate on preserving the integrity of the structure and logical
patterns of the code. judicial and academic opinion often diverge in matters of
substance. These interchanges often result in considerable complexity regarding
important legal issues and according to some. bring about unnecessary legal
. 'Iuncertainty. -
Undoubtedly. however. the contributions of outstanding academic writers such as
Dieter Medicus. Karl Larenz. Hans Brox and others have ensured that German judges
do not stray too far from the Code and the the restraints of logical reasoning.
2.1.3 Freedom of contract as a general principle
The BGB was produced in the era of classical individualism and laissezfaire that
implied a "hands off' policy by government with respect to the agreements and
arrangements between citizens. which are in principle supposed to reflect the result of
free negotiation between the parties to the contract.i' This basic premise regarding
the econorn ic organisation of society and the ideal of individual freedom is also laid
down in the German Constitution (Art.2 (I) Grundgesetzi of 1949.
Freedom of contract. however. entails two aspects. which have never been absolute
and which have. in recent times, been limited in many ways through the creation of
new provisions and norms.r' The first. the freedom to conclude contracts. entails the
freedom of individuals to decide whether and with whom a contract is to be
cl Youngs Sourcebook on German Law).
Larenz 84-87: HUbner Allgemeiner Teil des BUrgerlichen Gesetzbuches 262-264: Brox 46 47:
MUnchener Kommemar zum BGB Allgemeiner Teil 1222 1223.
Examples are the labour law and AGBG. which is similar to the Unfair Contract Terms Act in UK.
See Jauernig-Schlechtriem-StUrner Burgertiches Gesetzbuch mit Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts
der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen 96: MUnchener Kommemar zurn BGB Allgerneiner Teil
1224: Foster 232.
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concluded." This aspect. as will be discussed hereafter. is limited by a person's
individual capacity but may also be subject to limitations by statute. as for instance in
the case of monopoly powers. which are obliged to supply gas. electricity or train
services.f The second aspect is the freedom to determine the content of contracts.
This freedom is even more restricted than the former. and can exist only within the
general limits imposed by the BGB and by more general considerations of
constitutionality. legality and morality. There is an increasing tendency towards
greater governmental control and management of many aspects of Iik. often in
response to a perceived need to protect the consumer or the environment."
2.1.4 The structure of the BGB
An understanding of the formal structure of the BGB is essential for any any attempt
to discuss the German notion of contract. its essential prerequisites and the approach
of German law to the problems of mistake and defective consent.
The BGB is divided into five books. Each book is divided into Sections (Ahschniuei.
which are in turn sub-divided into Titles (Titel).
The first book. the general part (~§ I - 240 BGB). deals with general concepts of law
and with definitions. including. amongst others. the capacity of natural and legal
persons. juristic acts. mistake. duress and agency. The general part contains basic
concepts and rules governing all the other Books of the BGB and law in general.
unless excluded by specific rules or principles laid down in other enactments.
The second book deals with the law of obligations and contains general concepts
pertaining to obligations (§§ 241 - 432 BGB). A special part contains rules for
131'0:\.47.
Palandt Burgertiches Gesetzbuch 131: Milnehener Kommernar zum 13GB Allgerneiner 1 ei I 1226
1227 1228 1229 1230: ~ 6 EnergieWiG:~ 22 PbefCi. ~~ 13a AbsA S.3.90 Abs. I S. :; (jUK(i: ~ ~
-+8A9I3RAO:~ 15 PatG:~ 61 UrhG: ~ 5 PtlVersG-referring to ~ 5 PllVers(i: I3GH LM Pt11VersCi
Nr.3b=N.lW 1973.751.
Ebke & Finkin 175: I3rox 47 48.
18
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
different kinds of obligations such as those arising from sale. lease and contracts of
service (§§ 433 - 853 BGB). as well as the law of torts (§§ 823 - 853 BGB).
Book Three (§§ 854 - 1296 BGB) deals with the law of things and contains rules
regarding both possession. eg the factual control over an object, and ownership. being
the legal control over an object. It deals. in particular. with the acquisition and loss of
ownership and the establishment of other property rights.
Books Four and Five contain rules regarding family law ( §§ 1297 - 1921 BGB) and
the law of succession (§§ 1922 - 2385 BGB).
Contracts and the problem of mistake in their formation are in the main regulated by
the general part of the Code (exceptions are eg §§ 2078. 2281 and 1949 BGB).
Admittedly there are also some special rules. dealing in particular with the
consequences of defective agreement, but these will not be dealt with in the present
thesis. It is also apparent that the formal structure makes it unnecessary to consider
Books Two - Five in this study.
2.2 The general part - three general concepts of the 8GB
The general part of the BGB deals with the general concepts of the civil law
applicable to the entire BGB and to private law in general. From a conceptual
perspective. it provides the framework for the understanding of every private law
issue." Three basic concepts of the general part of the BGB are of paramount
importance in this regard: namely the juristic act. the declaration of will. and contract.
These concepts stand in close relation to one another." and an understanding of the
juristic act and the declaration of will provides the key to the German notion of
contract.
27 Brox 25: Milnehener Kommentar zum BGB Allgemeiner Teil 14: Foster 229 230.
28 Larenz 314-330: Markesinis The German La« of Obligations Volume I 31.
19
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.2.1 The Juristic act
The notion of the Rechtsgeschaft (juristic act) of German law is of central importance
for the treatment of contract-related issues.
The term juristic act in the most general sense denotes the intentional creation of legal
consequences by a legal subject." Although it is not a formal requirement. and
although the BGB does not always distinguish these terms." a juristic act presupposes
an effective declaration of wi 11.31
The .iuristic act. together with other matters. is dealt with in Section 3 (~~ 104-185
BGB) of the general part. Section 3 itself is divided into six Titles .
..Geschaftsfahigke it". or the capacity to conclude a "Rechtsgeschaft", is dealt with in
Title (§§ 104-115 BGB). Title 2 (§§ 116-144 BGB) deals with the
"Willenserklarung" (declaration of will). and "Vertrag" (contract) is thereafter dealt
with in Title 3 (§§ 145-157 BGB). The modalities to which a =Rechtsgeschaft' may
be subjected. namely =Bedingung (condition)" and "Zeitbesummung' (time
provision) receive attention in Title 4 (~~ 158-163 BGB). Aspects related to the
"Rechtsgeschaft" such as .. Vertretung" (agency) .. ,Vol/macht" (power of attorney),
"Einwilligung' (prior consent) and "Genehmigung' (approval) are regulated in Titles
5 (§~ 164-181 BGB) and 6 (§~ 182-185 BGB) respectively.
The term "Rechtsgeschaft", it must be stressed. although it features in various
provisions of the BGB and stands at the head of the third Section. does not receive a
statutory definition in the BGB at all. There is. nevertheless. at the present time no
uncertainty as to its meaning.
In order to define the notion and to distinguish it from other concepts. it may be stated
that by means of a juristic act a legal subject tRechtssubjektv can establish legal
11
Brox 54: Larenz 3 14.
Brox 54: HUbner 265.
l.arenz 3 15.
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consequences in the sense of creating. varying or extinguishing a legal relationship
with another or in respect of a thing or an issue (Rechtsobjekïi." A juristic act
requires at least one declaration of will tWillenserklarungi as in the case of a
unilateral legal act. eg the making of a will. but multilateral legal acts. such as
contracts. require more than one such declaration."
The creation of legal consequences by means of intentional conduct. therefore.
requires a decclaration of wi lion the part of the actor. A legally binding agreement
with another person demands the disclosure of his will or intention. Any other
approach would be problematic from a social point of view. A declaration of will is
therefore a precondition for each and every juristic act. In addition. as will be shown
below. contract itself is a special manifestation of the juristic act.
As already indicated. the juristic act has to be distinguished from related but
nevertheless distinct notions.
On the one hand there is the =rechtsgeschaftsahnliche Handlung' such as the setting
of a time limit. consent to an operation or the establishment of a domicile which also
brings about legal consequences. These are intentional acts. and on account of this
similarity. attract the rules concerning the capacity to undertake juristic acts
C'Geschdjtsfahigkeit") and the declaration of wi II (..Willenserklarungen ") by
''+analogy.' In contradistinction to the juristic act. the legal consequences in these
cases come about independently of the intention of the actor on account of the
provisions of the BGB itself." Human acts. such as the negligent destruction of a car
by a person. also have legal consequences. not. however. in consequence of a
declaration of wi II or intent. but merely because of the general law. eg the law of
torts." This second category of cases has even less in common with the notion of the
Brox 54: Larenz 314-315.
LareJ1Z 318-320: Brox 4854.
Bro:\ 52 53:
Larenz 511-514: Brax 53.
Brox 52 53: Larenz 51 I.
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It is of cardinal importance that a juristic act invariably presupposes a declaration of
wi II. The declaration of wi II. as the primary constituent of the juristic act. is regulated
in ~~ 116-144 BGB.
juristic act than the category of "rechtsgeschaftsahnliche Handlungen". and will also
not be discussed here.
2.2.1.1 The declaration of will
Before discussing the requirements for a declaration of will as the basis of a juristic
act. it is necessary to refer to more general requirements for the val idity of every
juristic act. which. somewhat indirectly perhaps. also refer to the declaration of will.
In order that conduct on the part of a legal subject may bring about legal
consequences. in other words. constitute a valid juristic act. requirements regarding
legal capacity and formalities have to be satisfied.
2.2.1.1.1 Legal Capacity and its significance under German law
A legal act requires that the actor be capable of declaring his or her will. and this
presupposes the capacity to form a legally relevant will." The BGB differentiates
between different levels of legal capacity by a resort to the notions of
..Rechtsfahigke it". ..Handlungsfahigkeit" and "Geschaftsfahigke it' as expressing
varying levels of competency in respect of the creation of legal duties and rights."
"Rechtsfahigkeit' refers to the capacity to be a bearer of rights and obligations.r" and
is not of great relevance for this discussion. It is of greater importance to distinguish
"Handlungsfahigkeit" from "Geschaftsfahigkeit , The former. the capacity to
perform legally relevant acts." denotes the general ability to obtain rights. undertake
J7 Brox 124: Larenz 9lJ .
.1~ Jauernig-Schlechtriern-Sturner 44: Brox 125-127.
31)
Milnehener Kommernar ZUIll BGB Allgemeiner Teil 1;26: Larenz. 35 42-43 .
Palandt BUrgeri iches Gesetzbuch 61;.
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duties. incur liabilities. and to enforce juristic acts or obligations. but does not extend
to "Geschaftsfahigkeit", the capacity or competence to perform juristic acts."
"Handlungsfahigeit", in other words. is a person s capacity for legally relevant
behaviour and comprises not only "Geschaftsfahigkeit" but denotes the capacity for
delictual liability as well." "Geschafisfahigkeit" is a component of the wider notion
of "Handlungsfahigkeit", But to acknowledge a person as being =handlungsfahig"
does not entai I recognition of that person as =geschafisfahig as well. A person who
is "gescháftsfahig', however. will ordinarily also be delictually responsible.
The BGB regulates the issue as to which persons enjoy the capacity to undertake
juristic acts. Although the BGB contains no specific provisions to this effect. it
proceeds on the basis that the capacity to undertake juristic acts commences with the
onset of majority. which. under ~ 2 BGB. is 18 years."
A sharp distinction is made between those who are legally incompetent and have no
capacity to undertake juristic acts (§ 104 BGB). those enjoying limited legal
competence (~ 106 BGB) and those who are fully competent."
The efficacy or otherwise of a purported juristic act therefore depends primarily on
the capacity of the particular legal subject to declare his or her will in a legal sense.
The written declaration. for example. of a 6 year old boy that he wants to leave his
bicycle to his friend does not entail any legal consequences. The issue is settled by
the more or less mechanical application of the provision that a person who has not
completed his ih year is legally incompetent" and that a declaration by such a person
is null and void."
-lI Larenz 99.
-p Palandt BUrgeri iches Gesetzbuch. 68.
HUbner 296-29R: Larenz 99.
Larenz 99-100: HUbner 297-300: Bm, 127-129.
-l5 ~I04BGB.
-il' ~I05 BGB.
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Whereas there is no scope in such a case for a judge to interpret the applicable norms.
this becomes a possibility in respect of a declaration of intent by a major who wishes
to buy a car. Such a declaration might be valid or void. depending on the subject's
mental condition at the time of declaration. The relevant statutory criteria of a
"disturbance of mental activity through disease" and "its nature as a transitory one,,47
have to be construed by the judge, and it is possible that. faced with the same facts.
different judges might come to different results. However. should the judge conclude
that the requirements of § 104 (2) BGB are satisfied. the particular act must be
declared void under the strict provision of § 105 BGB.
The capacity to undertake a juristic act is. therefore. in actual fact a precondition for
the validity of a juristic act. In the absence of "legal capacity". there is no need to
evaluate the conduct of the legal subject with respect to its validity as a juristic act at
all. The legal subject is either competent (at least in a limited sense) to undertake a
juristic act or not. If not. there is no need for a further investigation of questions
regarding the existence of a juristic act.
A similar situation obtains regarding the issue of formalities.
2.2.1.1.2 Formalities and their significance for juristic acts
German law is based on the principle of consensual ism. which means that juristic
acts. including contracts. generally do not require formalities for legal efficacy.
Freedom of form is a general principal of German law ..Jk
There are. nevertheless. various instances where. for a variety of reasons. formalities
of different kinds are required. Formalities may serve to clarify whether there is an
-17 ~104(2) BGB.
l.arenz 40ó-408: Munchener Kommernar zurn BGB A Ilgemeiner Teil 1008: .Iauernig-
Schlechtriern-Sturner 66: Brox 139: Palandt Burgertiches Gesetzbuch 91: Ebke & Finkin 176.
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In respect of juristic acts, the BGB distinguishes four different levels of formality:
agreement between legal subjects or not." are of evidentiary significance and may
fulfil a warning function. especially in respect of onerous juristic acts."
A brief overview of the different types of formal ity wi II suffice for present purposes.
Writing as required by statute tgesetzliche Schriftform. ~ 126 BGB)
Writing as prescribed by the parties igewillkurte Schrift/arm. ~ 127 BGB)
Notarial documentation tnotanelle Beurkundung, ~ 128 BGB)
Public certification ( offentliche Beglaubigung. ~ 129 BGB)
If formal requirements at any of these levels are ignored or violated. the juristic act is
as a general rule devoid of legal effect." As is the case in questions of legal capacity.
the BGB determines the legal consequences of formal defects clearly and
formalistically."
A bequest to a friend of a set of golf clubs which does not comply with the formal
requirements of the BGB regarding wills (§§ 2231. 2247 BGB) will accordingly be
void on account of ~ 125 BGB. In respect of formal requirements as well. it is
unnecessary to investigate the validity of a declaration if a required or agreed-upon
formality is ignored by the party or parties to it.
Many German textbooks, it must be admitted. adopt a different order of treatment in
this regard. Questions oflegal capacity and formalities are often discussed following a
treatment of the declaration of will.53 This approach does not. however. seem useful
for present purposes. Unlike a textbook. which. tor didactic purposes. has to deal
4" Hubner 351: Larenz 407: Brox 139.
5(1 Larenz 407: Palandt Burgertiches Gesetzbuch 91.
Hubner 356: Brox 143. There are exceptions. which shall nOLbe discussed here. cg ~ 51 X (2) 8G B
(notation) and some applicationS of ~ 242 BGB.
5: ~125BGB.
51
53 See for example Larenz 407.
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with every aspect of the subject matter. the more restricted scope of the present work
perm its a rather more selective focus.
The general definition of the juristic act and its preconditions do not clarify the
meaning of the declaration of will as its principal constituent. The invalidity of the
declaration in cases of defective capacity and form flow from the statutory provisions
themselves. ie §~ 105.125 BGB. and does not turn on the question of what a
declaration of will is and what its prerequisites are. These issues only come to the
fore where a person past the age of majority who is of sound mind declares something
in the appropriate way.
2.2.1.1.3 Requirements for a valid declaration of will
As in the case of 'juristic act". the BGB has no definition of "declaration of will".
The Code does, however. contain numerous provisions which regulate various aspects
of the central concept." The very term declaration (i/will indicates. however. that
apart from an internal or subjective element. ie the will to bring about a legal
consequence, it comprises also the declaration. ie the external manifestation of the
legal consequences desired by the declarer."
This brief description serves only as a staring point for the understanding of the
concept in German law.
2.2.1.1.3.1 "Will" in its legal sense
It is in the first instance necessary to elaborate on the concept "will". which in itself is
too general to yield precise results. It is generally accepted that the wi II comprises a
number of elements.
In the first instance. cognisance must be taken of the the Handlungswille. ie the
intention to act. The utterance, for example, of a sleeping or unconscious person, is
Brox 48.
l.arenz 333.
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wholly irrelevant. even if he or she appears to be expressing a wish to buy or sell
something. It is essential that the person should act purposefully."
Up to 1991. a Rechtsbindungswille. ie the intention to be legally bound by one s act.
was a second element. This particular component was, however. finally abolished by
a judgment of the BGH:
··In spite of the absence of the conscious making of a declaration (intention to
be bound. business intention). a declaration of will is present if the declarer.
by using the care necessary in the affairs of life. could have perceived that this
statement might. according to good faith and business custom. be regarded as
a declaration of will. and if the recipient did in fact also understand it. It can
be avoided in accordance with ~~ 119. 121. 143 of the BGB.··57
The implications of this decision shall not be discussed at present.
A further component of will in the legal sense is the Geschaftswille. that is the
intention of a person to engage in a particular transaction. In contradistinction to the
Rechtsbindungswille. this refers to the intention of the legal subject to achieve a
particular legal consequence. and not just any consequence whatsoever."
If. for example. S wants to sell an article to B for E 5430.00 and he correctly declares
this to B. he has a definite will in the legal sense in respect of both his own
declaration and its special legal consequence.
The subjective aspect of a declaration of wi II therefore entai Is two essential elements.
Apart from the necessity of intentional conduct in general. the intention of the legal
subject should be directed towards achieving particular legal consequences. As a
matter of logic it seems that the intention to engage in a juristic act and to be bound
jh Medicus 83: Brox 49.
57 BGHZ91.324:109.177.
;8 Brox 50: HUbner 284-2R5.
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Without an outward manifestation of the intent to effect legal consequences. the
intention is. as indicated above. legally ineffective.
thereby does entail both an awareness and an intention that the act will result In
consequences.
2.2.1.1.3.2 The declaration rof will]
The declaration may be expressly articulated in words. but may also be inferred from
conduct" For example. a car driver. who fills his tank with petrol indicates. without
saying a single word. that he wants to purchase petrol. This is admittedly only the
case if he does not entertain any dishonest intention. In such a case. the question of
the so-called factual contract becomes relevant. an issue wh ich wi II considered iii a
later section.
Recognition that a declaration may be made by non-verbal conduct does not mean
that mere silence will. as a rule. be sufficient to constitute a declaration of will.
Amongst legal subjects silence ordinarily does not mean anything at all in a legal
sense. Silence may be relevant as a legal act in cases within the ambit of ~ 362 of the
HGB60 Apart from this special instance. which will not be discussed here. silence
may be relevant as conduct in a legal sense in consequence of ~ 149 BGB. which in
certain circumstances compels legal subjects to act.?'
2.2.1.1.3.2.1 Legally binding as opposed to social agreements
The question of the intention to engage in a transaction and the outward declaration
thereof is closely connected with the issue of non-binding declarations of will made
merely for social reasons. This distinction is a matter of interpretation. depending on
a range of factors. including the surrounding eireurnstances.I"
)lJ HUbner 287: Larenz 357-359.
l~(l Medicus 37-4383: Brox 99-100.
See below: 2.2.2.2.3.
HUbner 286: Medicus 252 253 254.
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In the case. for example. where D. asks his acquaintance P. whether he needs a lift.
and his friend thanks him for the offer and gets into D's car. and is subsequently
injured in an accident. the question of whether the offer was made with the intention
to be legally bound or just as a favour would depend on whether or not D was aware
that his friend had to reach his train by a certain time and whether he had charged his
passenger for the Iift or not.
The inescapable need in this and other cases to interpret a declaration of will in order
to establish its precise significance is apparent from the provision in the BGB of rules
for the interpretation of declarations of will. Because a declaration of will is of
significance for the constitution of a juristic act. the interpretation provisions in actual
fact bear on the wider notion of the juristic act and on the determination of its legal
consequences."
2.2.1.1.3.3 The interpretation of declarations of will
The BGB states that the interpretation of a declaration IS directed at the actual
intention underlying it. irrespective of its literal meaning." The principal test to be
applied by judges when interpreting a declaration of intention is. therefore.
supposedly a subjective one." With reference to the example of the passenger
conveyed in his friends car." German judges would have to investigate the actual
intention of D. On this basis. the question is whether D intended to make himself
liable for damages in case of an accident. An indicator in this regard might be
whether he had charged his passenger for the lift.
A consideration of all these questions might enable a judge to make a finding as to
whether the offer had been made with the intent to establish a legal bond. or merely as
MUnchener Komentar zum BGB A Ilgemeiner lei I 1068-1069: Brox 66-68.
~ 133 BGB.
MUchener Kommemar zurn BGB A Ilgemeiner Tei I 1068-1080: Brox 67 68: Erman '218-219:
Palandt BUrgeri iches Gesetzbuch 101.
(1(1 See above: I Icase 61.
6.)
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a favour. Needless to say. § 133 BGB is not only relevant to the question of whether
there is a juristic act or not. but is also of importance in many other contexts.
A supplementary provision in ~ 157 BGB and its relation to ~ 133 BGB will be
discussed at a later stage.
2.2.1.1.3.4 Paragraphs 134, 138 BGB - their importance for the validity of legal
acts
To complete the overview of the notion of juristic act. it is now necessary to discuss
two other important provisions relevant to the validity of juristic acts.
Unlike the provisions previously discussed. which deal with the preconditions for a
juristic act or a declaration of will. two key provisions enable German judges to
declare a legally effective declaration of wi II or a juristic act to be null and void.
These rules. which are of enormous importance for the phenomenon of juristic acts
and therefore also for contracts. 67 embody limitations on the freedom of contract.
Generally speaking. their aim is to ensure the overall coherence ofthe legal system. as
well as to protect weaker legal subjects against more powerful parties."
2.2.1.1.3.4.1 Paragraph 134 BGB
The rule of ~ 134 BGB deprives an act of a legal subject. which violates another rule
of German law of legal consequences by declaring a juristic act that contravenes a
statutory prohibition to be void unless a different consequence is to be inferred from
the statute.
Munchener Kommernar zum BGB Allgemeiner Teil 1087 1088: Brox 147-154.
Palandt Blirgerliches Gesetzbuch 105 111-113: Mlinchener Kommernar ZUIll BGB Allgemeiner
Teil 1087-1088.
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The underlying idea is to preserve the overall unity of the German legal systern.?" by.
for example. preventing a professional murderer from claiming payment from his
cl ient.
2.2.1.1.3.4.2 Paragraph 138 BGB
Paragraph 138 BGB. on the other hand. relates to immoral acts and to those by which
a legal subject gains an unfair advantage over another.Ï" The open-ended terms in
which it is phrased permit judges considerable leeway regarding the control over
immoral and exploitive contracts." In 1969. for instance. the BGH related the notion
of "good morals' to the feeling of propriety common to all fair and right thinking
7cpersons.
2.2.1.2 Juristic acts recognised by the BGB
As indicated above, the concept "juristic ace. which is based on the notion of a
"declaration of will", is of general application for the entire area covered by the BGB
and. indeed. the whole of private law. Not restricted to a limited number of
applications. it is the basic tool tor the regulation of all endeavours to effect voluntary
changes to legal relationships, and as such is operationalised by means of a number of
tormal subdivisions of the central organising concept."
2.2.1.2.1 Unilateraljuristic acts
A first distinction is with reference to the number of legal subjects involved in the act.
It has been indicated that ajuristic act requires at least one declaration of wi II. Juristic
acts which require only one such declaration are characterised as being unilateral in
nature. Belonging to this category, and provided for by the BGB in its different
(,q Brox 147.
7(/ ~ 138 BGB.
BAG N.lW 1986,851: BGH N.lW 1976,710,711: BGH N.fW 1956.1272: BGH N.lW 1961.822:71
BGH N.fW 1965.580: BGH N.lW 1968.932.934: RGZ 99.107.108 f: RGZ 140.184.190: RGZ
114.331\.341: BGH N.lW 1968. 1571: BGH N.lW 191\7.2014 ,'(bill lorE 67R75.()() al the end ora
nightclub \ isit).
BGH N.lW 1990.704.
Brox 48-49 54.
7'
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A further classification of declarations of will turns on whether a declaration IS
received by another person. or takes effect independently of receipt.
books. are. for instance. the declaration of rescission (a form of termination of an
obligation). the grant of a power of authority to an agent and the testamentary
disposition."
A common feature of the unilateral legal act is that a party is entitled to change his or
her legal relationship to another legal subject or thing without the need for the consent
of another. The principal consideration in the recognition of a unilateral legal act is
whether any other legal subject has a legitimate interest in the matter that necessitates
its approval. 75 In the case of succession. for instance. it is c lear that the interest of the
testator in the disposition of his goods is the sole concern of the law.
2.2.1.2.2 Receipt of a declaration as prerequisite for its operation
The BGB recognizes declarations of both kinds. The most important instance of the
second kind is the offer of reward (Auslobung). a declaration of intention that does not
require communication to a legal subject who qualifies for the award.Ï" A further
example is the declaration of one's ultimate wi 11.77
In general. however. declarations of will have to be received by those whose interests
are affected by the particular legal act in order to be effective." Of paramount
importance in this regard for juristic acts and contracts in particular. is ~ 130 BGB.
which stipulates the manner in which a declaration of will becomes effective as
against absent persons.
32
Brox 54.
MUnchener Kommemar zum BGB Allgerneiner Tei I R80-881 1052-1053.
Regulated in ~~ 657-661 BGB: Palandt Burgertiches Gesetzbuch. 6<.)5697: .lauernig-
Schlechtriern-Sturner 771.
Milnehener Kommemar zurn BGB Allgerneiner Teil R81: Jauernig-Schlechtr iern-Sturner 72.
1:31'0\ 52.
77
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In general. a declaration of will. if not previously revoked. becomes effective when it
reaches the absent addressee (~ 130 (I) BGB). The operation of a declaration is not
affected by the death or subsequent incompetence of its maker (§ 130 (2) BGB).
For obvious reasons. however. the efficacy of a declaration of will cannot depend on
whether the potential recipient in fact received or not. In order to prevent a
circumvention of the provision. eg by an employee who expects to be dismissed not
opening the letter containing the notice of termination of service. the provisions of ~
130 BGB have been interpreted by the German courts to mean that. apart from the
case where a declaration of will which needs to be received to become effective
actually reaches the opposite party. it is necessary and also sufficient that it has come
into circulation in accordance with the intention of the declarant in circumstances
whereunder the declarant could expect it to have reached the intended recipient. even
if by indirect means.7'!
2.2.1.2.3 Multilateral juristic acts - contracts
In contrast to unilateral juristic acts. multilateral juristic acts require more than one
declaration of wi II in order to produce results. Where. for example. someone declares
his intention to sell his horse orally without anybody being in a position to hear the
statement. the requirements for a valid declaration of will and a valid juristic act
according to the BGB are satisfied. It is clear. however. that such a declaration cannot
bring about any legal consequences. The obvious reason is that the declaration in this
case necessari ly depends on a reply in order that a change in the declarer" siegal
relationship to the horse and an intended acquirer thereof might be effected. The
ordinary meaning of the word "sell" implies that there is another party who buys the
article offered for sale. A transaction of this kind presupposes agreement between at
least two interested parties.
RG7 99. 23: BGI-I LM Nr.15=N.lW 1980.990: BAG N.lW 1989.606.
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In cases like these. therefore. another legal subject has to react to the initial
declaration. and to this end. it is necessary that the second party should have received
the first declaration as envisaged by S 130 BGB.
In such cases. one generally speaks of contracts or agreements. And in view of the
ordinary meanings of these words. unless one wants to take into account the
possibility of contracting with oneself.80 it is logical to style agreements or contracts
as bi- or multilateral juristic acts within the German understanding of that concept.
From the definition of "juristic act" it follows that a contract under German law
requires at least two declarations of will in order that the desired legal changes may be
achieved. Basil Markensis provides an apt parable for the interrelation of the three
basic concepts of the German law of obligations .
..... contracts can be likened to molecules of ... German law. ie the smallest
components of the specific substance which shapes legal relations between
private individuals. But German law .... does not stop at identifying contract
as molecules. Rather than looking at the smallest components of specific
substances. it will look at the elements. ie it will focus on the atoms which
make up the molecules. If contracts are molecules. then legal transactions are
too large not to broken up into smaller pieces . .lust as atoms have a nucleus.
declaration of intentions lie at the centre of legal transactions.Y'
One should therefore always bear in mind that a contract consists of juristic acts and
that all juristic acts have at their core at least one declaration of will. Not every
declaration of will amounts to a juristic act. however. and not all juristic acts are
contracts.
For instance. the man who offers his horse to nobody in particular. declares his will
properly. but does not perform a juristic act. His declaration logically presupposes
:-:1
Which is possible under special circumstances but generally prohibited under ~ 181 BGB.
Markesinis 31 (he uses the term legal transaction instead of juristic act).
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receipt by somebody and because it does not fulfil the requirements of ~ 130 BGB. it
does not become effective. The testator. on the other hand. who declares his last will
in the appropriate way. performs a juristic act but one which is not a contract. and
which does not have to be received by anybody in order to become effective.
2.2.2 Contracts under the BGB
The question now is whether or not the BGB itself provides a proper definition for the
concept "contract". Not surprisingly. we do not find in the code a formal definition of
what a contract is.
The BGB contains rules regarding "offer" and "acceptance" as constituent elements
of a contract. and uses the word "contract" (Ver/rag) quite often. but does not supply
a formal explanation of the concept. The meaning of the concept has to be inferred
from the technical rules of the Code.
The third title of Section 3 of the BGB bears the heading "Contracts". X2 and it might
therefore be helpful to start with its first article."
Paragraph 145 BGB does not define the term "contract". but presumes an
understanding of what it is. There is in fact no article in the entire BGB that brings
any greater clarity regarding the definition of contract. The creators of the BGB
simply wove their understanding of contract into the framework of the code. A
perusal of the articles of the third title of section 3 yields an understanding of what a
contract is under German law and of its main prerequisites. A generally accepted
view is that a contract under German law consists of an agreement between parties
who wish to bring about certain legal consequences. In order for this to happen. one
of the parties must indicate his intention to enter into a binding arrangement with
another under certain preconditions. and that person must indicate assent to this
proposal.
R.1
See above: 2.1.4.
~145BGB.
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A contract thus involves corresponding declarations of wi II articulated by the would-
be contracting parties. and is designed to engage them in a legal bond_R.j Needless to
say. a contract will only be created if the preconditions for a juristic act and a
declaration of will are fulfilled.
2.2.2.1 Requirements of an offer
Under German law an offer must be precise and complete as to the essential elements
of the proposed contract: the detail regarding agreement on incidental terms may be
R"ileft open. -
Although offers nowadays often consist of many pages. the basic criterion as to
whether an offer exists or not. is whether the recipient can establish the essentials of
agreement by a simple affirmative response.Ï"
A more extended definition is that the offer must render the content of the proposed
contract sufficiently certain or at least capable of ascertainrnent.Y The requirement
that the offer be "sufficiently specific" implies as well that one should be able to
discern to whom the offer is addressed.
2.2.2.1.1 Offer ad incertas personas
Despite the requirement of certainty. German law recognizes an offer made to
indeterm inate persons. for instance offers made by way of vending machines.
Acceptance in such a case does not require that the offeror be notified. but should
nevertheless qualify as an act of intent under ~ 151 BGB.xX Although the article deals
with the acceptance of an offer. and not. strictly speaking. with the offer itself many
academic writers assume that ~ 151 BGB recognizes an offer ad incertas personas.
Medicus 33: Larenz 515 51ó: Brox 48-89: .lauemig-Schlechtriern-Sturner 94.
Larenz 5 17 518: Brax 8990.
HUbner 40 I .
Jauernig-Schlechuiern-Sturner 98: Brox. 89: Palandt BUrgeri iches Gesetzbuch 134.
~15IBGB.88
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The courts also assume that there is no need to address the offer to determinate
persons where business customs render this unnecessary."
2.2.2.1.2 Invitatio ad offerendum
Case law and academic opinion are also at one in treating newspaper advertisements.
prospectuses. merchandise catalogues and displays in shop windows as mere
invitations to treat (invitatio ad offerendumi and not as offers. Underlying this
sensible conclusion is the consideration that the intention to engage in a particular
juristic act tGeschafiswillei is absent in such cases. A contrary intention would
expose the declarant to the risk that an indeterminate number of persons might. by
mere acceptance. establ ish contracts irrespective of the declarant" s capacity to
perform them. The person to whom the so-called invitatio ad offerendum is addressed
is therefore required to make the offer with a view to its acceptance by the initial
declarant.
Whether this situation differs from the case of the vending machine is debatable.
Arguably. someone who sets up a cigarette-vending machine would also be unwilling
to place the limited number of cigarette boxes on offer to everybody who might come
along. since the number of potential buyers is likely to exceed the supply of boxes in
the machine.
As in the case of invitatio ad offerendum. the intention to supply an indeterminate
numbers of customers with goods must generally be assumed to be absent. It
therefore seems to me more acceptable to resolve the problem of offers ad incertas
personas by means of the notion of an invitatio ad offerendum. so that the insertion of
coins into the cigarette machine would constitute an offer by means of conduct. The
response whereby the seller supplies the customer constitutes acceptance under ~ 15 I
BGB.
8<> Munchener Kommemar zurn BGB A llgerneiner Teil 1270-1272.
37
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.2.2.1.3 The duration of the offer
The BGB regulates the period for which the offer remains open for acceptance in
some detail. An offer is a declaration of will that must be received by another party.
Paragraph 130 BGB90 stipulates precisely that an offer. if not made in the presence of
the offeree. becomes effective as such only when received by the other party.
Offers made in the physical presence of the offeree or to persons with whom the
offeror is in immediate contact. ie by telephone. must be accepted immediately." The
BGB rules that an offer lapses not only if it is rejected." but also if it is not accepted
in a timely fashion."
An offer made to an absent person can only be accepted up to the point in time at
which the offeror might expect the arrival of the answer in usual circumstances."
What amounts to a reasonable time for the purposes of ~ 147 (2) BGB has been
considered by German courts. but need not be discussed here.
2.2.2.1.4 The irrevocability of the offer
As is apparent from the first sentence of ~ 145 BGB.9:' an offer once made is
irrevocable. The offeror is bound by his declaration until the offeree rejects the offer.
or unti I the elapsement of the period fixed for acceptance or of a reasonable period.
This approach poses inherent risks for the offeror. For example. a salesman who
offers a product to a client for E 2000.00 and who subsequently realises that he has
not taken value-added tax into account faces the prospect that the client might insist
on accepting the offer of E 2000,00.
'If)
~ 130 BGB.
<Jl ~ 147 BGB.
'c ~ 146 BGB.
93 ~ 148 BGB.
~ 149 BGB.,,~
~147BGB.
lj';
~ 145 BGB.
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Although. according to ~ 130 BGB.96 an offer will be rendered ineffective if a
revocation reaches the offeree before or at the same time as the offer. this safeguard is
of limited practical relevance because its application is a matter of timing and
dependent on circumstances which cannot be influenced by the offeror. The second
half-sentence of ~ 145 BGB therefore provides the means of avoiding the binding
effect of an offer. It allows that a resort to qualifications such as "offer subject to
change" or "revocable offer". excludes the binding effect of an offer. Whether such
"qualified" offers are real offers is a moot point. The case law of the Reiensgericht
treated them as non-offers (invitatio ad offerendumi. but nowadays there is a tendency
to treat such declarations as real offers. capable of acceptance. in view of the
principles of good faith of § 242 BGB.
In the final analysis. therefore. it is safer to say that the precise effect on the
declaration of such qualifying statements depends on the facts of each case. Such an
approach does. of course. however. result in elaborate distinctions and considerable
uncertai nty.
2.2.2.2 Acceptance
As a matter of logic. a contract requires at least one other declaration of will in
addition to. and corresponding to the offer. This second declaration of wi II is the
acceptance of the offer. In order to be effective. an acceptance must be free and
unreserved. must correspond to the declared will of the offeror and have been
communicated to him.
2.2.2.2.1 The acceptance must be free
The principle of freedom of contract recognised under German law implies that there
is no obligation to accept an offer. Modern conditions have. however. necessitated a
number of exceptions where there is a duty to contract. Apart from ~ 149 BGB.97
'16 See above: 2.:2.2.1.3.
See belo\~: 2.2.2.2.3.
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Such interference with the notion of freedom of contract remains controversial.Ï" but
certain entities. such as publ ic utilities that provide electricity. gas and rai I services.
d b d . 98are uty oun to enter II1to contracts.
irrespective of whether it is justified with reference to considerations of public law or
the BGB itself 100 it is widely regarded as lawful and compatible with the German
legal system.
2.2.2.2.2 Communication of the acceptance
An acceptance is as much a declaration of wi II as an offer and is therefore also subject
to the prerequisites in this regard. More particularly. an acceptance has to be received
by the otferor or his representative in order to be legally effective as a declaration of
will.
Because ~ 145 BGB makes an offer generally irrevocable. the offeror is entitled to
know whether his offer has been accepted or not. The provisions of ~ 130 BGB are
therefore applicable to both offers and acceptances. There are exceptions to this
general rule. however. Apart from ~ 151 BGB. which states that in certain
circumstances a communication of the acceptance is unnecessary. it also is dispensed
with where a contract is notarially authenticated without both parties being present at
the same time.!'"
2.2.2.2.3 Belated or conditional acceptance
A further important aspect is that of belated or conditional acceptance. Paragraph 146
BGB states that an offer lapses if not accepted within a reasonable time. The issue of
belated acceptance is. however. the subject of a special provision. According to ~ 149
BGB. if a declaration of acceptance that reaches the offeror late has been sent in such
See above: 2. I .3.
q" Jauernig-Schlechtriern-Sturner 96: Milnehener Kommernar ZUITI BCjB Allgerneiner Tei I 1226-
1227 1270: Palandt Burgertiches Gesetzbuch 131.
lOU MUnchener Kornentar zum BGB Allgerneiner Teil 1227 122R.
1(11 ~ 152 BGB.
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a way that it should have reached him punctually on regular dispatch. and if the
offeror must have realised this. he should notify the acceptor of the delay immediately
after receipt of the declaration. insofar as this has not already happened. If he delays
the dispatch of the notification. the acceptance is not regarded as belated.
In contrast to the general principle that silence cannot attract legal consequences.l'" a
failure to "speak" might. thus, complete ajuristic act in certain circumstances.
In terms of ~ 150 BGB. an acceptance made belatedly or punctually but conditionally
with additions .. limitations or other alterations. is treated as a rejection of the offer and
amounting to a counter-offer.
Because the phenomenon of the conditional acceptance (~ 150 (2) BGB) brings about
uncertainty as to whether there is assent to the offer or a rejection thereof. it often
raises the problem of disagreement.
2.2.2.3 Disagreement in the formation of contract
Because a contract is constituted by agreement between the parties. difficulties arise
where the existence of a contract is disputed on the grounds that. in spite of apparently
concurring declarations of will. agreement has not been reached.
A distinction needs to be made between the case where parties are aware of the fact
that. despite an exchange of offer and acceptance. agreement has not been reached.
and the case where they are unaware of this. In the first case. it is doubtful whether
there is a contract. The parties after all. know that they have not reached agreement.
In the second case. where the parties assume that there is a contract between them but
realize afterwards that they failed to agree. the position is more complicated.
2.2.2.3.1 Open lack of agreement (o.lfener Dissens)
Open lack of agreement exists where. to the knowledge of the parties. they are not
completely in agreement. The juristic consequences of this state of affairs depend on
Ilic See above: 2.2.1.1.3.2.
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whether and to what extent any agreement has been reached. If the lack of agreement
concerns aspects fundamental to the intended contract tessentialia ne~otii). the contract
fails ah initio: if it relates to peripheral issues (accidentalia negotiis. it takes legal effect.
The points deemed fundamental depend. amongst other criteria. on the type of
transaction. The price of an article. for example. is always a fundamental point in a
contract of sale.l'" This may appear to contradict rules laid down in ~ I 19 (2) BGB.
relating to mistakes. which will be described below. under that heading.
Paragraph 154 BGB is in the mam a rule of interpretation. which allows the German
judge to construe the conduct of the parties in the special circumstances regarding the
question of whether a contract has been reached or not. I 11-) There are also other rules that
are relevant to the issue of whether the terms disagreed upon are essential. Apart from ~
133 BGB. which was discussed above.l'" §~ 157 and 242 BGB may also come into
play. Paragraph 155 BGB is also of importance in delineating when a state of affairs
may exclude a contract. In an oblique way. it establishes the essentials of an agreement.
2.2.2.3.2 Hidden lack of agreement (versteekter Dissensy
According to ~ 155 BGB. although the parties to what is regarded by them as a
concluded contract have in fact not agreed on a point on which agreement is required.
such agreement will be valid to the extent that it can be assumed that the contract
would have been concluded even without agreement on this point.
This rule deals with with the case where there is a lack of agreement or ambiguity of
which the parties are unaware. If the declarations are unclear. for instance. and open
to different interpretations. there is obviously no agreement and no contract.
Paragraph 155 BGB maintains the contract to the extent that the disagreement relates
to non-essential terms. but only if the parties would have gone ahead even if they had
42
I n~ ~ 154 BGB: Bro.\ 122: Larenz 527-528: Milnehener Kommernar zum BGB Allgemeiner Teil 1304.
I(J~ MUnchener Kornmeniar zurn BGB Allgemeiner Tei I 1303.
I(l~ See above: 2.2.1.1.3.3.
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been aware that the particular matter had not been agreed upon. If the lack of
i:: d I here i IOhagreement concerns Iun amenta terms. t ere IS no contract.
If. however. the declarations are on the face of things clear and unambiguous. but the
parties entertain different notions as to what they wanted and meant. there is a
contract. but the question of mistake comes to the fore.
2.2.2.4 Paragraph 157 BGB and its relationship to paragraph 133 BGB
Paragraph 157 BG B 11J7 forms part of the section of the code deal ing with contracts and
therefore applies only to them. The emphasis therein on objective standards appears
to be in conflict with ~ 133 BGB. which adopts a subjective focus.
An important case regarding the matter of hidden dissent and the interpretation of
contracts is the famous Haakjoringskod case. Here both parties were in complete
agreement that the contract was for the purchase of "meat". At all relevant times.
both parties used the Norwegian term for shark meat tHaakioringskodï. whereas in
fact both intended to contract for whale meat.
According to ~ 155 BGB. there was no contract: the kind of meat is undoubtedly an
essential aspect of such a contract. On the application of the objective standards of ~
157 BGB. therefore. one might conclude that the contract was for shark meat.
The court. however. held that in terms of ~ 133 BGB. effect had to be given to the
actual intention of the parties. Thus it was held that there was a contract for the
purchase of whale meat. 108
2.2.2.5 Paragraph 242 BGB - good faith and business custom
Paragraph 242 BGB. which requires performance to be effected according to the
requirements of good faith and business custom. plays an enormous role regarding the
1(1" Jauemig-Schtechuiem-Sturner 105 106: Brox 123: Mi.inchener Kornmentar zurn B(iF3
Allgerneiner Teil 1314: Foster 242.
1(17 ~ 1578GB.
1(18 RG1.99.147(14R}.
43
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
interpretation of legal acts. Although not contained in the general part of the BGB.
but in the second book (law of obligations). it has found general application
throughout the German civil law.l'" so that its application is not limited to the law of
contractual obligations but extends to legal acts generally.'!"
As has been already indicated. it is one of the key provisions used to develop private
law in response to the demands of changing economic and social circumstances.
The overview of the concept "juristic act" has shown that it requires a declaration of
will in respect of its required elements by a legally competent person. If these
prerequisites are met. § 133 BGB requires it to be construed in the light of the actual
intention of the legal subject. Thereafter. it has to be established whether the
declaration satisfies the standards set by ~ 134 BGB and ~ 138 BGB. An affirmative
answer yields the conclusion that the declaration takes effect as a legal act. In spite of
this. the wide formulation of ~ 242 BGB may nevertheless render the legal act
unenforceable.
In view of the restricted focus of this thesis. three examples of the resort to ~ 242 by
the German Courts will suffice to illustrate its significance.
In RGZ 161. 330 .. 338. a vendor who charged a very high price for a plot of land
because of its exceptional view was prevented from building on an adjacent plot
which he owned. because it would destroy the view from the first plot. This
conclusion was reached in spite of the absence in the contract ofa term or duty to this
effect.
1(lq Munchener Kommemar zurn BUrgerIichen Gesetzbuch Allgemeines Schuldrecht 9596: .lauernig
-Schlechtriem-Sturner 162 163: Palandt Burgertiches Gesetzbuch 207208.
110 Jauernig-Schlechtriern-Stumer 163: Ennann I. Band. 47R: Palandt Burgerfiches Gesetzhuch
208.
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In RGZ 107. 78. in 1923. the Reichsgericht revalued mortgage repayments to reflect
the true value of the property rather than allow them be paid in inflated and almost
worthless marks.
The question of good faith was also considered 111 a 1991 judgment of the BGH.111
Here the court abolished the necessity of the so-called Rechtsbindungswille. ie an
intention to be legally bound. as a requirement of a declaration of will. A principal
basis for this conclusion was found in ~ 242 BGB and the principle of good faith and
business custom.ll~ In this case the plaintiff had demanded a guarantee ofhis debtor.
The debtor s bank wrote to the applicant. stating that it would guarantee the debt. The
defendant bank later wrote to the plaintiff. stating that it had not intended to guarantee
the debt. the correspondence in question being sent in error. The plaintiff sued for
payment of the debt on the basis of the original guarantee. The BGH allowed the
claim. on the basis that the freedom granted by the BGB in relation to declarations of
intention implies an obligation on the part of the declarer. who must carry the
"Erklarungsrisiko" (or the declaration risk). Any behaviour amounting to the creation
of a legal right on the part of the recipient will be considered a declaration of will on
the part of the declarer. irrespective of whether the latter had consciously intended it
as such.
The courts ruling in this case makes it quite clear that. in cases where the declarer
should reasonably have perceived that his statement might be regarded as a
declararion of will. and where the recipient in fact understands it as such. it will be
held binding.
Paragraph 242 BGB. then. is an equitable principle. with wide-ranging implications.
which in fact affect all areas covered by the BGB.
III See above: 2.2.1.1.3.1.
112 BGH7 91.324: 109. 177.
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2.2.3 The factual contract
Although German contract law is based on the principle of consensus. sight should
not be lost of a leading decision of the BGH regarding the so-called factual
contract.113 This particular case is an illustration of the application of ~ 151 BGB. but
it also concerns a wider issue. namely whether a contract can be created by factual
conduct independently of the actual intention of one of the parties (in cases where
there is never any doubt as to the intention of the declarer).
The BGH acknowledged that a contract. and thus contractual liability. can be brought
about even though one party is explicitly unwilling to enter into a legal relationship.
A brief overview will indicate how the court came to its decision.
During the period from 3 September to 12 October 1953 the defendant parked her
motor vehicle several times in the City Hall Market car park. This was a supervised
car-park. the use of which required a fee. The defendant refused to pay the fee. and
made it clear to the attendant from the outset that she did not wish to enter into any
contract. She explained that this was a public car-park. for which she believed she
had no obligation to pay. Thus despite objections and demands for payment on the
part of the management the defendant continued to park without paying.
The courts were precluded from finding a contract based on conduct (ie based on an
implicit declaration of intention). since the defendant had made it clear from the
outset that no such intention existed. The BGH finally found the defendant liable for
payment on the basis of contractual obligation. finding that a factual contract existed.
Despite the fact that the plaintiffs case was based only on the unlawful enrichment of
the defendant. or on a tort committed by her. the court did not consider itself
prohibited from considering whether. in this case. the legal relationship of the parties
might be regarded as being of a contractual nature. despite the absence of legally
effective declarations (§ 151 of the BGB).
11.1 BGHZ 21. 31C).
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The court made reference to its agreement with the views of academics Haupt!" and
Tasche11:i that a contract may be concluded by factual conduct even when the
intention to be legally bound is lacking. This was found relevant in this case. which
occurred in the context of "the realities of life in present day mass transport." In this
context. the use of parking areas conspicuously designated as such. and requiring a
tariff. brings the user into a contractual legal relationsh ip. irrespective of that person s
verbally expressed intention or attitude.
It has been noted that "this contentious case has had almost no consequencesi+'" The
controversial decision has, thankfully. not lead to influential decisions in other. related
cases.
2.3 Defects of Consent: Mistake
2.3.1 Introduction
Before this topic can be dealt with. it is necessary to define the concept mistake. The
considerations introduced in the introduction make it clear that the intention to modify
ones legal relationship to other people may develop through several stages before the
inner intention is manifested in an objective way.
During this process the person in question will. as a rule. be in contact and in
communication with the outside world, on the one hand in order to gather information
relevant for com ing to a decision; and also to express intentions and opinions to
others. Both of these processes of communication can lead to discrepancies between
the expectations on the part of one or more parties and reality. and this. of course.
affects the will as well. All these situations may be subsumed under the notion of
mistake or defective will.
114 ··()ber faktische vertragsverhaltnisse" Festschrift der Leipzigerjuristischen Fakuitat mr Silber
Band II S I.
115 "Vertragsverhaltnis nach nichtigern Vertragsschluê" in .lherb Bd 90. lOl (128).
Ilr, Medicus 132.
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8 wants to buy a golden ring for his fianceé. in order to impress her. He
assumes that she enjoys wearing jewellery. He plans to spend E 500,00 at
most. At the jewellery shop the shopkeeper shows him a ring, which 8 takes
to be made of gold. 8 states: "1 want to buy this golden ring for E 500,00".
The shopkeeper assents to this declaration.
The discussion that follows will treat situations involving defects of will or mistake
which arise directly from the behaviour of the parties. In contrast to instances of
unethical or immoral behaviour and the issues of formality and capacity. which might
also lead to a transaction being legally defective as a result of legal rules. the topic of
mistake relates to the conduct and expectations of the legal subjects involved in a
transaction. This section of this study will accordingly be restricted to a discussion of
such situations and their juristic treatment.
It should be noted that the terms mistake and defective will are not mutually
exclusive. and indeed they go hand in hand. Ultimately they describe a situation
where there is a discrepancy between the real (objective) facts of "I ife' tSachverhain
and the perceptions thereof of the parties involved.
Case I:
In the ideal case. the development from the initial motive to the final declaration IS
free form defects. but mistakes may readily occur at different stages during this
development.
2.3.2 The different constellations
The creators of the 8GB sought to distinguish three major groups of cases involving
mistake in the formation of contract.
In the first instance. the declarer's motive might not be in accordance with the actual
circumstances (variation I). The factual basis of the declarer's intention to create or
vary a particular legal relationship is defective in such a case. In the given example. it
might for instance appear that B's girlfriend has in fact fallen in love with another or
has an intense dislike of jewellery. Both of these circumstances would have had an
48
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
impact on B's motives if he had known about them. Another possibility (variation
Ia» is that B' s assumption as to the substance of the ring is unfounded. Both aspects
relate to the relationship of his will to external circumstances. whether material or
subjective.
A second variation might be that the declarer did not in fact intend a particular legal
consequence at all. He might. for instance. declare what he wants to declare, but
without intending that his declaration should lead to legal consequences. In such a
case the declarant wilfully brings about a discrepancy between his declaration and its
apparent outward meaning and actual intention. B might. for instance. declare in the
presence of his girlfriend that he wants to buy the ring for E 500.00 merely to impress
her without any intention of buying the ring at all.
The third and final variation refers to the possibility of mistake during the act of
declaration. ie in the expression of the will. so that the subjective intention to engage
in a particular juristic act tGeschaftswillev+' deviates from the declaration which is
made: B. intends to say "I want to buy the ring for E 500.00 .. but in fact says "I want
to buy the ring for E 5000.00". In such a case the mistake relates to the
communication or expression of the will.
The decisive issue in all of these cases is that the mistaken party (whether offeror or
offeree) is disappointed with the contract. will deny liability and the opposite party
will endeavour to enforce it. The solution of this conflict of interests goes to the heart
ofthe idea of what a contract is.
2.3.2.J The solution adopted in the BGB
As regards the effect of mistake on contract. the draftsmen of the BGB had the choice
between two opposing academic views.
W See above: 2.2.1.1.:;.1.
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because of the lack of an essential component - in this case. B· sintention.
The Willenstheorie on the one hand. holds that the existence of a juristic act IS
decisively determined with reference to the actual intention of the declarant. A
declaration which does not correspond to or reflect the actual intention of the
declarant does not attract legal consequences at all. at least not according to its
tenor. I I R It is quite clear that such an approach favours a party who labours under a
mistake when uttering a declaration. In variation 2 above. the shopkeeper would.
according to this approach. not be entitled to claim the price. Because ofB''s mistake.
his declaration is ineffective as an offer. and therefore no contract is concluded
An opposing view (Erklarungstheonei holds that only the declaration itself ought to
be taken into consideration. and that the actual intention of the declarant is irrelevant.
In variation 3. therefore. B would be obliged to pay € 5000.00 for the ring instead of f
500.00. According to this view. only the recipient of a declaration is protected and
every mistake of a declarant counts against him.
In the case of variation 2. B. of course. would be held to his word. irrespective of his
intention.
In the final analysis the drafters of the BGB did not fully adopt any of these academic
views. They decided instead to frame the provisions of the code in such a way as to
accommodate various categories of mistake. In respect of these categories they
carefully considered the competing interests and whether they merited protection or
not. The BGB accordingly distinguishes between three categories of mistake and
provides three different solutions for them.119
In the first instance. it is clear that certain mistakes regarding declarations of will are
treated as legally irrelevant and as not affecting the val id ity of a dec laration of wi II.
In these cases the Erklarungstheorie is relevant. because the recipient is protected
IIX Brox 16ó.
II" MUnchener Kommemar zum BGB Allgemeiner Teil 874875 87ó: Hrox I óó.
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irrespective of what the declarer really believes or means at the time of his
declaration. I ~()
The Willenstheorie would. of course, yield the opposite result. since only that which
the declarer intended would be of relevance. rather than that which reached the
.. 1:'1recipient.
In a second category are defects of will which entail the substantive invalidity of the
particular declaration of will and thus result in the invalidity of the entire juristic act.
The declaration in such cases is null and void by operation of law without any need
for further action by the declarant. Here one recognizes the idea of the Willenstheorie
b I d . I ')""lecause on y the eclarant IS protected. -_ His declaration of wi II does not bring
about the legal consequences which would have ensued if his declaration had been
valid.1n
In the third class of case. the defect of intention is legally relevant. but the declarant
who utters a declaration by mistake has to take certain steps to eliminate the
consequences of his conduct. The declarant must challenge his own declaration in
order to escape from the obligation established thereby. This category reveals a
combination of Erklarungstheorie and Willenstheorie since the declaration IS III
principle valid. but voidable by the declarant in certain circumstances.
At first sight it might seem unfair to allow the declarant an election to decide whether
he wants to set aside his declaration and by so doing to free himself ofthe obligation.
But as will be shown presently. his right to challenge the declaration is subject to
certain requirements and qualified by the need to protect the other party. This is
1211 Brox 166 167.
121 Palandt 82.
122 Brox 167 168.
1:1 Brox 167.
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achieved by the rule that the declarer is liable to compensate the other party for his
rei iance loss iVertrauensschadenv'Ó'
2.3.3 Defects of consent and their treatment in the BGB
2.3.3. t Defects of motive
As already has been indicated. a mistake of the first category does not influence the
legal effect of the declaration at all, For example. if in variation I. B contends that he
does not have to pay the price for the ring because he made his declaration on the
mistaken assumption that his girlfriend loved him, he will not avoid liability, The
BGB in general does not afford protection against the frustration of personal motives
on ly, Hence B also cannot. in response to the shopkeeper's claim. contend that he
was unaware of the fact that his girlfriend dislikedjewellery.
Such mistakes. which occur during the formation of the intention to undertake a
juristic act (Motivirrtiimer) are legally irrelevant.':"
2.3.3.2 Defects which result in nullity of the juristic act
The second group. which comprises declarations of will that are void. IS
comprehensively regulated in ~~ I 16-1 18 BGB.
Cases of so-called mental reservation (geheimer Vorbehalt) occur when a declarant
does not seriously intend the declaration to be legally effective. and implies this by
h f h . dl' 1'6tetenor 0 t e putative ec aranon. - According to paragraph I 16 BGB a
declaration of will is not invalid merely because the declarant entertains hidden
reservations regarding its efficacy. The declaration is ineffective only when it is made
I ~j Brox 167 168: Munchener Kommemar zUIl18GB A llgerneiner Tei I. g91: Medicus l)~ 107.
1~5 Brox 166 167: l.arenz 370: Medicus 85: Wieser" Der KalkulationsirrturntLv 198ó 577 578.
12" ~ 116 BGB.
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to a third party who knows it to be spurious. In addition. the declarer must assume
that the recipient is aware of his secret reservation. I e7
Paragraph 116 BGB stresses the relevance of the recipient's actual knowledge or
ignorance of the declarer's reservation.l " A recipient who is aware of the declarer's
reservation does not deserve legal protection. and in such a case a declaration does not
entai I legal consequences for the declarant.
Variation 3 can be used as an example. If the shopkeeper was aware that B merely
intended to impress his girlfriend. it would be unfair to claim the price from him. To
do so would. amongst other considerations. flout the principle of ~ 242 BGB.le'! One
should note. however. that this will remain the case even where the declarant wrongly
assumed that the shopkeeper was aware of his intention.
The simulated or sham transaction is a special case. in which both the declarant and
the recipient intend that the declaration shall not to have legal operation according to
its tenor.130 As in the previous example. there is in such a case no need to protect
either of the parties involved.V' The simulated transaction is a false front obscuring
the actually intended legal act. For instance. the sale of a house is agreed for a price
of E 2 000 000.00. but the written and notarised contract indicates a price of E I 000
000.00 in order to save taxes. The effect of ~ I 17 (I) BGB is to render the false
transaction inoperarive.l '' In this example there is of course a real transaction. ie the
contract for E 2 000 000,00. Because of ~ 117 (2) BGB. which subjects the actually
1,7
Brox 170. I f the declarer presumes that the recipient is all are of his mental reservation. ~ I IR
BGB is applicable.
l,S
Brox 170: Jauemig-Schlechtriern-Stumer 55 5ó: Palandt BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch XO.
I:~q Sec above: 2.2.2.5.
1.10 ~ 117 BGB.
131 .Iauernig-Schlechtriem-StUrner 56: Brox I T2 173: MUnchener Kornmentar zum 8(i8
Allgerneiner Teil. R97: Palandt Burgertiches Gesetzbuch 8081.
11, And nOLby ~ I 17 (2) BG B as stated in Foster" s German legal System & Laws 243.
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intended juristic act to the rules applicable to the sham transaction. the former will be
void for lack of compliance with the prescribed formal ities.133
A declaration which is made without a serious intention to be bound is void.
according to ~ 118 BGB.13-l For example ifB tells his friend:" Yes of course. I want
to buy your old rusty bicycle for € 4000.00". his declaration does not constitute a
juristic act. The only requirement for applying ~ 118 BGB is that the declarer should
have been joking and that the circumstances be such that he is entitled to expect that
the lack of sincerity will be obvious to the other party. It does not matter whether the
recipient is in actual fact aware of the lack of sincerity or not.135 Whether B' s friend
thought that he was really keen on buying a rusty bicycle. is irrelevant according to §
118 BGB.
At first sight this might seem unfair. It is conceivable that the recipient might.
without any negligence on his part. have relied on the declaration. In such a case.
however. the BGB provides a special rule in ~ 122 BGB. which will be discussed
hereafter.
Common to all the instances of the second group of defects of wi II is that the
declarant does not have to take further steps to avoid his declaration. This is because
there is no opposing interest of sufficient weight to require that legal recognition be
given to declarations of this kind.
2.3.3.3 Defects which lead to a right of rescission
The juristic mechanism of rescission permits a declarant to rescind his own
declaration of will provide certain requirements are met. A party is thereby permitted
to withdraw from a contract. even as a result ofa unilateral mistake.131l
In Brox 173.
134 ~ IIR BGB.
I" Jauernig-Schlechtriern-Sturner 57: MUnchener Kommernar ZUIll BGB Allgemeincr 'I eil. l)(J).
I~(~ MunchenerKornmentarzurn BGBAllgelneiner"'eil 90890991(): 131'0.'\ 174175.
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With the exception of contracts of extended duration. such as employment or leasing
contracts. the transaction is. as a result of rescission. regarded as void ab initio (ex
lUnc).137 In consequence of the nature of contract as a multi-lateral juristic act. the
contract as a whole becomes ineffective upon the avoidance of only one necessary
part of it.
In other words. if one party to a contract successfully challenges its declaration of
will. relating to either the offer or the acceptance. the transaction as a whole is
avoided because of the lack of an essential component.
The second important point is that the rescission only extends to the obligationary
relationship.
On account of the principle of abstraction. which distinguishes sharply between the
contract as the obligationary act and the act of delivery envisaged by it. the return of
goods del ivered or transferred under the contract is regulated by the law of unjustified
enrichment. UR
2.3.3.3.1 Rescission under paragraphs 119 and 120 BGB
For reasons of legal certainty and with a view to the maintenance of good faith in
legal relationships. rescission according to ~ 119 BGB and ~ 120 BGB as well as
under ~ 123 BGB is restricted to a limited number of grounds. I]') By means of these
provisions. the creators of the BGB sought to balance the interests of the contracting
party who has rei ied on a declaration and the interests of the declarant who might
suffer disproportionately from a mistake in respect thereof. I.!!)
Paragraph I 19 BGB reads as follows:
!q * 1428GB: Brox 188 189: Medicus 92: Milnehener Kommernar zurn BUrgeri ichen Gesetzbuch
AllgemeinerTeil. 1211.
I ~~ ~ Il 12 BGB: MUnchener Kommentar zum BGB A llgerneiner Tei 1 121o. .lauernig-Schlechtriern-
StUrner 1IJ3I.
I~q l.arenz. 476-478: Westermann "Einheit und VielfaIt in der lrrtumslehre .lllS 169 17().
1-10 M unchener Kornrncntar zum 8GB A Ilgemei nel' 'le: I 908-910: Brox 176: Singer
"Geltungsbereich LindRechtstolgen der fehlerhalten Wi llenserklarungen" .iZ 19119.1030 1032.
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~ 119 BGB ( Rescission due to mistake)
I) A person who. when making a declaration of wi II. is in error as to
its content, or did not intend to make a declaration of such content
at all. may rescind the declaration if it may be assumed that he
would not have made it with knowledge of the facts and with
reasonable appreciation of the situation.
2) An error as to the content of the declaration is regarded in the
same way as an error as to those characteristics of a person or
thing which are regarded in business as essential.
For purposes of rescission. the BGB differentiates between mistakes as to the
meaning or content of the declaration tInhahsirnumï and mistakes as to the actual
declaration (Erklarungsirrlum). a distinction which is often difficult to draw in
practice.
2.3.3.3.1.1 Mistake as to content
Such mistakes occur when the declarant has one thing in mind and thinks that he has
accurately expressed himself. but is understood in a different sense by the recipient.
In other words. this relates to ignorance on the part of the declarant regarding the
actual content of the declaration.
If a shopkeeper. for example. places a price-tag for E 100.00 on a coffee machine
(which amounts to an invitatio ad offerendum under German law). but the price the
shopkeeper actually had in mind was E 200.00 and a customer offers to buy the coffee
machine according to the price-tag (without mentioning the price). the shopkeeper
who agrees to this offer assuming that the price-tag says E 200.00 is mistaken about
the meaning of his acceptance. He is ignorant of the fact that the price tag is for E
100,00 and not E 200.00. and this mistake in fact causes his declaration. He assumes
that he is assenting to a offer for E 200.00.
Errors (or mistakes) of content include those relating to identity. calculation and also
mistakes of law.I.!1 Calculation mistakes are those where the error IS 111 the
calculations which precede the declararion of will. Although the fault lies in the
1.11 This at least was the view of the Reichsgericht - see Jauernig-Schlechuiern-Sturner 5'1.
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formation of the will. the courts view such problems subjectively from the receiver's
point of view. Should the recipient be expected to have recognised the mistake. and
should the rescission involve hardship on the part of the declarer. the courts will allow
the contract to be rescinded.l " This jurisdiction is an exception to the principle that
mistake in the formation of the will does not constitute a ground for rescission and is
derived from the dictates of good faith.I~3
Mistakes as to law. eg as regards the legal ity or legal consequences of a transaction.
do not extend to mere ignorance as to the true state of the law. which would not give
rise to a ground for rescission according to ~ I 19 ( I ) BGB.
With regard to mistakes as to law issuing from the declarant. the German law
distinguishes between irrelevant and relevant mistakes. the latter rendering the
declaration of will void:
If the legal consequence of which the declarant is unaware is not related to the
declaration of will per se there is no discrepancy between will and the declaration of
will. For example: where V sells his car to P. there being no provision in the contract
regarding the Iiabi Iity of the vendor for material defects (th is following from statute).
it will be irrelevant whether V considers himself not to be liable for material defects
as a result of provisions in that regard not being made in the contract. I~~
On the other hand. when the legal consequence in question concerns the explicit
content of the declaration of will. there is a discrepancy between the declarants will
and his declaration. Should the contract for the sale of a vehicle. described above.
contain. for example. a provision limiting the liability of the vendor with regard to
legal mistake. the vendor believing this to free him from liability for material defects.
I", RGZ 64. 266 tt: Medicus.88: Brox 183.
I"' Giesen "Lur Relevanz des Kalkulationsirrtums .IR 1971. 403: Wieser. "Der Kal kulauonsirrtum
N.lW 1972. 708.
I"" Palandt 87.
57
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
then he will be held to be in error regarding the content of his declaration. which will
allow him to rescind his declaration.Y"
Mistakes of identity concern a declaration regarding a person or thing other than the
one intended. But one has to bear in mind that if both parties attach the same
erroneous meaning to an expression. term or description used by them. the contract
will stand on the basis of the intended rather than the expressed meaning. The
Haakjoringskod-ceser'" is a typical application of the rule fa/sa demonstratio non
nocet .
2.3.3.3.1.2 Mistake in the declaration of the will
Paragraph I 19 ( I) BGB permits the rescission of a declaration of wi II where a mistake
in the declaration brings about a result different from that intended. Cases of
misspelled words provide typical examples. and Variation 31-l7 would be a typical
instance.
Because cases of both Erklarungsirrtum and Inhaltsirrtum fall under ~ I 19 ( I) BGB.
it is unnecessary to determine the exact character of a mistake in a particular case
since the results will always be identical.l-lX
2.3.3.3.1.3 Paragraph 119 (2) BGB
The place of ~ I 19 (2) in the systematic scheme of the BGB and its precise meaning is
still a topic of academic discussion. I.)') The prevailing view is that it constitutes an
exception to the general principle that mistakes in motive are legally irrelevant. 1511
Mistake as to an essential characteristic under ~ 119 (2) BGB concerns the properties
or qualities. ie the essential characteristics of an object or a person. the subject-matter
I~' Palandt 87 88.
1411 See above: 2.2.2.4.
I~-
See above: 2.3.2.
I~~ Brox 178.
I JL) 1\11 unchener Kornrnentar zUIl18GB Allgemei ncr rei I lJ45-95 7: Palandt BUrgeri iches Gesetzbuch
8485.
lSI) Jauernig-Schlechtriem-Stumer 59: Medicus 90.
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of or party to an agreement. The notion of a characteristic is extremely wide. but it
has to amount to an implied condition of the contract or constitute the fundamental
basis of the agreement. A characteristic is essential if it is of objective importance to
the contract. and it must relate to either the object of a purchase or to a person
involved in it.ISI
In addition to the natural composition of the material subject-matter of the contract.
essential characteristics include the factual or legal standing of the subject-matter of
or party to the agreement. where this is relevant to the agreement. in that it affects the
valuation or usefulness of the subject-matter.i+ Such relationships must be essential
to. characterise or identify the subject-matter or person.l " In relation to the material
subject-matter. ~ I 19 (2) BGB makes it clear that not all characteristics are
essential. IS.) Where the contract itself does not provide points of reference in this
regard. the circumstances of each transaction must be examined.':"
With reference to this definition. the courts have concluded that the essential
characteristics of the subject-matter of or party to an agreement include only those
factual and legal qualities that specifically characterise it. thereby excluding attributes
which only indirectly effect its value. 15h
It remains the case that in general mistakes regarding external factors. eg mistakes of
motive. are irrelevant and cannot lead to rescission. I 57 Hence the fact that the non-
occurence of a wedding for which one has bought a present would not provide
sufficient ground for rescinding the purchase.':" Neither will mistakes merely as to
Ijl Brox ISO.
15: BGH 34.32.41
\53 RG 149.238: BGH 16.5457. BGH 70.47
I)" BGH 88. 240
Ij5 Palandt Xl)
15(1 BGHZ 16.54.57: Brox. 181: Jauernig-Schlechtriern-Sturner 59.
!); See above: 2.3.3.1.
15x Brox 166. where a similar example is provided.
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the value or the price of a thing lead to rescission'i" unless they relate to an essential
I· f h hi I flOqua tty 0 tet Ing.
It should be noted that the criteria of aceidemalia negotii as opposed to esseruialia
negotii. described above in relation to open lack of agreement.'?' have a different
significance in the context of the price of a thing. Paragraph 154 BGB deals with
cases in which the parties have not reached agreement with regard to the price to be
paid. Paragraph I 19 (2) BGB. on the other hand. deals with the question of whether a
particular party has erred with regard to a particular criterion - often the particular
error of entertaining a false expectation regarding the price. for example. This
constellation is to be separated from the applicability of ~ 154 BGB.
Authenticity. for example of a painting. is regarded as an essential quality. but never
the mere price of the object. When a person buys a painting under the mistaken belief
that it is worth E 500 000.00. but it has a market value of only E 50 000.00. his
mistake is not of the least significance. He cannot claim to have made a legally
relevant mistake unless the price determination is the result of a mistaken perception
regarding factual or legal qualities of the particular painting, eg that it is authentic or
that it is in good condition. The following are typical examples of essential qualities:
the size or position of a plot of land and the possibility of building structures on it:162
the resistance to light of a particular rnaterial.l'" the age of a second-hand motor
vehiclel6.J or the lack ofa criminal record ofa prospective ernployee.l'"
Mistake as to a characteristic according to ~ 119 (2) BGB is differentiated from
mistake as covered by § 119 (I) BGB. in that will and declaration correspond in the
former case. The declarer makes a mistake. not as to the subject-matter or the content
1)9 BGHZ 16.54.
1(,(1 BGHZ 6. 371.
li>! See above: 2.2.2.3.1.
I(,~ RGl 61. 86.
In, Jaeurnig-Schlechtricm-Sturner 59.
I,d BGHZ 1978. 221.
I(,j But only under limited preconditions - see MLinchener Kommemar zurn BGB Allgerneiner Teil
985986.
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under ~ I 19 (2) BGB is not to be understood as a particular kind of declaration
mistake. but rather as a mistake in motive which. as an exception to the general rule.
is legally relevant.
of the declaration. but rather as to the characteristics of the subject-matter. and
therefore as to a material fact that lies outside of the declaration.l'" Thus mistake
It is worth noting that mistakes in calculation are not covered by ~ 119 (2) BGB. since
a mistake in calculation is not a mistake as to characteristics - but rather at most a
signifier of the fact that the method of calculation was faulty. Again. mistake as to
characteristic must be essential; and will only be considered essential if by reason of
explicit or implied agreement. it is of fundamental importance to the transaction.
Whether a particular characteristic is essential and a mistake pertaining to it a legally
relevant one. depends in the final analysis on the circumstances of each case and the
type of contract concluded by the parties.i'" A rigidly dogmatic approach does not
seem appropriate. I (lX The example of the previous convictions of an employee
illustrates the fact that results might differ depending on whether the matter concerns
a refuse collector or an accountant.
In instance 1 (variation la».169 therefore. there would be a ground for reserssion
according to ~ 1 19 (2) BGB if the ring was not made of gold. since a contract to buy
such a ring impi ies that it should be golden. even if the ring turns out have been made
from a more expensive metal such platinum.
Paragraph 1 19 (2) BGB does deviate. therefore. from the principle that mistakes in the
formation of the will to engage in a juristic act are of no legal consequence.l" but
finds application only under limited preconditions.
166 Sigt OLGz S3. 304.
11,7 MUnchener Kommentar zurn BGB Allgemeiner Teil 957.
j('\X .Iauernig-Schlechtriem-Sti.irner 59: Palandt Burgerfiches Gesetzbuch X4.
!(1<) See above: 2.3.1.
17(1 Medicus g5 8ó: .lauemig-Schlechtriem-Sturner 59.
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Paragraph 120 BGB covers mistakes in communication. which may occur during the
transrn ission of the declaration. and relates to things incorrectly said or written. A
typical case is where an assistant. or employee or other third party mistakenly hears or
writes something which is thereupon conveyed to the other party. as if it were a
correct reflection of the wi II of the declarant.
2.3.3.3.2 The declaration of rescission
Rescission requires an Arfechtungserklarung. Under ~ 143 BGB. the declaration of
rescission must indicate the intention to do so clearly to the other party. The formal
composition of this document is not significant. the only demand being that it should
contain a clear and explicit declaration of the will to rescind.171 Paragraph 142 BGB
makes it clear that as a result of rescission. the contract is avoided.
2.3.3.3.2.1 The declaration of rescission in cases of paragraphs 119 and 1208GB
With a view to legal certainty. the declaration of rescission is subjected to time
limitations. These are laid down by § 121 BGB and § 124 BGB. the latter provision
being inapplicable to cases governed by ~ I 19 BGB and ~ 120 BGB.
Rescission brings about legal consequences for the opposing party and is therefore
itselfa declaration of will according to ~ 130 BGB.17~ In order to prevent a reliance
by the affected party on the initial declaration. it is essential that he be informed about
the changed legal position.l:' Rescission therefore becomes effective only upon the
fulfilment of the requirements of § 130 BGB. A party who wants to rescind is obliged
to do so as soon as he becomes aware of the rnistake.l " but the particular
circumstances of each situation wi II be taken into account. it being recognised that a
party is entitled to a period for reflection and legal advice.l:'
171 BGH.lR 1984.312 323.
17, Milnehener Kommenter zum BGB Allgerneiner Teil 1213.
17' 131'0.\. I X7: Miinchener Kommemar zum BGB Allgerneiner Tei I 1213 1214.
17J * 1218GB: Jauernig-Schlechtriern-Sturner 61: Milnehener Kommernar zum B(iS Allgerneiner
Teil 970971.
17) 131'0:\ I 1l7: Munchener Kornrnentar zum BGB Allgerneiner Teil 971 '172.
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Paragraph 121 (1) sentence 2 BGB lays down a special rule. A delay in the receipt of
the declaration of rescission wi II negatively affect the declarer if the delay is
imputable to fault on his part. i7(, Hence the risk of delay is basically on the side of the
opposing party. Paragraph 121 BGB. however. applies only in cases governed by §§
119.120 BGB.
2.3.3.3.3 Deception and threats
Apart from mistake. German law provides an additional basis for challenging a
declaration of will in circumstances going beyond those covered by §§ 119.120 BGB.
This concerns the special case where the declarer is manipulated into making a
declaration of will. so that the mistake is in the final analysis caused by someone else
and is not really the responsibility of the declarer at all. In view of their special
circumstances. such situations receive a differentiated treatment.
In the case of deceit. the situation is characterised as a Morivirnum which is legally
relevant. not merely because of the potential prejudice to the victim. but also on
account of the BGB's concern for the protection of the freedom of the will.177 In the
case of threats. on the other hand. the situation should more properly be characterised
as a manipulation of the will of the declarer. and is thus also protected under the
principle of the freedom of will.
2.3.3.3.3.1 Deceit
Deceit entails the creation of a false impression or mistake in the mind of a declarant.
Deceit may take an active form, as where the victim is suppl ied with false facts. but it
may also occur by omission. eg by way of a suppression of the truth. where a party is
legally obliged to inform the other of certain facts.17X
1-" Milnehener Kommernar zum BGB Allgemeiner Teil 977...
177 Jauernig-Schlcchuicm-Stumer A2: Brox 194: Munchener Kornrnentar zurn B( IH 1-\ llgemeiner
Tei1979.
178 Brox 194: MUnchener Kornrnentar zurn BGB Allgemeiner leil9R4 9X5: Jaucmig-Schlechtriem-
StUrner 63.
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The employee of a car sales firm. for example. is duty bound to inform a would-be
purchaser about the accident record of a car. This duty is independent of any enquiry
in this regard by the purchaser.l "
In instance Ils(J the shopkeeper would be obliged to inform B that the ring is not made
of gold if it that is not the case. Because B indicated that he wanted to buy a golden
ring. silence on part of the shopkeeper would entail a suppression of the truth about
the real substance of the ring. The principle of good faith of ~ 242 BGB is again
operative and establishes a duty to inform the opposing party.
The extent of a duty to inform. it must be noted. depends very much on the
circumstances of each particular case.l'" There is no general duty to disclose facts
relevant to the decision of the other party. Non-disclosure of facts will only be
considered fraudulent insofar as the facts in question fall into the category of facts
which there is a specific duty to disclose.lx:, Facts which one is duty-bound to
disclose are based on ~ 242 BGB.IR3 and fall into the following categories:
I. Questions posed by the other party. which must be answered fully and
I I R.jcorrect y.
2. Particularly important circumstances: circumstances which would obviously
be of decisive importance to the other party must be revealed. IX:' This applies
above all to circumstances which might hinder the goal of the contract or
endanger it significantly. Thus .. a vendor may not fai I to reveal an essential
defect in the sale object. I R6
390.
17q BGH N.lW 1967. 1222-1224: OLG Bremen DAR 19RO. 373: OLG Frankfurt VersR 19RI. 388-
180 See above: 2.3.1.
IRI BGH N.lW 1967. 1222-1224: OLG Bremen DAR I9RO.373: OI.G Frankfurt VersR 19XI.38R-390.
1 ~~ R(i77.:114.
);-.:~ Palandt 92.
18-1 BCiH 74.383: BGH N.lW 67. 1222.
185 Palandt . 92.
186 BCiH N.IW 90. 975.
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3. Certain relationships of trust create a duty to disclose. For example. in the
case of familial or close personal relationships'" or close business
relationships of trust developed over many years.IRR The basis for the duty to
disclose can lie in the position of the party in a business transaction (his
professional position). for example in the case of a bankerlxI) or an investment
fund rnanager.l'" The duty to disclose exists on the part of these professional
classes insofar as the other party is inexperienced in business. I'll
2.3.3.3.3.2 Duress
Under ~ 123 BGB. duress is defined as a threat of some harm directed at a party. that
threat being within the power of the person making it. The threat has to be unlawful.
and the criteria of unlawfulness require thorough and careful consideration.l'"
Because a threat of violence entails a resort to illegal means to obtain a declaration
from the victim. it always constitutes duress.
Not every threat is unlawful. however.l " If for instance. after weeks of negotiations
concerning a contract. one party breaks off the process and the other party insists on
the conclusion of the contract and extracts the necessary declaration of wi II by a threat
of legal action based on culpa in contrahendo. this will not be unlawful. A legal
subject is. after all. entitled to assert his rights by court action.
The question of whether a threat of criminal prosecution constitutes a threat in the
sense described in ~ 123 BGB raises the issue of proportionality. in this case of the
threat to its aim. The Reichsgericht has decided that the threat to prosecute a spouse
tor bigam/9-l arising during negotiations between spouses as a result of the end of
their marriage does not grant a right of recission to the wronged (bigamous) party.
1~7 BGH N.JW 92. 30().
IRR Palandt 93.
I~q RG III. 233.
1')(1 BGH 80.8084.
I'll BGH 47. 207211.
19, Miinchener Kornrnentar zum BGB Allgerneiner Teil 1000.
I~q Bigamy is 110 longer punishable as an offence.
I'}~ Brox 20 J: MUnchener Kornrnentar zurn 8GB Aligemeiner Teil 999: see BCiH N.l\V 196ó. 2399.
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123 BGB.
insofar as the performance demanded by the person making the threat fulfils certain
conditions. 195
The Bundersarbeitsgericht has decided that the drawing up of a redundancy contract
between parties (employee and employer). effected by the threat of criminal
prosecution (by the employer who wanted to get rid of his employee). will be held
val id. if a reasonable employer. with full knowledge of the circumstances would have
considered a criminal prosecution as against the employee. IY6
Thus. the threat of criminal prosecution per se does not fall within the compass of ~
2.3.3.3.3.3 Causality
The conduct of the person who resorts to threats or deceit in order to obtain consent to
contract is relevant only if it is the cause of the declaration made by the victim. If a
declarant does not take the threat seriously. or sees through the deceit. he is not
entitled to challenge his declaration subsequently. In such a case. his mind was not
manipulated by the other at all. and his declaration not defective in a legal sense.ILJ7
2.3.3.3.3.4 Intentional acts
The person who resorts to duress or deceit must have acted intentionally. The
perpetrator should intend the victim to make a declaration which he would not have
made if not deceived or threatened.!" Nevertheless. because the aim of ~ 123 BGB is
the protection of the freedom of will. the decisive factor will not be the intention of
the person making the threat. but rather the reception of that threat by (and its effect
199upon) the threatened party.
IlJ5 RG 166. 44.
1')6 BAC, DB 85. NZA R7. 91.
1'17 Palandt Burgeri iches Gesetzbuch t)(),
1"8 Bro\202203.
Iqq MUnchener Kommemar zurn 8GB Allgemeiner TeillOOI 1002: Jauemig-Schlechuicrn-Sturner
65: BGH N.lW R2. 2302: BGH N.lW 1982.2301 2302.
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2.3.3.3.3.5 The position of third parties
Paragraph 123 (2) BGB also provides a solution for cases in which duress emanates
from third parties. If the person with whom the victim enters into an agreement is not
the wrongdoer. it must be establ ished whether that person knew or ought to have been
aware of the misconduct of the third party. Ifso. the declarer is entitled to rescind his
d I· . hi 2(111ec aratien as against im.
This article also regulates the case where there IS no opposing party. but one who
acquires a right directly as a result of the manipulated declaration. If a person. other
than the one to whom the declaration was required to be made. obtains a right directly
as a result of the declaration. the declaration may be rescinded as against him. This
person. however. must have actually been aware or should reasonably have been
f' h . I' c. °lilaware ate rnarupu atmg racts.:
In the case of deceit. in contrast to the grounds for rescission falling under ~ 119
BGB. the party challenging the declaration and the person making the spurious
declaration of will need not be identical. The declaration may also have been
induced. in the manner defined under ~ 123 BGB. by a third party. According to ~
123 (2) S.I BGB. the other party to the agreement must allow for the deceit of a third
party. if he was aware of such deceit.
An agent will not be considered a third party under ~ 123 BGB. Due to the fact that.
under ~ 164 BGB. an agent is held to represent the will of the principal. his deception
will be held equivalent to the deception ofa party to the contract.
Thus. if a declaration is elicited by means of the deception of an agent. it will be
considered voidable.
There is some controversy with regard to the position of third parties in this regard.
:00 Brox 197.
:(!l MUnchener K0l11111entar zum 8GB Allgerneiner Teil 991 <)l)2: Jauernig-Schlechtnem-Sturncr 64.
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2.3.3.3.3.6 The declaration of rescission in cases covered by § 123 BGB
A declaration of rescission in respect of cases within the ambit of ~ 123 BGB IS. on
account of the particular circumstances. regulated differently from those in respect of
cases covered by ~ 119 BGB and ~ 120 BGB. The application of ~ 142 BGB.
regarding contracts ex tunc. is also applicable to cases falling under ~ 123 BGB.
In cases of threats and deception. the period of rescission is longer than in the case of
~ 121 BGB.coc The reason for this is that under ~ 124 BGB the declarer is in need of
special protection whereas the opposing party. who has extracted the declaration by
. d' 'OlImproper con uct. IS not.: .
2.3.3.4 Legal consequences of rescission - §§ 119, 120 and § 123 BGB
A declaration of will which has been rescinded is void ah initio.204 That means that
the entire contract is void. and hence unenforceable and regarded as never having
existed at all. This nullity is substantive and a contract can only be established by
b . . d '(J)emg constitute anew.":
Where a contract is vitiated only in part. however. the unaffected part can be enforced
to the extent that it is severable from the affected part.211(' This might be the case
where a buyer who buys three paintings from a seller subsequently rescinds his
declaration under ~ I 19 (2) BGB in respect of one painting. which is a forgery.
Depending on whether the contract is divisible. that is. on whether it would have been
entered into even if the affected part had been omitted. the contract for the purchase of
the two other paintings can still be enforced.
In cases of rescission it is c lear that the party in opposition to rese ission (in th is case
the vendor). relied on the affected declaration. and assumed the validity of the
202 ~ 124 BGB.
:n3 .
Brox 199: Milnehener Kommemar ZUIll BGB A llgerneiner Teil IO()4-1 005: Palandt Burgeri iches
Geseizbuch 9 I .
:(I~ See abo- e: 2.3.3.J.
~(J) Munchener Kommemar zUIl18GB Allgerneiner Teil 1207: Brox 19LJ: Palandt Btngcrliches
Gesetzbuch 128.
:116 ~ 139 BGB.
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contract. In order to prevent injustice to this party. the BGB provides a special regime
that has already been referred to in connection with ~ I 18 BGB.207
Under § 122 BGB. the declarant is. in cases where a declaration of wi II is void under
~ I 18 BGB. or rescinded under ~~ I 19. 120 BGB. required to compensate the other
party for the damage sustained in consequence of relying on the val idity of the
declaration. This liability does not. however. extend beyond the interest of the other
party in the validity of the declaration.
The claim to compensation under ~ 122 BGB is therefore restricted to the injured
party's reliance loss, ie the amount that will place him in the position he would have
been in had the contract not been concluded.i'" Losses reflecting his expectation
interest. ie with reference to the position that would have obtained had the contract
O()9been completed. are not recoverable."
A second limitation stipulates that compensation for reliance loss is restricted with
reference to the extent of the potential expectation interest. in two ways:
Firstly. the compensation is limited to loss suffered due to reliance (~ 122 (I) BGB),
as opposed to that suffered due to non-fulfillment of the contract. Reliance loss refers
to the loss suffered because the applicant relied on the validity of the contract.
Damages should put him in the position in which he would have been. had
negotiations never been entered into. This is not to be confused with damages
suffered due to non-completion. in which case damages should return the applicant to
the position in which he would have been had the contract been completed.
The second lim itation refers to the lim itation of damages recoverable to the extent of
the actual loss suffered due to reliance. Let us take for example a case where a party
books a holiday home for one month for E 3000.00. Intending to book the house for
2n7 See above: 2.3.3.2.
2(18 Jauernig-Schlechtr iem-Sturner 61: MUnchener Kommemar zum BGH Allgerneiner 'I eil 976.
~(lll 81'0.\ 191: MUnchener Kommernar zUIl18GB Allgemeiner Teil <')7ó.
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the month of .July. he accidentally writes 'June. As soon as he realises his mistake. he
rescinds his declaration. The lessor may successfully demand damages to cover his
administrative costs of E 6,00 and payment of E 2800.00 the loss of which he has
suffered as a result of turning away other potential customers. who would have rented
for E 2800,00.
The damages recoverable under § 122 BGB are limited to the extent of the loss
suffered due to non-fulfillment. In other words. should the lessor have turned down
an offer of € 3500.00 in reliance on the rescinded contract. the damages recoverable
by him in reliance will nonetheless be limited to the amount of the rescinded contract.
The underlying reason for this limitation is that the injured party ought not to be put in
a better position than he would otherwise have been because of the mistake of the
rescinding party. Without this limitation. the right of rescission would become
entirely meaningless. since rescission could result in the mistaken party being worse
off than he would have been were he to perform the unwanted contract.i'"
Paragraph 122 (2) BGB states that knowledge of the grounds for rescission or
negligent ignorance thereof on the part of the injured party excludes the duty to
compensate on the part of the rescinding party. To hold otherwise would be
incompatible with the principle of good faith."!'
It should be self evident that. in respect of ~ 123 BGB. the perpetrator has no right to
claim compensation from the victim. To require the latter to pay compensation to the
perpetrator or to a third party who knew or ought to have been aware of the unlawfu I
act would be absurd.~lc
:11. Brox 192.
:11 Munchener Kommemar Will BGB Allgerneiner Teil 97(, 977: Jauemig-Schlechuiern-Sturner (,2.
:I: Milnehener Kommemar zurn BGB Allgerneiner Teil 979.
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Moreover. the systematic position of ~ 122 BGB establ ishes that it does not apply to
cases within the scope of ~ 123 BGB.cI3
2.4 The Abstraktionsprinzip
German law regards the conclusion of and performance of a contract as two distinct
legal acts which. although related in so far as performance constitutes the fulfilment
of the duty established by the contract. are notionally distinct. This differentiation
finds expression in the principle of abstraction tAbstrakuonsprinzips.i'" which entails
that the act of performance is abstracted in a legal sense from the obligation which
gave rise to it.cl:"
A contract of sale between a seller and buyer creates an obligation for the former to
deliver the goods and for the latter to pay the price.i'"
The contract of sale by itself. however. does not serve to transfer ownership of the
goods. To this end. a further juristic act. delivery. in the nature of a disposition
tVerfugung or Verfugungsgeschafïi. is required. This in itself is constituted by an
offer and acceptance and. in the ordinary case. also by the transfer of physical
possession of the goods (§ 929 BGB). The acquisition of something by a purchase
entails. therefore. the conclusion of two agreements between the parties and also the
transter of possession of the goods. The agreement that the property itself should be
transferred to the purchaser usually concludes with the transter of physical possession.
and is known as dingticher Ver/rag. because the transfer of property is regulated by
'17the law of things.:
21 )
Jauernig-Schlechtriern-Sturner 61: Milnehener Kommernar zum BGFI Allgerneiner Teil <.)74.
210
1:31'0:\ A2 63: .lauernig-Schlechtriem-StUrner 1031.
210 Brox 62.
21" ~ -1338GB.
~17 See above: 2.1.-L: 130:\ 57.
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There are. however. examples of Verfugungsgeschafte or Verfugungsvertrage which
are regulated by the law of obligations. the most important of which is the cession of a
claim (Forderungsabtretungy+"
As a result of this fundamental feature of German law. the rescission of. for example.
a contract of sale on the grounds of mistake will not necessarily entail the avoidance
of the transfer of possession of the goods.
The seller cannot therefore recover the goods by means of proprietary remedies. but
must resort to a personal claim. The act of transter of possession itself might.
however. be affected by a mistake that could result in its nullity or voidability without
the contractual cause being called into question at all.
The principle of abstraction is of particular importance for the protection of third
parties who acquire goods in good faith. Because the efficacy of an act of transfer is
evaluated independently of the validity of the antecedent contract. a buyer may well
become owner of an article delivered to him even though the contract of sale is
vitiated by a defect of consent. This implies that a third party who acquires from such
a purchaser will not be affected by detects of consent affecting the contractual cause
for delivery.
The principle of abstraction is therefore of considerable importance for the resolution
of problems occasioned by mistake in contract.
72
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3 South Africa
3.1 Introduction
South Africa owes its existence to the first colonization by the Dutch. whose state was
a feudal dependent of the German Empire by the end of the 15th century. By the end
of the 15th century the reception of Roman law into Germany. and therefore also the
Netherlands. was an accomplished fact. and the so-called Roman-Dutch law
developed as a direct consequence of the fusion between Roman law and the
Germanic law of Holland. 219 Roman-Dutch law was formally introduced into the
Cape by Jan van Riebeeck, who establ ished a refreshment station for the Dutch in
1652. It eventually spread across the borders of the Cape into the Orange Free State
and the erstwhile Transvaal and NataI.22!)
Roman-Dutch law. however. is not the exclusive foundation of the present South
African legal system. During an aggressive colonisation programme in the late 18th
and the early 19th centuries. Britain occupied the Cape. initially in 1795 and then
again in 1806. As a result the English Common Law attained a presence in South
A frica. Despite the presence of the British. however. Roman-Dutch law initially
remained the common law of the inhabitants of the Cape.221
Only after 1814. when the Cape was finally handed over to Britain. did English legal
law take hold. Government by the English over a populace that included a significant
English element meant that English ideas. and especially English principles of law
and government, gained ascendancy and found their way into the law.222 In the field
of obligations and contract, however, the law retained its essentially Roman character.
~lq .loubert General Principles I 2: Thomas/Van der Merwe/ SLOOp 46-ó4.
~~() Joubert. :2 3: Fouche Legal Principles of Contracts and Negotiable Instrumerns 7.
::) Zimmermann & Visser Southern Cross 46-49: Fouche R.
Examples lor this are the English criminal procedure introduced in IR26. followed by I~nglish la«
olevidence in 1830. See Fagan "Roman-Dutch Law in its South African Historical Context"
Southern Cross 5 I .
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although some notions were received from English law. The South African law of
contract might be described as a comprising mixture of various legal systems. namely
Roman. Roman-Dutch and English law.cc]
A Ithough legislation is a major source of modern law. the South A frican law of
contract has essentially maintained its character as a case law system. As 111
Germany. the courts are the institutions through which the law is applied and
enforced. In South Africa also. the function of a judge is to apply the law and not to
make it.cc-l The crucial difference is that. in contrast to Germany. South Africa has
never resorted to a universal codification of Private law. For that reason. the
resolution of iuristic problems must be approached in a different way. Judges are
bound to resolve disputes by the application of rules of law. Often. however. there
would appear to be no rule applicable to the dispute. Because judges. however. have
to resolve cases put before them. new rules are frequently developed from historical
sources and with reference to general legal principles. Such a decision establishes a
judicial precedent. Because of the imprecise methodology. it may happen that another
judge settles a similar dispute in a different way. a state of affairs that results in
uncertainty and a lack ofuniformity.
In order to avoid such a state of affairs. judges adhere to the stare decisis rule. which
requires courts to stand by earlier judgments handed down by higher courtS.~~5
Application of the principle of judicial precedent serves certainty so far as it ensures
consistency in the resolution of disputes. within the hierarchy of courts. "ch
2:.1 Girvin "The Architects of the Mixed System Southern Cross LJ5-13R: Thomas/Van del' Merwe/
Stoop 7 X.
:2.1 Fouche 9: but sec Zimmermann & Visser "Introduction - South African l.aw as a Mixed System"
Southern Cross IO: "an important key to understanding South A trican la« lies in appreciating the
fact that. whilst it is largely civilian in substance. it is also shaped by the traditional conviction of
its judges LO be the custodians of the lall .
:25 1.inll11ernlann & Visser "Introduction - South African l.aw as a Mixed System Southern Cross JJ
15.
::(, Fouche 10.
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However. judicial precedents are not rigid rules of law and if a court is of the opinion
that a previous judgment was wrong, a new judicial precedent is created.
An understanding of the notion of precedent in a case law system presupposes an
awareness of the distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum as elements of
a judicial decision. The latter is an incidental remark made by a judge in arriving at
his decision. It does not form part of the reasoning upon which the decision is based.
and is therefore not binding on later courts. Obiter die/a may. nevertheless. have
persuasive authority upon lower COUI1S.:'~7 The ratio decidendi is the legal reason
upon which a judgment is based. It is this aspect of a judgment that is binding and to
be followed by other courts in similar cases.
3.2 Requirements for contracts external to the parties
For the creation of a contract the law imposes requirements unrelated to the
agreement of the parties. These relate to the issues of contractual capacity. formalities
and legality.
Should any of these requirements not be fulfilled. the contract will be invalid.
irrespective offuil agreement between the parties.
3.2.1 Contractual capacity
Contractual capacity under South African law is the legally recognised ability of legal
subjects to perform legal acts. such as a contract. Thus only persons with possession
of the requisite capacity may conclude contracts. Although people are regarded as
enjoying contractual capacity in an equal measure. the capacity of some persons is
limited in the sense that they are only able to conclude legal acts within certain
parameters. Others, again. have no contractual capacity at all. and are wholly unable
to conclude juristic acts.
cc7 Hahlo/Kahn South Africa The Development ot' its Laws and Constitution 256.
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Such restrictions. or a total lack of capacity. derive from the fact that certain groups of
people are regarded in law as lacking the capacity for an expression of wi II which the
law will recognise.v" In this regard. South African law recognises divisions relating
to contractual capacity.
Full contractual capacity is enjoyed by men and women who are older than 21 years.
whether married or not. and various kinds of juristic persons. Limited contractual
capacity entails that persons between the age of 7 and 21 years and so-called
prodigals are only able to conclude contracts with the assistance of certain other
persons. c::>9 Other persons. such as insane persons. person who are intoxicated to the
extent that they do not know what they are doing and minors below the age of 7 years
do not possess any contractual capacity at all. not even with the assistance of another
person.
3.2.2 Formalities
As a rule. informal agreements are binding and a valid contract may therefore be
concluded orally or even tacitly.::>3o In general. therefore. South African law does not
requ ire formal ities for the val idity of a contract. 231
For a variety of policy reasons. and to ensure that parties have enough time to
consider their interests carefully before committing themselves. tormalities of various
kinds have been prescribed by law. For different kinds of contracts. certain
tormalities are applicable. 232 Such interference with the common law has been
criticised by judges and jurists at various times.
Formalities might also be imposed by the parties themselves. so that there will be no
contract until the document has been drawn up and executed. Such a case must be
2~8 Newman! McQuoid-Mason The South A frican Law of obligations 15: Fouche 76.
2~9 Joubert 120 12\: Newman/ McQuoid-Mason 15.
2-'0 Goldbalu \' lremantle 1920 J\ D 123 128-9: Woods \' walters 192 I 1\0 30] JO).
211 .loubert 154: Kerr Principles 122.
""--;'
109that the contract must be rendered in writing. that the contract must he notarial!v executed. and
that the contract must be registered.
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Failure to comply with formalities, whether presented by law or imparted by the
parties. renders the contract null and void.
distinguished from those where the written document is intended only as an evidential
record of the terms of a binding oral agreement. The presumption is that a reduction
to writing is intended merely for the purposes of record and proof. Th is presumption
can be rebutted by proof of an intention that no contract was to come into existence
until the written document was signed.~:;:;
3.2.3 Legality
Another requirement for a contract is that it must be lawful. ie concluded in
accordance with statute and common law. ~3.j
A contract violates the common law if it is against public policy or moral standards
(contra bonos mores). a standard entailing a considerable measure of judicial
discretion. which has been considered in numerous judgments.r"
A constant theme is that the power to declare a contract contrary to public policy
should be exercised sparingly and only when the impropriety of the agreement and the
element of public harm are rnanifest.v"
Various statutory provisions prohibit juristic acts or conduct of a contractual nature.
Whether a contract which contravenes a statutory provision is void depends on the
intention of the legislature, and must be established by an examination of the statute
as a whole as well as its scope and purpose.v"
Although the general rule is that what is prohibited is rendered void. the proper legal
conclusion may be that legislature is content to impose a penalty. without nullifying
:J, Goldblatt ,. Fremantle 1920 AD 123 128-129: Woods \' Walters 192 I A f) JO] JOS.
c.l. Schierhout \ Minister of .lust ice 1926 AD 99.
c." .loubert 106 107 lOS: Wilken \ Kohler 1913 AD 135: Sutter \ Scheepers 1')32 /\1) IA5: Swart \
Smuts 1971 I SA S 19 (A) S29C-830C.
~J(1 Botha vFinanscredit f Pty) Ltd 19893 SA 773(A)7821-783C.
c.n Wilken \ Kohler 1913 AD 135141-5: Sutterv Scheepers 1932 AD 165 173-4.
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the contract. especially with regard to revenue statutes.i" Various considerations
regarding this issue have to be taken into account.r'"
3.3 The South African notion of contract
South African law inherited from Roman-Dutch law a notion of contract based
generally on consensus.r '" The foundation for the modern South African law of
contract was theretore provided by the premise that every agreement. no matter how
informally achieved. was enforceable. provided it had a reasonable cause. The
subsequent development of this premise. however. was not without difficulties.
Although. as has been indicated. the Roman-Dutch law acknowledged the term justa
causa. it remained unclear on exactly what that meant. The influence of English
notions of contract led to uncertainty regarding the very basis of contractual liability.
and to a dispute which occupied South African law for a considerable period of
. 2-1 Iurne. The Chief Justice of the Cape Supreme Court. Sir Henry de Villiers
controversially attempted to equate the justa causa of Roman-Dutch law with the
English requirement of valuable consideration.i" This attempt ultimately failed with
Conradie 11 Rossouw. where it was stated that "the only element that our law requires
for a val id contract is consensus ... in or de re licita oe honesto. ··2-1, and South Africa s
contract law was finally rid of the concept of valuable consideration. 2-1-1
Despite this. a fully comprehensive definition of the South African notion of contract
seems impossible. Although contract can be classified as an agreement which creates
or is intended to create a legal obligation between the parties thereto. 2-1) it is well
:.~N Metro Western Cape (Pty) Ltd v Ross 19863 SA I X I tA) IR8 A-I 89 C.
:J') Swart \ SInuts 1971 I SA R19 (A) 829 C-830 C: Oothuizen \ Standard Credit Corp l.td 19lJ3 3
SA 891 (A) 904 F-905 c.
::411 Hutchison "Formation of Contract" Southern Cross 165.
2-.11 Hutchison "l-onuauon or Contract" Southern Cross 16S
2-C Hutchison "lormation of Contract" Southern Cross I (lA.
2-l { Conradie \ Rossouw 1919 AD 279 320. cf 324.
2-+-+ Joubert ]~-35: Hutchison "Formation ofContract" Southern Cross 166 - 17J.
2-+5 Joubert :21.
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established that contractual liability can also be derived from a reasonable belief in
the existence of agreement induced in the mind of a contracting party by the conduct
of the other party. and thus even in the absence of agreement. 2.Jh
According to the primary definition. if A wants to sell his horse to B. a contract will
arise only if they both agree on the object to be delivered and the price to be paid for
it. Following the second view. agreement and payment wi II arise even in the absence
of explicit agreement on the terms of the agreement. Such an approach. is. of course.
incompatible with the classical consensus approach. It is obvious that to adopt
contradictory bases for contract must lead to tension and a lack of coherence in the
law. and there has been sustained debate. on whether enforceability depends not
exclusively on the concurrence of the subjective wills of the contractants. or the
objective concurrence of the declaration made by the parties. but also potentially on
the reasonable expectations conveyed to the mind of each party by the conduct or
expression of the other.i" These alternatives to the primary signifier of a contract -
consensus - will be discussed below.v"
3.3.1 The will theory
As has been previously indicated. South African contract law is principally based on
the notion that a contract is created when contractants reach a consensus to create an
obligationary relationship.r'"
According to the will theory, a contractant is legally bound to a contract because. if.
and in so far as. such consensus has occurred between him and his co-contractant(s).
:"" Hutchison "Formation of Contract" Southern Cross 180-193. There is a wealth of literature dealing
with this problem. See eg Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 14-42: Lubbe/Murray
Contract Cases. Materials and Commentary 106 - 109: Joubert 79-80: Hahlo/Kahn South Africa.
The development of its Laws and Constitution 441-442: Kritzinger "Approach to contract <J
reconciliation" ( 1983) 100 SAL.l47: Van Rensburg (1986) 4') THRHR 448: Cockrell "Reliance
and private law" 1993 Steil LR 41.
2-17 Eg Hortman "The basis of the effect of mistake un contractual obi igations" ( 1935) 51 Sf\ LJ 432.
Kritzinger "Approach lO contract: a reconci I iaiion ( 1')83) 1(J() SI)., LJ 47.
2-1:\ See below: 3.3.1.
2-1.') Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 13: Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereiniging \
l-riedrnann 19793 SA 978 (A) 993F.
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'-1prevented by any factor."
The will theory therefore demands a concurrence of wills between all parties
involved.i'' By implication. there is no contract where an actual consensus is
3.3.1.1 Elements of consensus
The will theory requires agreement on three elements. Firstly. the contractants must
agree on the consequences which they want to achieve. secondly. they must have the
intention to bind themselves legally. and finally. thev must be aware of their
",,~,agreement. ---
3.3.1.1.1 Agreement about the consequences
A contract involves the creation of obligations. Consensus can therefore only exist if
the parties involved are ad idem about the obligations or obligation they wish to
establish. Not only must the parties agree on whom they want to contract with. they
must also be ad idem as regards the performance or performances to be rendered
under the contract.
3.3.1.1.2 Intention to be legally bound - animus contrahendi
The intention to be legally bound is also known as animus contrahendi and has been
the subject matter of several judgments by South African courts.i " The concept of
animus contrahendi was explicitly equated with an intention to be bound. and
distinguished from the underlying cause of contract (redelike oorsaaks. by Jansen JA
in Saambou-Nasionale Bourvereniging v Friedman.25~ A statement of the price by
the vendor wi II be held to be an offer on ly when it is made with the intention of being
bound by the offeree' s acceptance.r" Furthermore. the courts have employed
~5(J Van der Merwe et al IJ.
~51 Van der Merwe ct al IJ.
~5: Christie G]: Van der Merwe et al Jó,
:5~ See for example: Hayter \ Ford (1895) I () I::OC ó 1 69.
:5-1 Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging \ Friedman 1979 J S/\ 47X 991
:"5 Hottentots Hollands Motors (Pty) Ltd " R 1956 I PH K22 (C j.
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commercial language to define a true offer as a "firm offer", which will be "certain
and definite in its terms" and "made with the intention that when it is accepted it will
bind the offeror. ,,25h
An expression of will that is made without the intention to establish a legal obligation
is not sufficient for the creation of a contract. A simple social arrangement. therefore,
does not lead to legal consensus. It does not matter whether or to what extent the
persons might regard themselves as bound 111 honour. they do not normally want to
0'7create legal consequences. -~
Neither can a statement made in jest or in a moment of anger lead to consensus, since
its declarer did not seriously intend to commit himself in a legal sense.25X The logic
operating here is that a consensus between the declarer of such a statement and the
receiver with regard to a contractual bond cannot be achieved since one party (here
the declarer) does not want to be legally bound at all. Consensus is therefore
excluded.259
3.3.1.1.3 Awareness of their agreement
A final requirement of the will theory is that the parties who agree should be aware of
this fact. Coinciding wills alone cannot constitute consensus, since the term itself
implies that the contractants should each have knowledge of the declaration of the
other party. Otherwise they cannot be said to have agreed to it. Consensus will
therefore only exist where one party becomes aware of the other's expression of will
and assents to it.
I di I ' 'h() -A ea 1I1gcase in this regard is B oom I' American Swiss Walch (0.- By means ot a
newspaper advertisement. a representative of the Swiss Watch Company offered a
reward for information, to be given to the CID, which would lead to the arrest of
~5() Wasmuth \ Jacobs 19R7 3 SA 629 (S WA).
25"7 Robi nSO!1 " Randfoniei Il Estates Gold Min i ng Co l.td 192 I ,1\ D I (iX 169.
2St:
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25q Van der Merwe et al 15: Bourbon-Leftlev \ WPK (Landbou) Bpk \lJ99 I SA 901 (C).
:"" 1915 AD 100: Christie 52 53 and 6364.
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thieves and the recovery of property stolen from his premises. The reward was to be
paid in proportion to the value of property recovered.
The advertisement was held to be an offer specifying a method of acceptance.
However. although Bloom satisfied the prescribed method of acceptance. he could not
be the acceptor of the offer because. being at the time unaware of the reward, he
lacked animus contrahendi.
3.3.2 Alternative approaches
For reasons of policy. eg legal certainty. good faith. protection of reasonable
expectations. South African law recognizes that the creation of contracts is not merely
a matter ofconsensus.t'" Alternative theories will now be considered.
3.3.2.1 Declaration theory
The dec laration theory states that contractants are legally bound not because of the co-
incidence of their subjective intention. but on the basis of their objectively coinciding
declarations of wil12óc
Although the declaration theory accepts that the will of the contractants determines
their contract. it qualifies the will theory insofar as the existence of consensus is
established with reference to the objective content of the declared will. and without
reference to the alternative intentions potentially establ ished by enq u iry into its
subjective intent. What is important is not what the contractants may have intended.
but rather what they actually declared.
South African case law contains a number of statements which support a more
263objective approach to the constitution of contracts and the treatment of dissensus.
None of them. however. supports the declaration theory as such.
82
:,,1 Van der Merwe el al 13.
262 Van der Merwe el al 21l.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
"The law does not concern itself with the working of the minds of parties to a
contract. but with the external man ifestations of their minds. Even therefore if
from a philosophical standpoint the minds of the parties do not meet, yet. if by
their acts their minds seem to have met. the law will. where fraud is not
The strongest statement. which is often quoted as supporting a declaration theory. IS
that of in Wessels .JA:
alleged. look to their acts and assume that their minds did meet and that they
contracted in accordance with what the parties purport to accept as a record of
their agreement. This is the only practical way in which Courts of law can
determ ine the term s of a contract." 26-1
It would be going too far to see this as explicit approval for the declaration theory.
The statement merely affirms that. in searching for the actual intention of the parties
in accordance with the will theory. a court is compelled to look for that intention in its
external manifestation, namely the objective conduct of the parties.i'"
3.3.2.2 Reliance theory
A further alternative approach to the issue of whether there is a contract or not. which
is quite often applied in South African law. is the reliance theory. According to this
view. a contract is based on the intention of one party to an agreement and the
reasonable impression or reliance on his part that the opposite party had the identical
intention regarding the contract.
Clearly. the reliance theory can only be used if. according to the will theory.
consensus is lacking. If both parties have coinciding intentions there is consensus and
thus a contract between them. It is not of great importance whether one party had any
::(~3 I Pieters & Company \' Salomon 1911 AD 121 130: National & Overseas Distributors
Corporation (pt)) Ltd \ Potato Board 1951\ 2 SA.+73 (A) '+79: Allen \ Sixteen Stil'llng
Investments (PtyJ Ltd 19744SA 164(0) 172.
2(,.j
South A trican Rai lways & Harbours \ National Bank of South A lrica Ltd 192.+ A f) 7(J4.
~(,~ Van der Merwe et al 2R 29: Christie 26.
83
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
particular impression of the other's intenticn.i'" If. however. there is a (material)
mistake by one contractant or both. and as a result no actual consensus. the reliance
theory establishes a contract in cases where one of the parties has reasonably relied on
the impression created in his mind by the other party that there was consensus.i'" The
extent to which this approach has been applied by the South African courts will be
shown below. in the sections on mistake and disagreement.
3.4 Formation of contract
Contracts. except in exceptional cases. cbS are constituted by the acceptance of an
It is. therefore. necessary to discuss the concepts of "offer" and
"acceptance". in order to establish what their prerequisites are. c71)
Like German law. South African law regards contracts as belonging to a species of
legal facts known as juristic acts (vregshandelinge") - which is equivalent to
Rechtsgeschaft under German law. A juristic act is the lawful act of a legal subject
which has at least some of the consequences which its author intended to bring
'71about.: From the previous discussion. it should be clear that the conduct of both
parties are independent legal acts. since both intend to bring about a particular legal
consequence. ie the contract.
3.4.1 Offer
An offer is a declaration by the offeror of his intention to conclude a contract. which
states the terms on which he is prepared to contract. In making an offer. a person puts
forward a proposal with the intention that by its mere acceptance. without more. a
2,,(, Van der Merwe et al 29.
2") Hutchison rl-orrnation ofContract" Southern Cross IRO-189.
268 See estate Breet \ Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 1':)55,) S,t., 52:1 (1\ 14321 ..
2(>" Reid Bros (SA) Ltd \ Fischer Bearings Co Ltd 1943 AD 23 2 24 I: Lstate Brect \ I'ni-llrban
Areas Health Board 1955:; SA 523 (A) 5321:::.
27() Van der Merwe et al 43.
271 Van der Merwe et al 5.
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contract shall be formed. This approved definition refers to the requirement for
animus contrahendi. which has been reviewed above. ~7~
3.4.].] The offer must be clear and unambiguous
In order to provide the basis for a contract. an offer must be clear. in other words it
must contain sufficient information to place the offeree in a position to know what the
offeror has in mind.
If any of the material terms of a declaration intended as an offer are vague and
obscure or ambiguous. the declaration will be ineffective as such.~7:1
3.4.1.2 The offer must be complete
Moreover. the offer must contain all the terms which the offeror wishes to embody in
the contract. The offeree will be bound only by those terms set out in the offer. It
therefore follows that if any essential terms of the intended contract are om itted. the
declaration cannot be considered as an offer and it cannot lead to a contract. and the
same applies should the contract omit the material terms of the envisaged contract.i'"
3.4.2 Declarations which do not amount to offers
It is often necessary to decide whether a particular proposal made in the course of
negotiations amounts to an offer or not.275 and in this regard. various kinds of
declaration that are to be distinguished from true offers might usefully be listed and
brietly discussed here.
It must be emphasised that these categories are not rigid or watertight. The cases
show that it is often difficult to apply the distinction between true offers and other
statements in practice. Everything will depend on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.
272 Christie 32: see above: :1.3.1.1.2.
'7' Christie 36 lOR I 16.
'Jj Van der Merwe et al 44.
:'7:' See Collen \ Rietfontein Engineering Works IlJ4X I SA -+ 13 (.A) vvhere the correspondence
between the parties was analysed step b> step.
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3.4.2.1 Invitations to treat
A statement intended to induce another to enter into negotiations with a view to
arriving at a contract may vary between a simple request to another to state his
views. nh and a statement of one' s own views with an invitation to the other party to
discuss them.~77
To distinguish an offer from a mere invitation to do business. it must be established
whether the declarer acted with the intention to enter into a legally binding agreement.
If not. his declaration can hardly be seen as an offer but amounts merely to an
invitation to treat.27X
The decisive South African case on this subject. Craw/ev I' Rex 1909 TS 1105.
involves circumstances very similar to those mentioned in relation to the decisive
German ruling. and the judgments operate under the same logic.~79
The Plaintiff shopkeeper placed a placard outside his shop advertising the sale of a
particular brand of tobacco at a cheap price to attract the public. Having bought some
of the tobacco. Crawley returned for more but the shopkeeper refused to serve him
and requested that he leave. He refused and was charged with statutory trespass. One
of his defences was that. by accepting the offer made on the placard. he had
concluded a contract with the shopkeeper and was entitled to remain in the shop until
the contract was performed.
The court found that there was no contract. but rather an invitatie ad offerendurn. It
was held to be contrary to logic that the shopkeeper should be taken to have intended
his notice as an offer to enter into a contract. Smith J held the notice to amount to an
announcement of his intention to sell the goods to somebody. This was differentiated
from an intention to sell to potentially "thousands of members of the public [who]
:7', Christie 37.
in Ferguson \ Merensky 19()] TS 675.
:og Joubert 3'1.
27\1 See above: 2.~.2.I.l.
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might crowd into the shop, all of whom would then have a right of action against the
proprietor for not perform ing the contract."
The surrounding circumstances will also be decisive, as the leading case of Efroiken li
Simon281J demonstrates. This 1921 case involved the telegram from a grain broker in
Johannesburg to his counterpart in Cape Town, which read: "Have seller 3000 oats
each January June II s local export if taken export any difference in railage to be
charged to buyers instructions ninth." This correspondence was taken to be an outline
of the circumstances of a potential long-term sale by cred it agreement. wh ich cou Id be
arranged if the recipient broker could find a suitable buyer. Thus the buyer found by
the broker was not entitled to accept the terms put forward by the telegram so as to
conclude a contract. This may not have been the case if the broker had communicated
with a particular buyer directly.
3.4.2.2 Request for an offer
If a declaration is expressed as a request for an offer. it obviously cannot itself be
considered an offer. In cases when it is not expressly stated to be a request. the
surrounding circumstances may show that a proposal should be correctly interpreted
as a request for an offer. insofar as it does not expressly indicate the intention of the
declarer to make an offer.cRI
Thus. for example. the advertisement of goods for sale at a stated price wi II normally
be dealt with as a request for an offer rather than as a finn offer to sell."8C This would
apply also to a request that a buyer be found. As in the previous situation. it is of
some importance to establish whether animus contraheridi was present. in order to
distinguish such a declaration from a real otTer.cx_'
28\ Efroiken \ Sirnon 1921 CPO 367.
282 Bird \ Sumerville I9t)O 4 SA 395 (N) 40 I D
2S; Christie 37 3X.
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3.4.2.3 Statements of information
Information supplied (often in response to an enquiry), which provides details about
the terms on which a person may be willing to offer. but does not communicate an
intention to be bound by those precise terms as an offer, is referred to as a statement
of information, ~8~ In effect. these will amount to conditional statements: "These
would be my terms, if I was to make an offer." 2R.'
A statement which does no more than convey information, is not considered to be
accompanied by animus contrahendii'"
The factual background and the wording of the particular statement may, of course,
yield the conclusion that it was intended as an offer,2x7
3.4.2.4 Statements of intention
A statement of intention does not. In general. amount to an offer.2RR although the
possibility that it does so increases when the statement is addressed to a particular
~kl)person,
It can often be difficult to distinguish between statements that declare an intention to
contract and an actual offer. Where there is doubt. it is necessary to establish whether
the declarant displayed an intention to be bound to the terms of his statement. should
it be accepted.?" In th is regard an exam ination of the surround ing ei rcumstances may
be decisive, even where the statement itself appears unconditional. For example, the
statement "I shall sell to the first comer who brings £ I00,000 in cash" has been held
to be a mere general expression of intention.Ï" Conversely, an ostensibly conditional
88
:~" Christie 3R: Hottentots Holland Motors (Pty) Ltd \ R 195A I PH K 22 (C): Societe Commereiale
de Moteurs \ Ackermann 1981 3 SA 422 (A I
:S5 Christie 3R.
,~" 1::lroiken\ Simonl921 CPO 371: Hottentots Holland Motors (Pt;.) l.td x R 19561 PH K22
(C)
287 TrutervRosenthal t l Svój S HCCi 117: Young vLand Values Ltd 1924WLD216221.
2RR Rood \ Venter 1903 TS 221.
:8<) Brown & Co \ Jacobsen 1915 ()P!) 42.
2<-J(I Christie 39.
2-11 Rood \ Venter 1903 TS 221.
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statement may be found to be a definite offer. For example. a lener conveying a
request to another party not to press for payment of a third partys debt contained the
statement: "should you require a guarantee from me I am quite willing to do
so ..... Trusting you agree to my proposal." This was deemed by the court to amount
"9'to an offer to guarantee payment of the debt. - -
3.4.2.5 Calling for tenders
A call tor tenders is generally understood to fall ShOl1 of an offer. Here. the same
logic applies as in the case of advertisements: a person calling for tenders may hardly
be expected to commit himself to an offer made to any number of unknown
persons.i'" For that reason. the seeking of tenders is no more than an invitation to do
business and the response thereto is an offer that can be accepted or rejected by the
person who called tor tenders. An obligation to accept the highest or lowest or a
particular tender cannot be implied.Ï"
Apart from this lack of animus contrahendi. calls for tenders will also lack the
material details necessary to constitute a complete offer. In construction contracts for
instance. tender documents such as plans and specifications are presumed to be given
tor the convenience of potential tenderers and not with any guarantee of their
accuracy. By incorporating them in his tender. a tenderer makes them his own. This
may lead to unfortunate results. tor example if they are unworkable or inaccurate and
the works prove impossible or unexpectedly diffïcult.~9:i
3.4.2.6 Proposals for partial, incomplete or provisional agreement
This term refers to conditional proposals. which may be made while parties are in the
process of negotiating a binding agreement. 296 In cases where the comprehensive and
precise agreemant aimed at between the parties may involve protracted negotiations.
:>12 Brown & Co \ Jacobson 1915 ()PD 42.
2
l
)1 Christie-l 7.
:,)~ Leyds \' Sil1101l 1964 I SA 377 (T): Christie 47.
~»5 Robertson \ Maurice Nichols (Pty) Ltd 193X NPT) 34: lclion Skead and Grant \ Port Hizabeth
Municipality lYM 4 SA 422 (E).
2'lh Pilout v North Cape I .ivestock Co-op Ltd 1977 -+ S.A X42 (A) R50 I).
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it IS not unusual for the progress achieved to date to be recorded III a partial
agreement. This allows the parties to confirm the terms on which they are In
agreement. which in turn may encourage progress towards further agreement. Such
partial agreements normally become obsolete when a final agreement. on which the
parties are willing to contract, is reached. Clearly. such a system is open to potential
abuse in cases where a final agreement is never concluded. and where one party seeks
to hold the other to the terms of the partial agreement.Ï" The success of this
endeavour wi II depend on whether the partial agreement can be classified as a true
contract. This in turn will depend on an analysis of whether an offer can be isolated:
and if so. whether the contractual and circumstantial evidence shows that the offeree
was aware or ought to have been aware that the offer was intended to be accepted on a
provisional basis only. with the conclusion of a binding contract to be dependent on
~ h . ')9Ragreement on turt er pomts. -
An indication that further terms remain outstanding or unsenled will not necessarily
be enough to preclude an intention to be bound. In certain cases. it may be taken to
have been understood by the parties that outstanding terms will conform to what IS
considered reasonable=" or usual.i'" In such a case. no further agreement IS
necessary. so that the proposal will amount to a potentially binding offer301 Even the
mention in a proposal of the need for further agreement after acceptance of the
proposal does not therefore necessarily indicate that the initial agreement is of a
provisional nature only.
Ascertainment of the intention of the parties will of course be central. and this will be
gathered from an examination of their conduct. the terms of the agreement and the
surrounding circumstances.
,')7 Christie 39 40.
~'/X Christie 39: see also Pitout " North Cape Li, esiock Co-op Ltd 1977 4. SA 842 (f\) HSO I),
~9() Blundell v Blom 19502 SA 627 (W) 633: Fourlarnel (Ply) Ltd \' Maddison 1977 I SA 333 (A)
342 A: Roman Catholic Church (Klerksdorp Diocese) \ Southern l.ife Association I.td 19922 SA
807 (A) 812
:;(1(1 Lindner \ Vogtrnannsberger 19654 SA lOX (0) I I OH-I Jl D.
JOl Christie 40.
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The courts will consider the possibility that the intention may have been to conclude a
binding contract which would stand if no agreement was reached on the outstanding
matters. but would be incorporated in and superseded by any further final
31)"')
agreement. - South African courts have also decided that the mention of further
agreements may amount to a pactum de contrahendo. which is a binding agreement to
make a contract in future303
3.4.3 Communication of offers
As mentioned above.ï'" an offer should reach the other party in order that he may
assent to it. and thereby constitute a contract. for one cannot accept an offer of which
. 30,one IS unaware. .
3.4.3.1 Offers to the public
An offer is usually addressed to a specific person with whom the offeror wishes to
conclude a contract. However. South African law acknowledges the possibility that
an offer may be made to the public or to indeterminate persons. eg by means of an
advertisement or any other method of mass communication. and that such offers may
ripen into a contract as a result of acceptance in the appropriate way..'!)!,
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Whether such advertisements are offers or merely invitations to negotiate or puffs.
must be ascertained from the wording of the advertisement and the factual
background. and. in the event of ambiguity. with reference to the surrounding
circurnstances.i'" In interpreting an advertisement it is always relevant to consider the
practical resu Its of interpreting it as an offer.
3(!2 Murray & Roberts Construction Ltd ,. Final Properties (Pt; ) Ltd 1991 I SA 50g (A) 51 Ó A-) 17(':
Lewis \ Oneanale (Pty) Ltd 19924 SA il I I (f\).
3(13 Hirschowitz \ Moolman 1985 3 SA 739 (A) 765 I: H Merks & Co I.tcl \ The B-M Group (Ply)
Ltd 19962 SA 225 (A) 233 D-235 G.
3(1~ See above: .3.4.
w~ 8100111 \ The American Swiss Watch Co IS) 15 A D 100.
,(j(, Bloom \ The American Watch Co 1<)15 .'-\1) I(H) 102 105 107.
_l07 Neugebauer & Cu Ltd " Hermann 1923 AD 564572: Raath \ Commissioner Ior Inland Revenue
1954.3 SA 7M (T)
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On this basis an advertisement of the price of goods exposed for sale is not normally
an offer. because if so interpreted. it would deprive the seller of his liberty to choose
his customers and would expose him to claims for breach of contract if he had
insufficient goods to satisfy all persons purporting to accept his offer.r'"
The principle that an offer has to be communicated to the offeree and be noticed by
him is demonstrated by the manner in which the question of reward is treated. When
a reward is offered by advertisement. it can be claimed only by a person who has
complied with the requirements specified in the advertisernent.r'" Further. and more
importantly here. a reward cannot be claimed by a person if he was unaware of the
offer at the time he complied with its requirements. because he could not be regarded
as accepting an offer of which he was unaware.'!"
Advertisements offering a reward or competition may seek to avoid litigation by
stating that the offer is binding in honour only. or subject to the offeror's discretion or
that the offers decision shall be final."!' Reservations of this kind. which exclude
animus contrahendi. will be effective unless they contravene a statutory
. ., I -,requirement.' -
3.4.3.2 Auctions
The question of whether an auctioneer makes an offer by call ing for bids. or each
bidder makes an offer by bidding. which crucially determines which party. as offeree.
will decide whether the contract is to be entered into or no1.m depends on the
advertised or announced conditions of sale laid down by the organiser of the auction.
lOR Crawley \ R 1909 TS I 105: Hottentots Holland Motors (Pty) Ltd \" R 1956 I PH K 22 (C).
;(lq Sephton \' American Swiss Walch Co 191] CPD 1024 1032-3: I ,ee \ American S\viss Walch Co
1914 AD 121
.;111 BloOITI" American Swis« Watch Co 1915 .AD 1()3.
'II Gerson \ l Jnited Tobacco Co (South) Ltd 193 I CPO 2R3.
31: De Villiers \ Sports Pools (Pty) Ltd 1975.1 SA 25.1
'I' Christie 49.
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If the terms of the auction require the auctioneer to accept the highest bid. he becomes
the offeror and is obliged to accept the highest bid. provided it is fJonofide314 Bona
fides is excluded if the bidder has agreed with other bidders to keep bids down.,I) or if
the bidder acts without the required intention (animus contrahendiv.t'" If the terms of
the auction do not require the auctioneer to accept the highest bid. his call for bids is
an invitation to those present to make offers. Therefore. each bid is an offer. which
the auctioneer is not obliged to accept317 Whether he accepts or not. is normally a
question of whether the seller has fixed a reserve price, If the reserve price is not
revealed to bidders thei r bids are offers,3IX
An advertisement sening out particular terms on which the auction is to be held. is
binding on the seller and auctioneer.r" Bidders who attend the auction in response to
"(Jthe advertisement are also bound by them." this effect being produced by the
auctioneer's tacit offer to conduct the auction on the advertised terms. and each
bidder's acceptance ofthat offer by bidd ing duri ng the auction,
3.4.3.3 Tacit offers
South African law acknowledges that offers may be made tacitly by conduct.r" The
only difference between a tacit contract and an express contract lies in the method of
proof. it being necessary to prove a tacit contract by inference from the conduct of the
parties.'::>::> With regard to auction situations. an exception is made. in so tar as a party
.~ I ~ Neugebauer & Cu Ltd v Hermann 1923 AD 564 57()- I: Shandel \ ,Iacobs 1949 I SA 310 (N)
325-.326,
,I" Neugebauer & Co Ltd \ Hermann 1923 AD 5ó4.
31f~ Shandel \' .lacobs 1949 I SA 320 (N): SWA Amalgameerde Afslaers (Ldrnsjbpk \ l.ouw 1956 I
~!\ 346 (A),
; 17
Demerara Turf Club Ltd I Wight ( 191 ~) AC 605 (PC): Neugebauer & Co Ltd I Hermann 192:>
AD 564: Shandel I' .lacobs 1949 I SA 320,
;I~ Christie 50 51,
~I ij
Neugebauer & Co Ltd I Hermann 192:> AD 564 571 572: Demerara Turf Cl uh I.tel I' Wight
(1918) AC 605 (PC)
,2() Shandel \ Jacobs 1949 I SA 320 (N): Nicolau \' Navarone lnvestmcnts (Ptyi Ltd llJ71 3 SA
883 (W) 884-5,
;:1 Reid Bros (SAl Ltd I' Fischer Bearings Co Ltel 1943 .'\U 232241, Collen I Rietfontein
Engineering Works 1948 I SA 413 (A) 429-3!1,
322 Bremer Meulens (Edms) Bpk v Floras 1966 I PH A.36 (A).
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to an auction must clarify III advance the manner In which his conduct IS to be
interpreted.
3.4.4 Termination of offer
Having discussed general principles regarding the offer under South African law. it
becomes necessary to investigate the law on the termination of offer. It will appear
that termination of an offer does not depend merely on the offeror. but can result also
from the conduct of the offeree and from external circumstances.
3.4.4.1 Revocation
The concept of pollicitatio (enforceable unilateral promise) has not been accepted by
South A frican law.m so that South A frican law does not accord an offer any
obligationary effect. It may therefore be freely revoked by the offeror.v" A
withdrawal or revocation by the offeror at any time before the offer has been accepted
will, as a general rule. terminate it.32:i Revocation is effective from the moment that it
is communicated to the offeree. The communication need not necessarily be by the
offeror but may also emanate from a authorized person.r" But if acceptance has
already occurred. a contract has been establ ished and the offer cannot be revoked.
3.4.4.2 Effluxion of time
An offer may contain a time clause stipulating a period within which the acceptance
must take place. Upon effluxion of this period the offer expires automatically and it
can no longer be accepted.r" If an offer does not contain a time clause. it must be
accepted within a reasonable period32R What constitutes a reasonable period cannot
be determined in the abstract, but will differ from case to case.
323 Hutchison "Formation of Contract" Southern Cross 17-l.
32-i Van der Merwe et al 46: Newman/ McQuoid-Mason 24 .
.,,5 Christian vRies ( 1898) 13 EDe 8 15: Hersch \ Nel 194X:; SA 68611\) 6'1:;.
126 Greenberg \' Wheatcroft 19502 PH !\ 5ó (W).
127 Joubert 43.
328 Dietrichsen v Dietrichsen 191 I TPD 496,
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"It is trite law that an offer can at any time before acceptance thereof be
revoked and that the mere statement that it is irrevocable or not revocable for
3.4.4.3 The option - an irrevocable offer?
As mentioned above, offers are considered to be revocable until acceptance has taken
place. But what is the state of affairs if the offeror expressly or implicitly declares
that he wishes his offer to be irrevocable or that it will remain open until a specified
date')
Tha traditional answer IS provided by Coetzee J III Anglo Carpels (Pry) LId v
"'')9Snyman:':
a certain period is ineffective. The only way in which this result can be
achieved is if there is indeed a binding agreement on this aspect."
Such declarations are therefore considered as unilateral declarations. which do not
"(Jhave a binding effect on the declarer."
3.4.4.4 Rejection and Counter-offer
An offer will lapse when it is rejected by the offeree..'>! A counter-offer is regarded
as a rejection. and so as terminating the original offer..":' Cases do. however. arise in
which a declaration of the offeree which inquires or even rejects an isolated term of
the offer. does not amount to a rejection of the offer as a whole.333
J~I) 197R3 SA 582(T)585H.
:nn Kritzinger 1983 SAL.! 441: Zelfert 1972 SAL.J 152: Kotze \' Newment SA Ltd \977] SA 368
(NC). Against this \ ie« with considerable arguments: Christie 57 5R 59. whose \ ic« s have found
acceptance in University of the North \ Franks (2()02) II I.AC 5.2.R .
.'3 J Wessels para 175.
n2 Christie 69 70.
333 Stephen '" Pepler 1921 EDL 70.
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Therefore. as Christie states. the rule is a general rather than an absolute one.33.J Of
decisive importance is the wording used by the parties and the circumstances of the
transaction.
3.4.4.5 Death
If contract formation is seen as requiring the meeting of corresponding intentions. the
effect of the death of the offeror (or of the offeree. for that matter) seems beyond
question. Because one party is dead. consensus can no longer be reached.r" The
tendency to take a more objective approach to contract may. however. introduce
complexities in this regard.v" Thus the rigid rule stated above has been waived in
cases where an offer indicates that it might also be accepted by an executor. These
cases remain exceptional. since the assumption seems to be that an offeror intends that
a contact wi II come into place between himself and the offeree personally. 337
3.4.4.6 Loss of contractual capacity
In view of the impossibility of consensus being reached. a loss of contractual capacity
is accorded an effect similar to the death of a party.BR The exceptional circumstances
referred to above may also be relevant in such cases however.r'"
3.4.5 Acceptance
The offer must be accepted in order to establish agreement.t''" and this holds true even
for unilateral contracts such as donations3.J1 Acceptance entails an affirmative
response to an offer that has come to the attention of the offeree.3.J2 This implies that
no contract is created in the case of simultaneous identical cross-offers. neither of
1.14 Christie 70.
135 Kahn "Sorne mysteries of offer and acceptance"( 1955) 72 SAL.! 24() 26<): Christie 54.
33(1 Costain & Partners \ Godden 19604 SA 45ó (SR): H itzeroth v Brooks 1965 ~ SA 444 (.A).
3'ï Christie 55.
1)R Christie 55 .
.. JC) Kahn _.S0l11e mysteries of offer and acceptance" ( 1955) 72 SA LJ 246 269.
HO Dietrichsen \' Dietrichsen 1911 TPD 486494-5: Whittle v Henley 1924 AD 13X 14X.
1-11
De Kock \ Execurors of Van de Wall ( I R99) 16 SC 463: LJnion Free State Mining and Finance
Corp Ltd \ Union Free State Gold and Diamond Corp Ltd 19604 'if\ 547 (W)
14C Bl00111 \ The American Swiss Watch Coornpan. 1915 AD 100: Van Jer Merwe et ,,14X.
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which has been accepted by the other party3~3 The precise question has not arisen in
South Africa. but in the English case Tinn li Hollman & Co it was held that there was
no contract in such cases.3~~ This reflects the subjective theory of contract. for
according to the declaration theory there would be a contract. since it holds that
coinciding declarations alone are sufficient.3~5
For a declaration to amount to an acceptance certain requirements have to be met.
3.4.5.1 Who may accept
A basic principle is that a simple contractual offer made to a specific person can be
accepted only by that person.v" Because everyone is in principle entitled to decide
with whom he wants to contract. a purported acceptance by some other person is
ineffective and does not bring about the conclusion of a contract.r "
Closely connected to the question of who may accept an offer is the question of the
other party's knowledge of the particular offer. When a person "accepts" an offer of
which he is unaware. typically by performing an act which. unknown to him. is
specified as acceptance in an offer made to the public. there is no agreement and
therefore no contracr.i" Another case which entai Is the same problem is where an
acceptance of an offer is made in anticipation.r'"
When the offer is addressed to the general pub Iico it is a matter of interpretation
whether it was open for acceptance by the first person only. or also for acceptance by
further persons.r"
3~J Christie 60-61.
3~~ linn v Hoffmann & Co (1873) 29 LT 271.
J~5 VanderMerweetal13.
3'+6 Levin \" Drieprok Properties (Pty) Ltd 1975:2 SA 397 (A).
,~J Blev. \ Snoxell 1931 TPD 226: Christie 64.
,.s I3loom\TheAmericanSwissWatchCo 1915 AD 100.
w' Kotze \. Newment SA Ltd 1977 3 SA 368 (NC).
350 See abox e: 3.-L3.1.
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3.4.5.2 Clear and unambiguous acceptance
The acceptance must be clear and unambiguous. leaving no doubt that the offer has
been accepted. 351 The offeree's response must extend to all the terms contained in
the offer. and should strictly conform to the terms thereof.i " A qualified acceptance
does not signify agreement. so that if the offeree attaches a condition to his
acceptance. it is a matter of counter-offer.F:' which will destroy the validity of the
'--1acceptance."
3.4.5.3 Period for acceptance
If the offer states a period within which acceptance is to take place. the offeree must
accept within this period in order to form a contract. A late acceptance is irrelevant.
since there is at that stage no offer open to which the offeree could assent.r"
3.4.6 Communication of acceptance
In order to achieve agreement. and therefore a contract. it is normally necessary for
the offeree' s acceptance to be communicated to the offeror.v" If one requires
consensus for a contract. it is a question of logic that a contract cannot be concluded
until the offeree has not only decided in his own mind to accept the offer. but has
communicated his acceptance to the offeror. For achieving consensus it is therefore
essential that both parties have to be informed about each other" s state of 111 ind.
According to the courts, however. an offeror may expressly':" or even impiiedly' "
1) I Boerne I Harris 1949 I SA 793 (Al: Kahn I Raatz 19764 SA 543 (A),
35c Joubert 43-45,
353 Christian v Ries (1898) 13 EDC 8: Joubert I Enslin 1910 AD Ii 29: JRM Furniture Holdings I
Cowling 19834 SA 541 (W)
35-+ Jones I' Reynolds 1913 AD 366: Harlin Properties (Ptv JUd I Los Angeles Hotel t Ptv) Ltd 1962
::; SA 143(A)
JSj Laws v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261.
15', Hersch I' Nel 1948::; SA 686 (A): Driftwood Properties (Pry I Ltd I' McLean 1971 :; SA 591 (A),
357
McKenzie I' FarmersCo-operative Meat Industries Ltd 1922 AD Iii,
)58 R I Nel 1921 AD 339 Remini v Basson 1993:; SA 204 (N) 211
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dispense with the necessity for communication. or the negotiations may reveal that
neither party contemplated that communication would be necessary.r"
3.4.6.1 Tacit acceptance and silence as acceptance
Just as an offer can be made tacitly. so can an acceptance.r?" According to South
African law. acceptance might therefore be inferred from a demand for delivery of the
subject matter of the offer.r'" Silence or inactivity in response to an offer is not. in
general. sufficient to raise an inference of acceptance. On the other hand South
African law regards certain circumstances (especially a business relationship or a
course of dealing) as giving rise to a "duty to speak ..3óê The approach is that when an
offer or an assertion of rights is made. the recipient who does not reject the offer or
assertion when according to ordinary commercial practise and human expectation he
would reject it. may well be taken to have accepted it.363 The answer will depend on
'f..)the facts of each case."
The general rule under South African law is that the offeror cannot. without the
consent of the offeree. specify that the latter's silence will be taken as an acceptance
of the offer.365 Applied to the case of unsolicited goods received by a person. this
principle means that the recipient is not ordinarily obliged to keep and pay for the
goods "" or to return them.3h7 but his acceptance of the otter may be inferred from his
making beneficial use of the goods or otherwise exercising ownership over them:1flX
-'59 Hawkins v Contract Design Centre (Cape Division) (Ptv) Ltd 19X3 4 SA 196 (T).
\(~(l Timoney and King v King 1920 AD I ]3: Collen,' Rietfontein Engineering Works 194R 1 SA 41]
(A)
V,I Goldfrcy \' Paruk 19652 SA 738 (0) 742 B.
j(1~ Sun Radio and Furnishers v Republic Timber & Hardware (Pty) Ltd 19694 SA 37R (T).
363 McWillianlS\'FirstConsolidatedHoldings(Pty) Ltd 19822 SA I (A) IOB-12B.
36~ See C0l11111aille v Steyn 1914 CPD 11001103: Benoni Produce and Coal Co Ltd \ (irundeltinger
1918 TPD 453:SeedatvTrucker"sShoeCo 19523 SA :ïJ3(T)517F-518B: IJoortSugal'
Planters (Pty) Ltd v Urnfolosi Co-operative Sugar Planters Ltd 1960 I SA 53 I (D) 541 B-1':
Wilmot Motors (Ptv) Ltd I Tucker's Fresh Meal Supply Ltd 19f19 4 SA -174 (Tl -17611-477 II as
against Martin I De Kock 194R2 SA 719(Ai735: lJnitlnspeClionCooIS;\(I'!,)I.ld, Hall
Longmore & Co (Pty) Ltd 19952 SA 795 (A) 800A-80 IB.
,65
Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 I SA 413 (A) 422.
366 Bellingham & Co v Smith ( 1894) 8 EDC 155.
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3.4.6.2 Method of acceptance
In cases where the offer contains no indication of the manner of acceptance. the
offeree is free to accept the offer in any manner which he deems proper. Sometimes.
however. an offer contains certain conditions regarding the way in which it is to be
accepted. for instance that acceptance must be in writing. In these cases acceptance
must take place in the prescribed way in order to constitute valid acceptance and
I . I I'd 369U urnare y a va J contract.
3.4.7 The conclusion of the contract
As a basic rule. South African law accepts that a contract is concluded when and
where consensus is reached. usually at the place where and when a person who has
made an offer is informed that is has been accepted by a person entitled do S037() The
so-called . information theory". which governs South African legal principles
regarding the conclusion of a contract. is based on the notion that the primary ground
of contractual liability is the true agreement between the parties to the transaction.i"
As we will see. numerous exceptions to this general principle have been made.
According to the information theory. this is the point in time at which the offeror
becomes aware of the acceptance. This is easily applied to situations in which the
parties are in each others presence. since there is no need to consider problems of
timing. At the very moment the acceptance is heard and understood by the offerror
the contract is said to be concluded (ifall other prerequisites are fulfilled).
Where contracts are concluded between parties who are at a distance from one
another conclusions become more difficult. It might. for example. be possible for the
1!~7 Charles Velkes Mail Order 1973 (Pty) Ltd " CIR 19R7 J SA 345 (/\) 35RB-I-:.
_j6~ Charles Velkes Mail Order 1973 (Pty) Ltd \ CIR 19R7 3 SA 35R I",
36'1 A lO Z Bazaars (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Agriculture 1975 3 SA ....68 (A).
'lO Dietrichsen v Dietrichsen 1911 TPD 486: Fern Gold Mining Company \ Tobias (IX9()):1 SAR
134: Bloom \ American Swiss Watch Company 1915 A [) 100: !\ mcoal Collieries Ltd \ Truter
1990 I SA I (A) 4.
'lI Van der Merwe et al 4:1.
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offeror to claim that he did not was informed about an acceptance. despite the fact that
the written acceptance was placed in his letterbox.
The courts initially adopted the view that the time of conclusion of a contract was
determined by the information theory. irrespective of whether the parties were
contracting inter praesentes or inter absentes.37c In the course of time. however. it
became more and more difficult to follow this approach rigorously. In 1921 the Cape
court. in Cape Explosive Works Ltd v South African Oil and Fa/ Industries Ltd..m
adopted a different approach regarding commercial contracts concluded in/er absentes
by offer and acceptance through the post. The court conceded that from a theoretical
perspective the information theory accorded with the modern notion of contract based
on the agreement of the parties. Nevertheless the so-called "expedition theory" was
adopted as the most satisfactory pragmatic way of determining the time (and place) of
conclusion of a postal contract. These contracts were held to arise at the moment (and
place) of posting the acceptance.Y" In so deciding. the court rejected not only the so-
called information theory. but also two other approaches to the problem. According
to the declaration theory. for instance. a contract comes into being at the time when
and the place where the letter of acceptance is written. in other words. when the
offeree has declared his acceptance.r " Another approach is embodied in the
reception theorv. In terms of this theory the contract comes into existence where and
when the letter of acceptance is received. therefore even before it has been read. The
decisive question is whether the letter has reached its destination.r '"
Against the background of these diverse approaches. the position of South African
law regarding the issue of when (and where) a contract is concluded can be
considered with reference to contract formation between parties at a distance from one
another.
vr: Van der Merwe et al 51.
m 1921 CPD 244.
~ï ~
Cape I:::xplosi\ e Works Ltd \ South African Oi I & lat lndustries l.td 192 I ("]Jf) 2M.
,75 Joubert 45.
'I" .loubert 4:5.
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3.4.7.1 Contracts made by post
Subsequent to the decision in Cape Explosive Works Ltd v South African Oil and Far
Industries Ltd..377 the courts have affirmed the view that the expedition theory is
applicable to contracts which are created by means of the post.m It is important to
note that the expedition-theory is restricted to postal contracts and is not a rule
generally applicable to contracts which are concluded irtter absentest'" Another
crucial aspect is that the intention of the parties must always prevail.i'" Therefore the
rule does not apply if any other intention of the parties appears hom their
agreemenr'[' or if the offeror in his offer prescribes when the contract will come into
ex istence. 382
Another situation which has been considered is the case where the offer is made inter
praesentes (verbally) but the acceptance takes place by means of the post. Here the
postal rule does not apply. Acceptance by post may well have been contemplated, but
it will not be assumed that the offeree is impliedly authorised to bring the contract
into being at the moment he posts his letter of acceptance.r''" It is of course a different
matter if the parties have agreed that the acceptance shall be posted. A further
example for non-application of the expedition theory is when the acceptance has been
posted to the wrong address. An immaterial mistake in the address will be ignored.
however.t'" As in the former example. the information theory applies. The law has.
moreover. modified the expedition theory in so far as it requires that the post must
operate regularly. so the theory cannot be applied when the post is not operating at the
time of acceprance.r"
vn 192 I CPD 244.
m Kerguelen Sealing & Whaling Co Ltd v Commissioner lor Inland Revenue 1939 AD 487 .
.17
Q Van der Merwe et al 52.
:l8n Kergeulen Sealing and Whaling Co Ltd v CIR 1939 Af) 50] .
.181 SA Yster en Staal Industriële Korporasie Bpk I· Koschade 19iU 4 SA 837 (TI.
1Se Coloured Development Corp Ltd I Sahabodien 1981 I SA 116X(Cl
181 Bal vVan Staden 1902 TS 128135-6142: Smeiman vVolkcrsv l v.i-l-! Sf\ 170(C)
~8-l
l.evben Products (Pvt ) Ltd I Alexander Films (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1959.1 SA 208 (SR).
-'85 Bal," Van Staden 1902 TS 128 136-7 145.
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Another very important question arises when an offeree withdraws his acceptance by
a faster means of communication after having posted it. The matter has not been
finally settled. but has been raised peripherally.
In A 10 Z Bazaars (Ply) Ltd v Minister ojAgricuirure3k6 such a telegram was held to
be ineffective. The Appellate Division387 decided the case on other grounds. but
Jansen JA doubted whether the rule that posting the letter brings the contract into
existence should necessary preclude the possibility of neutralisation of a posted
acceptance before its receipt by the offeror.r"
This approach seems reasonable when one considers the case of an hypothetical
offeror who in good faith relies on a telegrammed withdrawal and believing that the
offeree does not wish to enter into a contract. sells the goods in question to somebody
else. The offeree then could then. in principle. change his mind and argue that his
withdrawal was ineffective in law. with negative consequences for the offeror3k9
3.4.7.2 Contracts made by telephone
In 1935. South African law was required to consider for the first time which rule has
to be applied to contracts made by telephone. The court preferred the expedition
theory and Green berg .r stated:
"In my opinion. when a person makes an offer over the telephone he
authorises the use of this instrument for an acceptance. and as soon as the
acceptance is uttered into the telephone. whether he hears it or not. there is an
··390acceptance.
1~h 19744 SA 392(C).
187 .A to Bazaars (Pt) ) l.id \ Minisier of Agriculture 1975:; SA ..+6X (A).
188 Jansen JA staled: ··... nor is is at all clear that the principle [expedition theory I. mainly conceived
for the protection or the offeree. should necessarily precl ude the possi hi Iil: of neutralisation ol a
posted acceptance before its receipt by the offeror.'
lRc> Christie 84.
39(1 Wolmer v Rees 1935 TPD 319.
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Although other considerations raised by the court do contain a measure of truth.3,)1
this statement is unpersuasive.
It takes no account of the fundamental importance of agreement in the conclusion of
contract. It also seems quite illogical that - whether the parties are in one anothers
physical presence or otherwise - the declaration should not have to be received. ie
heard. in order to be accepted and thus agreement establ ished ..19~ However. after a
period of some uncertainty. the Eastern Cape Provincial Division held in 1965 that the
information theory has to be applied because in cases of contracts made by telephone
the parties are in the same position as when they are inter praesentes. The matter was
finally settled in the case of S v Henckerl.393 where the view point of the Eastern Cape
Provincial Division was confirmed.
3.4.7.3 Contracts made by electronic means of communication
The Electronic Communications Act 25 of 2002 (the ECT act) became law in August
2002. finally establishing a formal structure to define. develop. regulate and govern
electron ic-commerce in South Africa. Part 2 of the act provides the defau It situation
where parties have not agreed amongst themselves what term wi II govern the
formation of contracts electronically.i'" In this regard. the act follows the reception
theory. in that an acceptance of an offer by electronic means will be deemed valid
once it is received in the computer system of the offeror395
I'll Greenberg.l stating: --... It seems to me it would be i ruperting a dangerous doctrine i j' one held that
the offeror could say afterwards 'It may be that you accepted Illy offer and did so in an audible
tone. but I happened to be thinking of something else and I did not hear you. and therefore I am not
bound ... " From Illy point of view this reasoning concerns merely the question ui" prooi" and
evidence. rather than the issue of when a contract is concluded.
_N~ Christie 87.
39, 19813 SA 445(A)45IB.
394 Section 21.
~C)5 Section 22(2).
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3.5 Interpretation of contract
In order to determine the contents of a contract and the extent of liability thereunder.
it is necessary to interpret the declarations that embody it. The theoretical approach
underpinning the interpretation of contracts is that the intention of the parties has to be
determined.39(' South African law provides a great many rules of interpretation. which
principally reflect an objective and linguistic approach to revealing the intended
meaning of contracts. Although the rules allow the courts some tlexibility in that the
written provisions of a contract may be interpreted within the context in which they
came to exist. it is debatable whether South A frican Law in practice reflects the
supposedly subjective orientation of the interpretative exercise.
3.5.1 The technique of interpretation - content and context.
In interpreting a contract the court inquires into the common intention of the
contractants as it appears from the wording agreed to by both parties. The written
document. if it speaks with sufficient clarity. is presumed to express their common
intention.'>97 The first step in construing a contract is therefore to determine and adopt
the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used by the contractants. unless this
would result in some absurdity. repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the
39Rcontract.
Another principle is that the words must not be construed In isolation. but III the
context of the entire contract.Ï"
It is difficult to precisely determine the scope of contractual context. To begin with. it
is clear that the context should include the contract as a whole . .j()() This. in turn has
been defined. in contrast to statutory interpretation. as including even marginal notes.
396 Joubert 59.
J~}7
Total South Africa (Ply) Ltd I Bekker 1992 I SA 617 (A).
-'os Sassoon Continning and Acceptance Co (Ptv) Ltd I' Barelays National Bank Ltd 1974 I S.A MI
(A): Coopers & Lybrand v Byram 1<)95 -' SA 761 (A)
.N') List \' .lungers 1979 J SA 106 (A): ()K Bazaars (1929) Ltd \ Grosvenor Buildings (Ply) Ltd 1<:>93
-' SA 471 (A)
-wo List \ Jungers 19793 SA 106 (I\).
lOS
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at least insofar as these notes are taken to represent the common intention of the
panies.':" Analogously. in cases where a printed contract has been added to In any
way by written words. the two aspects must be reconci led as far as possible.-I(lc Where
attempts to this effect fail. however. the written words will be held to prevail
(regardless of chronologyj.i'" The deletion of words in advance of agreement wi II be
respected. so that they must be ignored. and no inference drawn from their deletion.-I04
A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation which has been applied in the
contractual context is that primacy should be afforded to the intended effect of the
agreement. over and above any strictly semantic interpretation which may present
itself. -1(15 This principle has been concisely stated (in its original context) by Schreiner
.JA in Jaga liDonges:
·the context". IS not limited to the language of the rest of the statute
regarded as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted.
Often more important is the matter of the statute. its apparent scope and
purpose. and within limits. its background."
The ordinary grammatical meaning of the words employed wi II not be adopted by the
court if the common intention of the contractants was to use the words in some special
or technical sense. This common intention may appear from the context of the
. Ir406 b d b id -1(17contract rtse T or may e prove y eVI ence.
Evidence of an identificatory nature to apply the contract to the facts is admissible.-I(I~
but this principle should not be extended to permit extrinsic evidence to be led to
-Hll Parkinson \ Matthewes and Drysdale 1930 WIJ) 58: Bekker \ Western Province Sports Club
(Inc) 1972 SA X03(3)818(D).
40~ Badenhorst v Van Rensburg 19852 SA 321 (T).
~O.l Trever investments (Pty) Ltd ,- Friedhelrn Investments (Ply) Ltd 19R2 I SA 7 (A).
4()4 Pritchard Properties (Pty) Ltd v Koulis 19862 SA I (A).
40; Lewis "Interpretation or Contracts" Southern Cross 2 I 021 I: Christie 241 242.
·W(, List v Jungers 1979 J SA 106 (A).
407 Rand Rietfontein Estates Ltd \ Cohn 1937 A IJ 317.
m Le Riche \ Hamman 194ó AD 64R: Delmas Milling Co Ltd \ Du Ijlessis 19553 SA ~47 (A).
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show that the application of the unambiguous wording of the contract would result in
an absurdity that is not apparent from the contract itself.-llilJ This seems to me to be a
fine distinction. which might not be easily made in practice.
It may happen that sufficient certainty about the meaning of the contract cannot be
achieved by the method described above. To resolve such problems South African
law permits recourse to evidence of the surrounding circumstances (ie notions that
were probably in the minds of the parties when they tanned the contract). This can
include evidence of previous negotiations and correspondence between the
contractants and even subsequent conduct by the parties showing the sense in which
they acted on the document. but not direct evidence of their own intentions.'!" When
even an inquiry regarding the surrounding circumstances does not help. recourse may
be had to what passed between the parties on the subject of the contract."!' This
subtle balancing of the need to interpret contracts in the context in which they were
formed with the need to respect the integrity of the written document. is reflects the
adherence of South African law to the parol evidence rule.
3.5. I.] The parol evidence rule
This rule is an outstanding example of how South African law has been intluenced by
English law-l12 and it has been the subject of some academic controversies.":' It
operates to exclude parol evidence. that is evidence from sources extrinsic to the
contractual document which runs counter to its terms. The rule has its foundations in
public policy. on the basis that certainty would be promoted and litigation shortened
by confining evidential matters to the four corners ofthe contractual document.
-Hlq Trollip \ Jordaan 196I I SA 23R (A).
~I(J Deinlas Milling Co Ltd \ Du Plessis 1955 _) SA .+47 (A): Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd \ Bekker
1992 I SA 617 (A)
"II Delmas Milling Co Ltd \ Du Plessis 1955:; SA 447 (Al.
41 : l.c« is "1nterpretation of Contracts" Southern Cross II.)Ó-19R.
411
l.ewis "l nterpretaion of Contracts" Southern Cross 197 19R: Joubert 160 I ó I.
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"The rule is that when a contract has once been reduced to writing no
evidence may be given of its terms except the document itself. nor may the
contents of such document be contradicted. altered. added to or varied by oral
evidence."
The rule first entered the jurisdiction of South Africa at he highest judicial level by
means of a 1914 decision of the Appellate Division. in Lowrey v Stedman:"I"
In Union Government v Vianini Ferro-Concrete Pipes (PIV) Ltd. ..I" Watermeyer JA
declared:
"Now this Court has accepted the rule that when a contract has been reduced
to writing. the writing is. in general. regarded as the exclusive memorial of the
transaction and in a suit between the parties no evidence to prove its terms
may be given save the document or secondary evidence of its contents. nor
may the contents of such document be contradicted. altered. added to or varied
by parol evidence."
It is important to note that this rule applies where a document (or documents) is taken
to be intended to comprise the whole contract. The notion of integration. which
according to some forms the basis of the rule. is defined in the following terms by
Wigmore:
"This process of embodying the terms of a jural act in a single memorial may
be termed the integration of the act. ie its formation from scattered parts into
an integral documentary unity. The practical significance of this is that its
scattered parts. in their former and inchoate shape. do not have any jural
effect: they are replaced by a single embodiment of the act. In other words:
When a j ural act is embodied in a single memorial. all other utterances of the
~Ij 1914 AD 532.
~ 15 194 1 AD ·B.
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parties on that topic are legally immaterial for the purpose of determining
what are the terms of their act.··-IIA
In the case of an integrated document. then. the document (or documents) will be
accepted as the sole evidence of the terms of the contract.
The inherent danger of an exclusive reliance on parol evidence is expressed by
Corbett .lA in the leading case of Johnston \ Leal. -117 in a ruling which does
something to help distinguish between relevant contextual evidence and extrinsic
evidence:
"It is clear to me that the aim and effect of this rule is to prevent a party to a
contract which has been integrated into a single and complete written
memorial from seeking to contradict. add to or modify the writing by
reference to extrinsic evidence and in that way to redefine the terms of the
contract, '" To sum up. therefore. the integration rule prevents a party from
altering. by the production of extrinsic evidence. the recorded terms of an
integrated contract in order to rely upon the contract as altered, ..-IIX
The rule is of a controversial nature. as has been indicated. and it has been discussed
whether it belongs to substantive law or the law of evidence.!'" However. the rule
exists and is part of South African case law,-I"(I
3.5.1.2 Resolving linguistic ambiguity
If the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the words does not lead the COul1 to an
interpretation of the contract, reference should be made to whichever of the classical
rules of interpretation best fits the problem.t"
'+Ih Wigmore Evidence vol 9 Sec 2425: cfNational Board (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd \ l.starc Swanepoel
1975 :; SA 16 (A): Venter v Birchholtz 197:2 1 SA 270 (A I
.JIl 1980] Si\ 927(A),
41~ .IohnSlOn\Leal19802SA '127(A),
419 Hoffmann/ i:ellert The South African Law or Evidence" 293,
-1::;0 l.ewi s "Interpretation of Contracts" Southern Cross 19X.
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Change of language
A deliberate change of expression will primafacie be taken to signify a change in the
. d d . .l""mten e mealllng.--
Presumption against tautology or superfluity
This rule introduces the presumption that no word is tautological or supertluous. but
that every part of a contract was intended to have some effect ..l~3
Restriction of general words (eiusdem generis, noscitur a sociis)
In cases in which an examination of the context makes it clear that the parties
intended that certain words should carry a special rather than their general meaning,
effect will be given to the special meaning intended ..l~.l However. where no special
meaning was attached to a word. effect will be given to the full extent of its general
.l~5meaning. even insofar as this entails aspects of which the parties were unaware.
Generalis specialibus non derogant
Special provisions will be accorded greater importance than general ones . .l~6
Expressio unius est exlusio alterius
It may be presumed that the express mention of one item indicates an intention to
exclude other similar items which are not mentioned. This presumption. however.
may be rebutted. and the courts are not hostile to pleas that a particular item was, In
fact. mentioned ex abundante cautela (without excluding others) ..l~7
.cl Zimmermann & Visser. - Lewis - 198 -20() .
• c~ Cradock \ Estate Cradock 19493 SA I 120 (N I.
-c~ Portion I of 46 Wadeville (Pty) Ltd \' Unity Cutlery (Pt) ) I~td 1984 I SA () I (A): But notice:
Commercial Union Assurance Co of South Africa Ltd \ Kwazulu rinance and lnvcstrneru Corp.
19953 SA 751 (A) .
.l:?-t Grobbelaar,' Van de Vyver 1954 I SA 248 (A): Ovcon (Ply) Ltd \ Administrator. Natal 19914
SA 71 (D)
·cs Lanfear \' Du Toit 1943 AD 59 .
..26 James NOl1h (Zimbabwe) (Pv) Ltd v Mattinson 1990 2 ~A 228 (Z) .
• c7 Florida Road Shopping Centre (Ptv) Ltd \ Caine 19684 SA 587 (N)
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If analysis of the language of the contract under the preceding guidelines cannot
resolve the ambiguity. the contract is considered void due to vagueness.t" This
extreme measure will. however. often be avoided in the light of equitable
intervention.
3.5.1.3 Equitable interpretation
While it is trite that a cOUl1has no equitable jurisdiction to improve an unambiguous
contract.t" equitable considerations do playa role in the process of interpretation, A
construction that does not give one party an unfair or unreasonable advantage over the
other will be adopted if the contract is truly ambiguous. In Rand Rietfontein Estates
Ltd v Cohn-l3(J De Wet JA quoted from Wessels:
"The Court will lean to that interpretation which will put an equitable
construction upon the contract and wi II not. un less the intention of the parties
is manifest. so construe the contract as to give one of the parties an unfair or
bl d h h ··-131unreasona e a vantage over t e ot er.
Equity will also prefer a convenient and effective interpretation, as the following rules
spell out:
Avoidance of inconvenience
The argument ab inconvenienti appl ies to cases of am bigu ity and entai Is that the
construction that will lead to the least inconvenience wil be preferred.
~2S Levenstein x Levenstein 19553 SA 615(SR),
~::q Van Rensburg \ Straughan 1914 AD J17: De Haviland Estates (Pty) Ltd ,. Me Master 19ó9 2 S!\
312 (A): South A lrican Warehousing Services (Pt> ) Ltd \ South British Iusurance Co Ltd 1971 :1
SA IO(A)
~3(! 1937 AD 317 .
. I.1t l.ess \ Bornstein 1948 -I SA 333 (C ),
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Thus. for example. in the case of Deutsche Evangelische Kirche ::/1 Pre/aria "
Hoepner .' 3c the ambiguities of the church's constitution were interpreted with a view
to avoiding potentially costly delay and uncertainty.
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
This rule favours an interpretation which renders a contract fully efficacious to one
that renders it abortive.v':'
Construction contra proferentem or contra stipulatorem
This general rule is applied in cases of otherwise unresolvable ambiguity. so that any
contract will be interpreted against the person who drew it up and was thus
responsible for the ambiguity (contra proferentems .' 34 A related rule is that an
ambiguity will be resolved against the promisee so as to impose the lighter burden on
the promisor (contra stipulatoremi.i'" In a case of contlict between these rules of
final resort. the former should prevail.Y"
3.6 Defects of consent
As we have seen."37 valid consent implies that the will of the person. as expressed
during the formation of an agreement is both a true reflection of that person' s
intentions. and that those intentions were not formed in circumstances which might
invalidate them.
Where a person's will has been formed in consequence ofa misapprehension. whether
self-induced or as a result of external intluences. it may in particular circumstances be
4" Deutsche l-vangel ische Kirche zu Pretoria \ Hoepner 191 I TPT) 21X.
-1.13 Kotze \ henkei & Co 1929 M) -118: Du Plessis \ Nel 1952 I SA 51:; (A I
-U-l
Ionnes \ .Anglu A frican Shipping Co ( 1936) l.td 1972:2 SA 8271;\ I.
4." Cairns (Pt: ) Ltd \ Playdon & Co Ltd 1948:1 SA 99 (A I
-n(, Cairns (Pty) Ltd \' Playdon & Co Ltd 1948:; SA 9LJ(A).
-U7 See above: 2.3
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held to be legally defective. The law deals with this possibility under several
categories.
We will firstly exarrune the position under South African law where a party
misapprehends a material circumstance during negotiations and declares his consent
to the contract on the basis of an unfounded assumption.
Also to be considered is the position where one party declares his assents. but this is
obtained in an improper way. for example by means of duress. The approach of
South African law to such situations. and the extent to which the solutions are related
to questions of agreement. eg whether the contract is binding but voidable. or wholly
void for lack of agreement. must be ascertained. A Iso to be investigated is the extent
to which solutions are arrived at independently of the notion of agreement. for
example on the basis of a lack of certainty or good faith.
The primary focus of the investigation concerns the effect of mistake on the
agreement which constitutes the contract. It will be seen that outcomes differ
according to the kind of mistake that occurs. and also depending on whether one or
other of the parties must take responsibility for what has occurred.
What has to be established is how South African law defines mistake 111 the
contractual context. and what juristic solutions it provides if the mistake IS not
imputable to the opposite contractant (or a third person). The investigation will
finally consider the position that obtains when the relevant mistake is caused by
somebody other than the mistaken party.
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The discussion in this study has proceeded on a distinction between "self induced"
defects of wi II and those caused by "external factors" ..J3R Th is section focuses on the
former category and its resolution by law.
3.6.1 Mistake
South African cases make it clear that for a mistake to be legally relevant. it must
concern a material aspect of contract and should. in addition. be reasonable (justus).
In respect to material ity. South A frican law d istingu ishes between mistakes regard ing
the content or consequences of the contract and those relating only to the motive or
reason which led a person to conclude a contract.
3.6.1.1 Material mistake
Material mistakes are those that relate to the consequences or content of the
agreement as expressed in its material terms ..J:;9 and entails that the parties are in
disagreement regarding the the constituent aspects of the consensus. Examples are
any mistake with regard to an obligation or obligations under the contract. that is to
say. in regard to a performance due under the agreement. mistakes in respect of the
incidental terms thereof and the identity of the parties to the agreernent.T"
In contrast to material mistakes. which result in disagreement about the elements of
contract. a mistake in motive has no bearing on the elements or consequences of the
contract. Since it does not effect agreement. the contract remains valid ..J.J1
In the example previously given ..J.J2 it is beside the point that B·s girlfriend has a
liking for gold. This circumstance merely relates to B·s motive for buying such a
ring; it does not prevent agreement on the elements of the contract. and is therefore
-138 See above: 2.3.1.
-l_1CJ Logan v Beit (1890) 7 SC 197: National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd \'
Potato Board 1958 2 SA 473 (A): Diedericks \ Minister of Lands 1964 I S/\ .+9 (N): Orban \
Stead 197R 2 SA 713 (W): Papadopoulos \ Trans-Stale Properties and Investments l.td 1979 I
SA 682(W):DuToit\Atkinson·sMotorsBpk 19R52 SA X93(1\)
.1.1(1 Van der Merwe et al 16.
-1-11 Diedericks x MinisterofLands 19641 SA .+9(N).
-l-l:
Sec abov e: :2.3 I
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-l-l'supposedly part of the contract .::' '
irrelevant in a material sense. There is no mistake regarding the content or
consequences of the contract. B is merely under the mistaken impression that his
girlfriend likes gold or that she is faithful. But should B mistakenly believe that the
agreement has been concluded subject to a term that his girlfriend likes gold or IS
faithful. the mistake would be material because it relates to a term which IS
Mistakes of law have historically constituted something of an anomaly in terms of the
understanding of material mistake. A Ithough such 111 istakes may certainly affect the
consequences of an agreement. they have nevertheless traditionally been treated as
insufficient to affect the consensus between the parties.T'" When a party is mistaken
regarding the legal aspects of the contract. his mistake is not considered material.
according to the maxim ignoratio/uris neminem excusai.ï'" Nowadays. however. in
keeping with the theoretical basis of material mistake. no distinction should be drawn
between mistakes of fact and law.-l41i
Declarations are sometimes made without the declarer intending to be legally bound
thereby. A classic example is that of an offer (or acceptance) in jest. where the party
in question cannot be heard to claim that his declaration was in jest, although
statements lacking in animus contrahendi may arise in other circumstances. But
whether a contractual liability exists in spite of the absence of animus contrahendi
and therefore consensus. depends on whether the other party knows or ought as a
reasonable man to have known that animus contraheridi is lacking.-l-l7 This relates to
115
-t-n See Van der Merwe el al 17.
-t-t-+ Sampson v LJnion & Rhodesia Wholesale Ltd (in liquidation) 1929 AD 46R: Mann \ Sydney
Hunt Motors (Pty) Ltd 19582 SA 102 (GW).
-t-+) Kimberley Share Exchange Co v Hampson ( I RR3) I HCC, 340.
-+-+6 Willis Faber I::nthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue 199:2 -+ SA 202 (1\). which opens the \Na}
lor equating mistakes of lact and law in general .
.I·n Heatlie \ Colonial Government (1887) 5 SC .153: Hort) lnv csiments (Pty) Ltd \ Interior
Acoustics (Pty: I.td 19843 SA 537 (W)
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
the crucial aspect of the reasonableness of the mistake and will be discussed under the
b· . ~Hru nc JUSlus error.
3.6.1.2 The taxonomy of mistake
South African law tends to distinguish between unilateral. common and mutual
mistake.
3.6.1.2.1 Unilateral mistake
A uni lateral mistake exists where one of the parties misunderstands an aspect of the
contract. whereas the other party is aware of the true state of affairs.
A. for example. knows the spoon which he is selling to B to be silver-plated. while B
thinks it is made of solid silver. One might readily assume that the parties in such a
case have not reached consensus and the contract should therefore be void or at least
open to rescission. The position is not so simple. however.
The seller is only liable for the qualities which he has claimed the item in question
has. This means that a mistake about a quality is often immaterial.-I-I9 It will be
relevant only in cases where the purchaser believed the seller was giving a warranty
regarding a certain quality. whereas the seller had no intention to do SO.-I511
In Maritz I' Prat/e/51 the court came to the conclusion that there is a material
unilateral mistake regarding an essentiale negotium i f it concerns the identity of the
thing sold. In this case. A wanted to sell a mirror. and B thought that the mirror was
being sold together with a marble slab on which it stood at the auction hall. This was
regarded by the court as a question of identity. rather than of the quality of the thing.
Where a unilateral mistake is adjudged to be material in a particular case. the outcome
wi II be affected by a consideration of what a reasonable man would have understood
~~8 See below: .1.6.2.3 ..1.
"'-+(j Trol lip x .lordaan 1961 I SA 238(1\).
~5(1 Van der Merwc et al Fr f x.
H (1894) II SC 345.
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3.6.1.2.2 Common mistake
under the circumstances - a consideration which is considered in more detail under
justus error. below ..!)::' Where a mistaken party cannot show that his mistake to be
reasonable. he may be held to the contract on the basis of quasi-mutual assent
(reliance theory).
Common mistake exists where parties are in full agreement about the contract and its
consequences. but are both labouring under the same mistake. The central issue is
whether both parties would not have contracted if aware of the true state of affairs. A
common mistake on a matter which did not affecr the understanding of both parties
has no effect on the validity of the contract.v"
For example A and B think that the spoon which B is buying from A is made of solid
silver. while it is actually silver-plated. If B's mistake is the result of his own
conclusion regarding the substance. there is only a unilateral mistake in motive and
the contract is still valid if A would have contracted in any event ..J5.l Although there
is wide-spread agreement that there is no contract where both parties labour under a
mistake in motive ..)):' opinions differ on the theoretical explanation for this outcome.
Apart from the notion that a mistake of this kind is in itself sufficient to vitiate the
agreement there are those who attempt to explain the consequence of common
mistake in terms of initial impossibility ..)56 The prevailing view is that the agreement
is abortive if in the circumstances the agreement was based on a common supposition
constituting a material term of the contract.i'"
~5~ See below ].6.2.3.3
-l:i ~ Hillview Properlies (Pty) Ltd \ Strijdom 197R I SA 302 ("I).
~5~ Joubert 57-60 7R.
~)5 Dickinson Motors (Ptv) Ltd \ Oberholzer 1952 1 SA 443 (A). Ciollach and Gomnerts (19ó7)
(Ptv) Ltd \ Universal Mills and Produce Co (Pt)') Ltd 19n 1 SA l)14 rA I.
451'> Such as a sale of res extincta.
~57 Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v Smith 20024 SA 264 (SeA): Van der Merwe et al 1920: Christie
380 381: Joubert . 78 79.
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Even if this is not accepted, such mistake will certainly be material if it relates to a
matter which was vital to the transaction. in the sense that if either of them had been
aware of the true position the transaction would not have gone through.
3.6.1.2.3 Mutual mistake
A mutual mistake occurs when parties come to different but reasonable
understandings of an ambiguous aspect of the contract. and are unwittingly at cross
purposes. while believing themselves to be in agreement. This is sometimes referred
to as mistake about dissensus. For example. A. the owner of both a stallion and a
mare. offers to sell "my horse" to B. A is referring to his stallion. while B assumes
he is referring to the mare. In this case. each party reasonably develops an
understanding which is different from the understanding of the other. They have not
actually achieved consensus. and so the contract is void.-l5X
As mentioned. the issue of reasonableness is decisive with respect to the question of
contractual liability in cases of disagreement. If one party" s understanding of what
was agreed was unreasonable. the party whose understanding was reasonable wi II be
entitled to enforce his version of the contract on the basis of quasi mutual assent.-·5')
However. if both parties are reasonable or both are unreasonable the contract must be
held void ab initio for lack of true agreement.i?"
In relation to mistake reference is often made to further categories of romanistic
origin. These assist in determining whether a mistake is material or not. One speaks
about error in corpore if the parties are mistaken regarding the identity of the thing.""
A mistake regarding the substance from which an article is made called error in
substantia: this in turn is a special manifestation of the general concept of an error as
to the quality of an article. error in qualitate . Here the parties are at one with regard
-t5S Allan \' Sixteen Stirling investments (Ply) Ltd 19744 SA 164 (I)).
4SQ Van Ryn Wine and Spiril Co v Chandos Bar 19n TPD 417.
46(1 Maritz v Pralle) ( 1894) II SC 345: Dobbs, Verran 1923 [DI. 177: Ocean Cargo Line Ltd ,
FR Waring t Ptyj Ltd 19634 SA 641 (A)
41>1 Maritz v Pralle: ( 1894) II SC 345.
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to the identity of the item. but not with regard to its quality.t'" Error in negotio refers
to a mistake about the nature (type) of the contract entered into by the parties.l'"
Another kind of mistake is error in persona which means that one party is mistaken
regarding the identity of the party with whom he is concluding the contract. This kind
of mistake will prevent consensus only if the identity of the other person is of material
. h -IIi-lImportance to t e contract.
3.6.2 The treatment of disagreement
It is apparent from remarks already made that even in cases of material mistake. the
mistaken party might nevertheless be contractually liable. The conclusion that a
mistaken party will not invariably be entitled to rely on disagreement means that the
will theory in its original form is no longer applied by South African courts.
An unqualified application of the will theory would mean that every material mistake
would exclude contractual liability. Either party would be entitled to rely on the lack
of consensus to avoid liability. This might be acceptable when both parties are aware
of the mistake. but ifone or both are unaware of it. unacceptable results might follow.
In order to prevent the consistent application of the will theory from having unfair
results in cases of disagreement which is not immediately evident. South African
jurispudence has considered alternative approaches to the basis of liability in such
cases.
3.6.2.] CuLpa in contrahendo - a rejected approach
The doctrine of culpa in contrahendo acknowledges that no contract can arise where
consensus is lacking owing to a mistake by one of the parties to an agreement. Unfair
results are corrected by the recognition that where the mistaken party has suffered
J6~ Trollip \' .lordaan 1961 I SA 238 (A ,.
Jill Standard Rank \ Du Plooy. Standard Bank \ Coetzee ( I X99) 16 SC I ó I.
-H..J Landsbergen \ Van der Walt 19722 S/\ 6ó7 (R').
119
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
loss. he has a claim for delictual damages against the other. if the mistake has been
caused by negligent or intentional conduct the of other party to the agreement. .jh:'
3.6.2.2 Estoppel
The doctrine of estoppel was adopted into South African law from English law ..j(,h It
essentially provides that where a person. the representor. conducts himself in such a
way that another reasonably understands it to evince an intention to contract on a
particular basis. the representor will be held to his ostensible intention if not to do so
Id I d .. . .j67wou ea to InJ usnce.
It has been pointed out that the doctrine of estoppel entai Is the enforcement of a quasi-
contract in cases where intention and therefore consensus is lacking. The party falsely
asserting an intention will be estopped from relying on his lack of intention where he
himself has encouraged or tolerated reliance on it. so that the fiction of a contract is
. . d bh' .jhRrnamtaine etween t e parties.
In cases of estoppel therefore. the reasonable expectation of the representee is
enforced. although of course. the court cannot create a contract where no consensus
ad idem was in fact reached between the parties.
As a doctrine having its basis in equity therefore. the effects of an application of
estoppel will not extend to third parties. Additionally. and again as a result of the
equitable roots of the doctrine. a heavy burden of proof is placed on the plaintiff. who
will be required to prove all of the elements of estoppel by representation. including
detrimental reliance.i'"
-té15 Van der Merwe et al 23.
466 Connock" s (SA) Motor Co Ltd \ Sentraal Westelike Ko-operaue« e Maatskappy Bpk 1964 2 SA
~7 (T)
.jh) Van der Merwe et al 23 .
.jnR Hutchison "Formation ofContract" Southern Cross 188: Van der Merwe et al 25.
-t(1q Van der Merwe et al 27.
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Thus although the doctrine has been expressly accepted by the Appellate Division as
being an acceptable plea in the appropriate circumstances.V" il is not widely resorted
. . -l71to In practice.
3.6.2.3 Contractual liability on objective grounds
3.6.2.3.1 Declaration theory
Although South African case law contains a number of dicta supporting a more
objective approach to the creation of contracts and dissensus. -l72 it can hardly be said
that the declaration theor/73 as such is of real importance for the treatment of
problems related to contractual liability.
3.6.2.3.2 Reliance theory
Instead. the South A frican courts have adopted the re Iiance theory as an alternative
basis for a contract where there is no consensus.-l7-l Two versions of the reliance
theory may be identified. depending on whether the contract assertor is. in cases of
disagreement. required to establish the elements of a contract on an objective basis. or
whether. given that the existence of an objective contract is presumed in cases of
hidden disagreement. the law requires the contract resiler to establish that he is not
bound on an objective basis.
The first version entails a direct protection of reliance.-l75 and has its foundation in the
English case Smith v Hughes.i" In such cases. the party who wishes to enforce a
contract where the other party raises disagreement must prove two elements. He must
.j)(1 Van der Merwe et al 26.
m Van der Merwe et al 26 .
sr: Hutchison "Formation ot' Contract" Southern Cross I RJ.
-l71 See above: 3.3.2.1.
m IPieters&CompanyvSalomon 1911 AD 121: Allen x Si:\teenStirlinglJwestments(Pty)Lld
19744 SA 164 (Dl: Spes Bona Bank Ltd v Portals Water Treatment South A irica (l)t\ ) Ltd 19XJ
I SA 9n (A): Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging \ Friedman 1l)7') -' S/\ ')7X (/\) ')')]. 995.
j7S Van der Merwe "Die Duiwel. die Hof en die Wi] \ an "n Kontraktarn .IC Nosier 13 _)I .
.jJ(, (1871) LR 6 QB 597.
121
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
122
prove that the other party has created in his mind the belief or reliance that full
consensus has been reached between them. Protection is afforded the defendant by
virtue of the fact that the test here is objective. that is to say. it must be shown that a
reasonable man under the circumstances would have understood the conduct of the
defendant in the same way. 477
The relevance of fault or prejudice on the part of the apparent promisor remains
unresolved in the case law. and an issue of some controversy.t" There has not yet
been a clear statement by the courts in this regard.4],) This is true also or the question
of whether reliance must be detrimental to the plaintiff 4XII
The second approach manifests itself in thejusLUs error doctrine.4x1 In cases where
there is. ostensibly. objective agreement. a party who wishes to escape contractual
liability must provejUSlUS error. The mistaken party will be held to the contract on
the basis of quasi-mutual assent. ie the reliance theory.4R::>unless he can show that his
mistake was reasonable (justus error).4R3 This will be assumed to be the case where
the mistake is imputable to the contract assertor because he induced the mistake or
was aware of it. or ought as a reasonable person to have been aware of it.4x4 Whether.
if the mistake cannot be imputable to the contract assertor in any of these ways. the
contract resiIer may yet avoid liability by establishing that his mistake nevertheless
was reasonable. is uncertain."? The South African courts have developed some
guidelines regarding the question of whether a unilateral mistake is reasonable or not.
Thus a mistake is not reasonable if it was due the mistaken party's own fault. for
-177 Van der Merwe et al 30-32.
m Christie 28 29: Van der Merwe et al 3031.
~7q Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (EdI11S) Bpk \ Kemp & De Beer 19794 SA 74 (A): Spes Bona
Bank Ltd I' Portals Water Treatment South Africa (Ptv) Ltd 19R3 I SA 978 (A).
-I~(' Van der Merwe et al 32: Christie 29 30.
m See below: 3.(,.2.3.3.
-IRe See above: 3.3.2.2.
-18.1 See below: 3.6.2.3.3.
4~-l George \ Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 195R 2 SA -+65 IiI,): National and Ol erscas I)istrihulor\ ( "I'P (Pt; I
Ltd v Potato Board 195R 2 SA 473 (A): Sonap Petroleum SA (l>t\ ) Ltd I' Pappadogian is 1992 :;
SA 234 (A)
485 National and Overseas Distributors Corp (Pt: ) Ltd " Potato Board 195R:2 SA ~73 (A).
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example where he has not carried out reasonably necessary inquiries before
committing himself to the contract.t'" Reasonableness has also been den ied when the
mistaken party did not read the contract before signing-lX7 or carelessly misread one of
the rerms.!" The same applies to circumstances in which the mistaken party did not
insist on having a contract in a language he could not understand explained to him-lX9
or misinterpreted a clear and unambiguous contract.i'"
Through the doctrine of jus Ius error. the reliance theory has become established as an
explanation for an alternative basis for a contract when consensus is lacking but it is
nevertheless equitable to hold a party to an impression of consent which he induced in
another.-l91
3.6.2.3.3 A unified approach
By demanding proof that the material mistake was also reasonable under the
particular circumstances. the courts have limited the effect of dissensus on the
existence of a contract. The final decision about the existence of a contract has
become dependent on subjective as well as objective considerations. This is also the
import of a direct recourse to induced reliance bv means of the Smith " Hughes
doctrine.
The fact that the direct reliance theory and justus error doctrine approach the same
problem from opposite perspectives. leads to a certain degree of tension and
uncertainty. . . ~I..r'In Sonap Petroleuni (SA) (Ply) ,. Pappadogianis. - the Appellate
Division reviewed the law relating to mistake in contract and attempted a
reconciliation between these closely related approaches.
~S!) Diedericks \ NI inister of Lands 1964 I SA -1-9(N): Springvale Ltd " Edwards 1969 1
(RA): Osman \ Standard Bank National Credit Corp Ltd 19R5 2 SA J 7R (C).
-l87 Standard Credit Corp Ltd \' Naicker 1987:2 SA -1-9(N) .
• 88 Patel \ Le Clus (Pty) Ltd 1946 TPD 30.
-189 Mathole v Mothle 1951 I SA 256 (T).
·NO Van Pletsen \' Henning 1913 AD 8289: lrwin \ Davies 1937 CPI) 442.
j\) I
SA 464
Sonarep (SA) (Pty] Ltd \ Pappadogianis 1<)92.3 SA 234 (A) 23l\-2J9.
Jq2 1992,) SA }J-J.(A).
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Although South African law. as we have seen. is primarily interested in the objective
man ifestations of agreement. ')'J.1 it may tru itfully pay heed to more subjective
considerations in cases of alleged dissensus. as this important case demonstrates.
Harms A.IA stated that. in such cases. the reliance theory had to be resorted to in order
to determine whether or not a contract has come into existence.
In a classical application of the theory. he deemed it unnecessary to determine
whether the mistaken party had been justified in his mistake. and he did not favour the
appl ication of estoppe I either. On the facts of the case. it seemed clear lO him that the
contract assertor had had constructive notice of the mistake. which he had chosen to
ignore to his own advantage. Therefore there had never been any meaningful
consensus. and the agreement in question was void ah initio.
The issue of mistake now appears to be more easily resolved: one merely needs to ask
whether or not the parties had reached consensus: and. if not. whether a reasonable
belief that consensus had been achieved had been induced in the mind of one party by
the other. The foundation for Iiabi Iity is thus extended from consensus to reasonable
reliance thereon. and an alleged contract will be void ah initio where neither is found
. .)').)to exist.
3.6.3 Consensus obtained by improper means
As has been shown above. the requirement of an actual or apparent meeting of the
minds of contractants renders the intention of the parties to a contract of paramount
• -ll)':;;Importance. .
A prospective contractant might declare a particular intention in consequence of the
most diverse reasons: mostly he will do so in reaction to the particular circumstances.
In all probability. he will act on certain expectations regarding the meaning of the
words exchanged as well as on his expectations in relation to the particular subject
_'~I:; See abov e: 3.5.
_'~).l Hutchison "Formation or Contract" 193
~l)" Sec abo. c: .3.J. I 1.2.
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matter of the envisaged contract. It might happen that in a particular case the
intention or the expectation of a legal subject does not correspond with the actual
circumstances of the case. This general scenario was considered in the previous
section.
As we have seen. South African law will not consider as legally relevant every factor
that might conceivably influence an expression of wi 11.~9f, Consideration of subjective
factors will be counterbalanced by the concern that - in keeping with the principles of
good faith and public interest - serious expressions of will must be adhered to and
given their intended legal consequences. On the other hand. expressions of will
which are obtained by means of improper pressure should obviously not be given
legal effect. due regard being given to the principles of good faith. Thus in order for a
contract to be effectively constituted by agreement. that agreement must be a free and
independent expression of the wi II of both parties.-l97 Of present relevance are
situations where agreement is vitiated because a party was. in the formation of his
will. intluenced in a way which the law holds to be improper. Situations of this kind
can be approached in one of two ways.
One approach would deny the existence of the juristic act altogether. and treat the
contract as absolutely void ab inilin.~9k Although support for such a solution is to be
found in common-law authorities. it has not been approved by the South African
.1')')courts.
The more popular view is that the contract should be viewed as merely voidable, so
that effect may be given to it unless the party whose consensus was obtained
improperly elects to rescind it.so(l Various circumstances will render an agreement
defective. and hence voidable. in this sense.
~lJ6 See above: 3.6.1.
-lq7 Van der Merwe et al 71.
-l9X Van der Merwe et al 71
~l)l) l.ubbe "Voidable Contracts" Southern Cross 262.
,fI(, Christie.33 I.
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3.6.3.1 Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation is usually divided into three classes.?" These will first be outlined.
and the qualifications applicable to them discussed. before we return to the available
remed ies.
3.6.3.1.1 Classes and qualifications
Misrepresentation is divided into simple. fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation.
and is qualified by requirements of materiality and causation.
3.6.3.1.1.1 Simple misrepresentation
Misrepresentation refers to statements made before a contract is made. which do not
form part of the contract. Because this is so. an action for breach will not succeed
should the statement turn out to be unfounded. Nevertheless. there are statements
which are distinguished from mere puffs or commendations (which are legally
irrelevant) by being so seriously made as to invite reliance on them. which are
covered under the category of misrepresentation.r'"
Misrepresentations are false statements of past or present fact. made by one party to
another during the negotiations preeeeding agreernent.i'" Mere declarations of
opinion which prove unfounded are said to be beyond the scope of misrepresentation.
irrespective of whether they consist of opinions on questions of law:'!).) or l'act.-'o:, or
whether they refer to the past. present or future.i''" This rule is. however. qualified in
the case of fraudulent conduct. so that where a party fraudulently misrepresents his
opinion on any matter with a view to encouraging the other to enter the contract. and
501 Burchell "Honext Misrepresentation and Damages" (1950) 67 SAL.! 121.
5(1~ Sinai I v Smith 1954 3 SA 434 (SWA): Mazza \ Jones 197~ ~ S/\ 74() (RA) (" pu ning in
reverse" b; slating one cannot afford the price asked).
",{j1 Feinstein \ Niggii 19RI 2 SA 684 (A).
5(14 Sampson \ Union and Rhodesia Wholesale l.td 1929 I\D 46X.
50j l.arnb vWalters 1926AD358.
5(1("1 Feinstein \ Niggii 198:2 SA 684 (A).
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where the other does in fact rely on the false statement. a misrepresentation vitiating
the agreement will be held to have occurred.i'"
The doctrine of rescission for misrepresentation is prern ised on a duty of good faith.
since the law in this regard recognises that misrepresentation may be implied. and
may even be made by silence or an omission to disclose inforrnation.i'" On the other
hand. the law stops short of implying a general rule that all material facts must be
disclosed. so that any non-disclosure might amount to a misrepresentation by
silence.i''" Public policy considerations continue to allow a party to make a bargain to
his own best advantage. A misrepresentation by silence will occur where only part of
the truth has been told and the om ission of the remainder causes a misleading
impression"!" or where the facts have changed materially since a true representation
was made.s'l Apart from certain instances where a duty to disclose is recognised.51~ a
legal duty to disclose a material fact might arise in view of the circumstances of a
particular caseSI, Despite the duty generally imposed on any party signing
contractual documents to look to his own interests. someone who is aware of the tact
that the other is unlikely to read a document which contains unexpected or
particularly onerous terms may find the contract vitiated by misrepresentation by
silence.51.J In such circumstances also there is a legal duty to disclose and a failure to
do so constitutes a misrepresentation.
3.6.3.1.1.2 Fraudulent misrepresentation
j07 Orkin Bros Ltd \ Rell 1921 TPD 92.
)()~ Speight '" Cilass 1961 1 SA 778 (D): Novick \ Comair Holdings Ltd 1979:2 SA I 16 (W)_
5(1\) Novick '" Comair Holdings Ltd 19792 SA I I () (W).
jlQ Marais\EdlmanI934CPD212.
)11
Cloete \ Smithfield Hotel (Pty} Ltd 19552 SA 622 (O).
512 A seller for instance is under a duty lO disclose known delects. and a prospective insured I11L1sl
disclose circumstances material to the risk undertaken b: the insurer: see Van der Merwe ct al 7X-
79.
513 Dibley \ Funer 1\l51 4 SA 73IC).
'1.1 Kempsion Hire (Pty) Ltd \ Snyman 19884 SA 4A5 (TI.
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"Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made
(I) knowingly or (2) without belief in its truth. or (3) recklessly careless
whether it be true or false. Although I have treated the second and third as
distinct cases. I think the third is but an instance of the second. for one who
A fraudulent misrepresentation is one made without an honest belief in its truth.515
Lord HerscheIl stated in Derrv l' Peek Sif,
makes a statement under such circumstances can have no real belief in its
truth. To prevent a false statement being fraudulent there must. I think. always
be an honest beliefin its truth."
This view was adopted in R l' /\;Jver.\)i7 and it can be taken as the accepted view under
South African law.
Thus. absolute knowledge on the part of the III isrepresentor that the misrepresentation
is not honest is unnecessary. if it results from fraudulent abuse of ignorance.i"
However. negligence while making inquiries or unreasonableness in drawing
conclusion from facts. irrespective of how gross that negligence or unreasonableness
may be. cannot amount to the absence of honest be Iier 5i Cj
Fraud may be constituted by silence in situations where a party has knowledge or
constructive notice of material facts. and has actively concealed those facts with a
view to inducing another party to enter a contract based on a material
misapprehension.r" Silence will also be deemed fraudulent in situations where the
silent party is aware that the other party is unaware of material facts.?" or where a
duty of care is implied by virtue of the fact that the other party is reliant on him for
'I' Hamman \ Moolman 19684 SA 340 (A).
"" (1889) 14AC337(HL)374.
5)7 1948 I SA J75 (1\).
)IR R \' Myers 194R I SA 375 (A).
51" See below: 3.6.3.1.1 . .1.
52rJ R"M!ers 194R I SA 375(A): Dible; \ lurter 19514S/\ 7J(C).
5:1 Van der Merwe \ Meades 1991 2 SA I (AL
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disclosure of certain material facts.-'~~ Similarly. telling part of the truth while
remaining silent with regard to related material facts will also amount to fraud.5::>_'
3.6.3.1.1.3 Negligent Misrepresentation
A further type of misrepresentation is that attended by negligence on the part of the
representor. The representor may honestly believe his statement to be correct (if he
does not. one is dealing with fraudulent misrepresentation). but the decisive question
in such a situation is whether his honest belief was negligent in the circumstances.
In R v Mversr" Greenberg JA underlined the fact that the element of honest belief
distinguishes negligence from fraud. a distinction which can be difficult to draw in
some cases:
"It appears to me that negligence in making enquiries ..... whether such
negligence .... be gross or of lesser degree. can never [itself] amount to an
absence of honest belief."
Thus. where there is a shadow of doubt. leading lO even the most half-hearted
enquiries. the requirements for honest belief set out in Derrv I' Peeks~<, will not have
been met.
Greenberg JA further referred to the dictum of Innes C.I in R I' Nkosi:" that:
"Dolus and culpa (in the sense of negligence) are distinct conceptions.
underlying distinct fields of legal liability. They can never be identical: for the
one signifies intention. and the other connotes an absence of intent. No doubt
522 Meskill '" Anglo-American Corp of SA I.td 196R 4 SA 793 (W): Orban \ Stead 197R 2 SA 71]
(W)
-;:~ Marais v Edlnlan I tJ34 CPJ) 212.
';2-i 1948 I SA 375 (AD) 383.
52) 14 AC ]]7.
sc" J ng AD 488 489.
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the law sometimes regards gross negligence as equivalent to fraud - notably in
certain cases involving civil liability,"
3.6.3.] .1.4 The misrepresentation must be material
A misrepresentation must. under South African law. be material in order to be of legal
significance. In other words it is not sufficient that the misrepresentation is of a
merely incidental or unimportant nature. it msut be of such a kind as would probably
have induced a reasonable person to conclude the contracr.i "
In this context. the mistepresentator must take his victim as he finds him, except that a
representee who regards an unimportant misrepresentation as more material than it
would be treated by a reasonable man in his position. is not entitled to redress.r"
The objective qualification is waived in the case of fraudulent misrepresentation. In
which case the misrepresentation does not have to be one that would have misled a
reasonable man. but is merely required to have misled the particular party in
. 519question. -
3.6.3.1.1.5 The misrepresentation must induce the contract
A key factor in identifying relevant representation is the question of causation. re
whether the representation induced a party to enter into the contract. when he would
otherwise not have done S05311
The crucial question of whether the misrepresentation actually induced the
representee to enter the contract is established by an examination of the facts and
circumstances of each case." I
~:7 Service '" Pondan-Diana 1964 J SA 277 (J)).
'cS Forbes \ Behr & Co ( I g96) 13 SC 304 31 I: Woodstock. Claremont. Mowbray and Rondebosch
Councils \ Smith ( 1909) 26 SC óR I,
S"lQ Otto \' Heyrnans 1971 4 SA 14X (T).
-53() Roorda v Cohn 190} TH 2792X3: Josephi \' Parkes 19()h ":1)(' 21:1: Khan \ ~;Jidn() 19XC).)
SA 724 (NI
531 Schultz \ Myerson 1933 WLD 199,
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It will not become irrelevant by virtue merely of the fact that other factors were
intluential also.53c but it will become immaterial where il can be proven that the
misrepresentee was. in fact. aware of the misrepresentation. '3.1 Th is remains true in
cases of agency. but not where there was fraudulent collusion between the party
perpetrating misrepresentation and the agent of the misrepresentee. ,.1.)
Another important rule is that the representee is entitled to rely on a misrepresentation
without inquiring as to its correctness. even if this would be a simple procedure (since
a misrepresenter must lake his victim as he finds him. as we have seen)5~, The only
exception to this principle operates contra proferemem. and is applicable to exclusion
clauses stating that there wi II not be a right to cance I on grounds of misrepresentation.
A misrepresentation made by a third party will not qualify for the remedies available
in the various circumstances listed thus far. The principle in operation is that an
innocent party should not be allowed to suffer. nor a guilty party benefit. as a result of
misrepresentation. This will not usually be the case in the case of misrepresentation
by a third party. where none of the parties to the contract are implicated.
The rule was stated as follows by Watermeyer J in Karobus Motors ( /951.)) Lid ,. Van
Eck ,36
"It is a general rule of our law that if the fraud that induces a contract does not
proceed from one of the parties. but from an independent third person. it will
have no effect upon the contract. The fraud must be the fraud of one of the
parties or of a third party acting in collusion with. or as the agent of one of
the parties."
53~ Symons and Moses " Davies 191 I NPD 69.
"n Poole and iVlcLennan \ Nourse 191X AD -1-04-I-IR-t).
:'1-'
Simon \ Equitable Marine and Fire Insurance Co l.td (IX92) 9 SC 455.
q.;;
Sampson \ Union and Rhodesia Wholesale Ltd 1929 Ai) 46X: Christie 32()
)~(l 19()2 I SA-I-51(C).
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A misrepresentation which induces a contract might affect the transaction either by
rendering it void or - more likely in South African law - voidable. Either case may
allow damages.
3.6.3.1.2 Remedies
3.6.3.1.2.1 Nullity of the transaction
Where the misrepresentation induces In the mind of the representee such a
fundamental error that the contract into which he appears to have entered is not in fact
the transaction he wanted. the misrepresentation affects his consent absolutely and the
resultant disagreement excludes the possibility of a contract in terms of the will
theory.m Subject only to the possible application of the objective reliance theory. the
representee wi II be entitled to escape Iiabi Iity under the transaction.
3.6.3.1.2.2 The right to rescind
A second possibility is that the misrepresentation might merely make the contract
voidable at the instance ofthe representee. However. it does not seem to be very clear
whether an aggrieved party may always rescind the contract. In principle. as we have
seen. the requirement for rescission is that the misrepresentation in fact induced the
victim to enter a contract which he would not otherwise have concluded. :i3H
This criterion. however. is virtually impossible to establish in a practical situation.
The better view is that a right to rescind should be available in all cases where the
elements outlined above are established. This is the position in case law. where the
notion that reseission be restricted to cases where the misrepresentation caused the
contract as a whole is not applied.
51.7 Preiier \' .lordaan 1956 I SA 4R3 (A): Allen" Sixteen Stirling lnvcstrnents (Pt:) Lid 1974 -+ SA
164 (D): Maresky \ Markel 1994 1 SA 24')((')
j3S Van der Merwe ct al Iu l Iuê
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Since. as we have seen. material misrepresentation need not be traudulent.r'" even
negligent and simple misrepresentation ought to afford such a rights.liI
3.6.3.1.2.1.1 Exercising the right to rescind
If the fact of misrepresentation becomes known to the misrepresentee. he must elect
within a reasonable time whether to rescind or stand by the contract. and of course he
cannot both approbate and reprobate.r" A reasonable time in this context means no
more than that the misrepresentee is not required to make an immediate election.
Even if he decides only after a reasonable time has elapsed. he will not be debarred
from making his election. since delay. according to South African law. is not per se a
defence to proceeding tor rescission.i'" An election to affirm the contract. whether
expressly or by conduct. results in the loss of the power to rescind.i " and the right to
do so is also restricted if third parties have already acquired rights in good faith as a
resu It of the contractS-l-l
According to South African law. a reserssion takes effect from the time the
representee intarms the representor that he has rescinded. or serves a summons
claim ing rescission54'
3.6.3.1.2.2 Damages
A part from reseission. a representee has always been entitled to claim del ictual
damages tor fraudulent misrepresentation irrespective of whether he elects to rescind
I d b . 5.Jót le contract or stan y It.
qt) Vall der Merwe el al 102 103.
",-'0 Kerr 158.
:'-11 Bowditch \ Peel and Magill 1921 AD 5ó I: Frost \ Leslie 1923 A J) 276.
).12 Atlas Diamond Mining Co (Bultfontein Mine) Ltd \ Poo'le (1882) I HC(i 203235: Ambrose
and Dunning \ Dalton 1921 SR 116: Penefather \ Swarfield 1926 EDI. 2S;.
).n Feinstein \ NiggIi 19RI 2 SA 6g4 (A).
5-l-l Penefather \ Swatfield 1926 EDL 256: Toflee \ Prudential Bui Iding Socieiv 1l)~4 WI.I) I Só.
:;-l5 Lebedina \ Schlechter and Haskell 1931 'v/IJJ 247.
5-l(, Ciaassens \' Pretorius 1950 I SA 37 (»).
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Since such damages are delictual rather than contractual in nature.5~7 they may also be
claimed against a third party whose misrepresentation induced the III istaken party to
5~Xenter a contract. Damages wi II be avai lable to neither party in cases 0 f mutual
fraud.5~9
The question whether an action for delictual damages is available for negligent
misrepresentation inducing a contract - long a controversial point under South
African law.:i5(1was finally answered in the affirmative in Bayer South A/i-ico (Ply)
Lid 11 Frosl.551
3.6.3.2 Duress
"Duress is a threat of harm or intimidation which engenders fear in a person. which
causes him to concl ude a contract. ..55:' ltshou Id be clear that the consent of the victim
in such cases is obtained in an improper manner. provided certain criteria have been
satisfied. Where the threat is wrongful. effective and imminent. and is directed at
relevant parties. the victim can. analogously with misrepresentation. claim delictual
damages for loss suffered in addition to the remedy of rescission ..
3.6.3.2.1 The object of the threat
Although the doctrine of duress clearly envisages a subjective effect on the victim. the
test contains an objective element. in that the fear induced must be reasonable for ..the
sort of person the victim is..553
The scope of the doctrine with regard to the object of the threats remains unresolved.
Threats to the victim's family will obviously constitute duress. but there have been
intimations that this should not be extended to include remote relations or strangers.
SJ) Trotman \ Edwick 1951 I SA 443 (A I.
5JR Tail \ Wicht (1890) 7 SC 15X.
)4" Christie :1 I:J.
,;(1 Joubert 99-1 () I .
5S1 1991-lSA559(A).
«: Christie 34{).
:'53 Christie 35 I .
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'i'i-l This position may well be found to be untenable with regard to the test described
above. and there remains no expl icit authoritative statement on the subject.
The decisive ruling in this respect was Broodrvk \' Smuts. in which the court
confirmed that a threat to the family of the party is relevant.:":' In this case. the threat
of internment was held to be directed not only to the plaintiff. depriving him of his
own freedom. but also to his family. as it would deprive them of his support. The
party's property was added in Hendricks v Barnetr:"
3.6.3.2.2 The imminence of the threat
Moreover. the threat must be of an imminent or inevitable evil in the sense that the
party could not have avoided it except by entering into the contract.i" However. this
requirement will not be rigidly applied if the party acted on the spur of the moment.r"
3.6.3.2.3 The wrongfulness of the threat
The threat must be contra bonos mores or unlawful. Whether this is the fact will
depend on the circumstances of the case.
A threat which induces payment of a legal debt will never constitute duress.':il) On the
other hand. a threat that induces the giving of a liquid document acknowledging the
debt does amount to duress.i'" This peculiar anomaly illustrates a certain imbalance
between the operation of duress in relation to threats of criminal as against civil legal
steps in South Africa.
)5~ Christie 352.
55' 1942TPD47.
556 1975 1 SA 765 IN)
S:iï Joubert 104-106.
~5X Broodryk \ Smuts 1942 TPO 47.
55" Christie 357.
:ib() Arend,' Astra Furnishers (Pty) Ltd 1974 1 SA 298 (C).
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A threat to bring civil proceedings will not amount to duress. but a threat to bring
unjustified criminal proceedings may do S05hl
A threat to bring civi I proceedings which causes another to contract is not considered
duress. since a person who is legally entitled to bring such an action should not suffer
for doing so. Thus. a threat to dismiss an employee lawfully is not duress. nor is a
threat to sue. since the applicant will pay for a failed litigious action. This principle is
firmly established in South African law. extending even to a threat made to a divorced
wife that her custody of their children would be investigated if she did not pay her
former husband a sum of rnoney.i'"
The situation regarding threats to bring criminal proceedings is more difficult. A
threat ra bring criminal proceedings where the prosecution would not be justified is
clearly contra bonos mores. The appropriate treatment of cases where an employer
threatens to prosecute an employee for theft unless he pays or promises to pay back
the sum alleged ly stolen has been qu ite contentious.
The crucial question here has been identified by Corbett .I as being the issue of
whether the employer has obtained advantages to which he is not otherwise entitled.
This will be the case where he obtains a liquid document and an apparent agreement
as to the amount owing, probably to his own advantage. The advantage tlowing from
the terms of payment of any such acknowledgement of debt would make the contract
contra bonos mores. In any case. an express or implied agreement nol to prosecute in
exchange for the advantages mentioned amounts to the crime of compounding. so that
the contract is illegal and therefore voidSn-'
~(,I Threat to bring criminal proceedingsHamilton Paneelkloppers \ NkuI110 19lJ! .2 S/\ 534 t O).
Threat to bring civil proceedings: Shepstone \ Shepstone 1974 1 SA 411 (D).
5b~ Shepstone \' Shepstone 1974 I SA 411 (0): Christie 353. but see Shepstone \ Shepstone 1974::2
SA 462 (N) where it was held that the agreement enduced h\ the threat was contra bono-; mores
and lor that reason undenforceable.
-;h~ Arend \ Astra Furnishers (Pty) Ltd 1974 I SA 29R (C): Christie 35-L
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"On the Transvaal approach. it seem to me that in deciding whether the
contract had been entered into under duress. or whether it amounts to a
compounding. the same test in determining whether the threat of prosecution
was contra bonos mores has to be applied. namely did the creditor thereby
extract or extort something to which he was not otherwise entitled."
The advantages listed by Corbett J have been discounted in a series of Transvaal
cases. Nestadt .I stated in Machanick Steel and Fencing (PIV) Ltd I' Wesrhodan (Pty)
Ltd:i6.J
3.6.3.2.4 Duress emanating from third parties
Rescission is also available by virtue of duress applied by a third party.i":' In Broodryk
I' Smul.I.:i66 Ramsbottom .I accepted in an obiter dictum that the legal conclusion
should be the same even if the third party and the other party to the contract are in no
way connected.
3.6.3.2.5 Damage
Finally. there is the criterion of damage. This supposed element is potentially
somewhat misleading. and does not refer to an evaluation of the effect of the contract.
but rather to the effectiveness of the duress itself. This means that the threat must
137
have caused damage: that is to say. it must have actually induced the threatened party
to enter into the particular contract. Thus. damage is equivalent to effective duress.i'"
3.6.3.3 Undue influence
"Undue intluence exists if one party has acquired a psychological intluence over the
other party which weakened his powers of resistance and made his will pliable. and
uses this intluence in an unscrupulous manner to persuade him to consent to a
5b.l 1979 I SA 265 (W): see also BOF Bank Bpk \ Van Zyl 2002 5 Si\ 165 (C).
)(,) Christie 357 J58.
j(,,, 1942 TPD -17.
5h7 Padayachey . l.ebese 1942 TPD 1O.
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transaction which is to his detriment and which with normal free will he would not
have entered into.··568 Whether there is a special relationship between the parties or
not. is of no importance.r'" and there is no presumption of undue influence which the
h but i h ,70ot er party must re ut In sue cases:
Since there is no presumption of undue intluence under South African law. the party
seeking relief bears the onus of proof. as he does in the case of misrepresentation and
duress. and must prove that the contract is one which. but for the undue influence.
would not have been made. In other words. the party seeking relief must be proved to
have been induced by the undue intluence to enter into the contract. As with
misrepresentation and duress. undue influence wi II be material on ly insofar as it
actually induces the victim to enter the contract. :i71
4 Evaluation
':'(1}: Christie 356-3.59: Preiier \, Jordaan 1956 I SA 4RJ (A): Patel \ ( irohbelaar Jl)7-1. 1 ~/\ 5J2 (A).
5t>() Preiier '" .Jordaan 1956 I SA 483 (A).
57(1 Miller \ Muller 19ó5 4 SA 458.
571 Christie 361.
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4.1 General remarks on basic differences between the systems
Before a comparison of the two legal systems considered here and an evaluation of
their treatment of the subject matter of this study can be made. some general remarks
are appropriate.
That both systems are rooted in the Romanistic tradition does not imply identity of
origin. Developments in Europe during the renaissance period were far too multi-
dimensional to have involved the uniform adaptation of Roman law in Western
Europe. As indicated in Chapter 2. German law represents a system based upon
codification. whereas the South African system is. in the field of contract. at least. in
the main rooted in the case law. Amongst other significant consequences. which are
addressed later. this means that the legal principles are come to by completely
different methods and with points of reference unique to each system.
The German judge is required to apply the law to the facts placed before him without
in the least being required to consider or quote old Roman principles or their
interpretation by medieval academic authors. The written law alone. in other words
the BGB and other relevant codes. are authoritative for his reasoning. This has the
immediate consequence that the German lawyer tends to focus only on the law.
without much contemplation of its origins. That some of the astonishingly complex
and structured ideas and legal concepts derived from the Code are based to a
considerable extent upon notions of Roman law. becomes apparent only when the
historic development of laws in the BGB and their development in past epochs is
i IIurn inated. 57:>
Although the basis of every judicial decision is to be found in the written law. in the
German case the BGB. it will by now be clear that. throughout the long lifetime of the
BGB judicial law-making. especially in respect of the general clauses (for example ~
138 BGB and ~ 242 BGB). has assumed significant proportions. Even so. the basis
;7, See above: 2.1.1.
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for every judicial innovation remains the text of the Code itself just as this remains
the basis for every judicial decision. However. it is also quite obvious that the
somewhat cryptic words. for example. of ~ 242 BGB allow significant room for
interpretation.
South African law is a different matter. South African judges cannot refer to a
codified law which purports to state the entire corpus of Private law principles. since
such a compilation does not exist. Instead. COUl1S rely to a significant extent upon
principles developed from the views of recognised authors of the Roman-Dutch law in
long lines of judicial decisions.
Although the principle of stare decisis. briefly discussed under 3.1. may suggest the
conclusion that regard is to be had only to previous judgments. and that a direct link
to the ancient authors may be supertluous. this in fact is not the case. The precedents
have their roots in the principles of the Roman-Dutch law. and the ··old masters" and
their views are still cited today. Despite the significant influence of English common
law which. in the course of South Africa's eventful history. resulted in the mixed
character of South African law. the law of obligations in particular still reflects its
romanistic origins. even if modified by the influence of the Dutch authors Such
obvious proximity to Roman law cannot be as readily detected in a system such as
that of Germany. in which Roman principles and legal constructions lind themselves
within a closed legal sphere and are. as a result. somewhat hidden or camouflaged.
One significant difference between the codified and uncodified systems which
became apparent through this study lies in the methods for the development of law in
response to the demands ofj ustice.
The BGB is a statutory enactment formally approved by the legislature. This implies.
in the context of a tradition based on the division of power. that law is exclusively
created by parliament and that judges are appointed merely to apply the norms so
established. Independent development of law is not a function of the judge. as an
instrument of the judiciary. This standpoint is enshrined in various constitutional
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regulations in Germany, even if it has to be conceded that it cannot be understood in
absolute terms. Many cases simply cannot be satisfactori ly resolved merely with
reference to the wording of the relevant code. There are. therefore. many instances of
Judge-made law. but these are exceptions to the rule and are only permissible when
the Code does not provide clear provisions for the issue requiring resolution. This
occurs relatively rarely because of the complexity and vast scope of the BGB. which
was conceived and designed as an enactment to address and resolve all future
problems.
Returning to case law systems such as that practiced in South Africa. the application
of law and its development assumes a different aspect. It is fundamental to South
African Law that any contentious issue be brought before a court of law by private
parties in order that the law concerning the matter may be determined. To some
extent. this principle becomes more practicable with the passage of time: as more and
more juristic problems are decided. subsequent disputes may be settled according to
the rule ofs/are decisis.
The problem regarding the conclusion of a contract by means of the telephone can
serve as an example.Y'' The dispute. when it arose had. to that date. not been heard by
a court. Hence it was impossible to deterrn ine with certainty how South A frican law
would react to this problem. Unlike German law. which would refer to ~ 147 BGB as
the relevant norm. South African law did not have such a provision at its disposal
when the dispute arose in 1935. Regrettably. the judgment was not made by the
highest court. Only in 1965 did the matter come up again. when a court of equal
ranking reached a different conclusion on the same matter. resulting in greater
uncertainty. A final settlement was only reached in 1981 with a decision on the
matter by the highest court.
This raises the question of legal certainty in a case law system: citizens may simply be
unable to determine the outcome of litigation with any approach to certainty. Insofar
,7.' See above: 3.-+.7.1.
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as a case law system is based on the changing circumstances of Iife. rather than on
any apparently immutable logical code. the need for the continuous development of
that system will necessarily carry very obvious implications for legal certainty.
The preceding retlections make it clear to a German lawyer that the case law system
poses problems that cannot occur within his own legal system. simply because it is
based on different principles. This is not to deny that German law accommodates the
principle of stare decisis to some extent. Although the principle is absent in theory.
German law is. in practice. clearly influenced by judicial decisions. Decisions of the
BGH. for example. set important precedents for lower courts. although they are not
bound by them in theory. but rather only to the law itself. Such precedents serve an
important function in respect of legal certainty. with the result that lower courts. in
practice. pay great heed to them. It is more than unlikely that a lower court will
intentionally disregard the view of the BGH or any other superior court.
4.2 Contracts under both legal systems - common features and
differences
For purposes of the comparison of the two systems. attention will first be given to
themes common to them. before attention is focused on dissonances.
4.2.1 Common characteristics
With regard to the conclusion of contracts. both German and South A trican law set
fundamental preconditions. which need to be fulfilled before the conduct of both
parties can lead to a legally recognised agreement. As previously indicated. a
distinction needs to be drawn between requirements relating to the participating legal
subjects and those that the law sets as parameters for the conclusion of contracts.
4.2.1.1 Contractual capacity
The first requirement sets conditions relating to the capacity of the individual to
decide freely in respect of legal transactions. The overview of both legal systems
reveals these requirements to be virtually identical. In South African as well as in
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German law. for instance. m mors are. In general. excluded from entering into
contracts. The difference regarding the age of majority reflects society" s value
judgment regarding the accountability and insight of younger individuals. but this is a
matter of detail rather than of legal principle.
Both countries apply similar criteria to intoxicated and mentally disabled individuals
pertaining to the conclusion of a contract. A noteworthy variation in principle from
German law occurs in the South African recognition of the "prodigal". which entails a
restriction on the capacity of an ind ividual regard less of mental health. Under
German law. an individual needs to be mentally ill for his declaration of will to be
null and void. so that a person is free to dissipate his patrimony by means of
irresponsible transactions. Because the concept of the prodigal is of little practical
importance in South Africa. however. the differences between the systems are rather
insignificant in practical terms.
4.2.1.2 Formalities
On the question of formalities also. there is little difference between the systems
under discussion. Although both recognise the principle that a disregard of legally
prescribed formalities or formalities agreed upon by both parties will render the
contract null and void. both systems adhere to the general intormality of contract.
4.2.1.3 Legality
A further area of consequence relates to the need for contracts to conform lO the
requirements of public pol icy, good faith and the moral convictions of the community.
The approach of the BGB in provisions such as ~~ 134. 13S. 242 BGB. discussed in
chapter 2.57-1 is to some extent mirrored by the decisions of the South African courts.
In both systems. the use of rigid criteria relating to this aspect is avoided in favour of
a flexible approach in the light of the circumstances of the case at hand. Of
'7-1 Sec abox c: 2.2. 1.1.:1.~: 2.2.2.:5.
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importance is also the recognition that the contravention of a prohibition will not
invariably lead to the complete nullity of the contract. '7'
As a provisional result. it seems fair to conclude that. with regard to these
prerequisites. there exist no decisive differences between the systems as regards the
effective conclusion of a contract.
4.2.2 Contract formation
The core of the investigation addresses the question whether and to what extent the
concept of "contract" differs within the two legal systems. The emphasis within both
legal systems is that what has to be determined is whether the parties have committed
themselves to a legally binding agreement and are bound to certain performance
obligations. Both systems also accept that the parties need to be in agreement as to
the essential terms stipulated in the contract.
Such a consensus logically requ ires that both parties should be aware of the substance
of the contract and to have agreed to it of their own free will..'7!>
This is immediately apparent form the wording of the relevant provisions of the
German code. The declaration of will i Willenserklarungs indicates the central
importance of the intentions of the parties concerned. Although. in South African
law. one cannot refer to the wording of a code for the substantiation of th is subjective
approach. numerous decisions reveal the need for the corresponding wills of the
parties as a prerequisite for the genesis of a contract. Both systems therefore require
two or more relevant individual actions in order to establish an agreement.
Remarkably. German law subdivides offer and acceptance. as juristic acts. into
smaller components. by means of the concept of the declaration of wi II.577 a
construction which is of importance in establishing whether a contract has been
~75 See abox e: 2.2.! .1.3.-L I: ~.~.3: Brisle. \' Drorsk) 20()2 .4 SA I (SeA).
st« See above: 2.2.1.2.3: 2.2.2: 3.3: 3.4.
57ï See above:2.2. I: 2.2. I. I.
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concluded and whether it is vitiated by error. Although South African law to some
extent recognises the term "juristic act'·. 578there is no sign of the refined. systematic
analysis of the concept along the lines of German law. The explanation for this lies.
on the one hand. in the fact that the development ora comprehensive and complicated
code. such as the BGB. represents the concern of its creators to establish a logical and
holistic system of concepts to accommodate the greatest possible constellation of
circumstances.
South African law. on the other hand. although starting its development with the same
set of basic concepts. the notions of offer and acceptance derived from Roman and
English law. proceeded in a piece-meal fashion typical of a case law approach
unmindful of broader theoretical and systematic considerations. A sensitivity to such
"scientific' concerns typical of German law arrived late in South Africa. and might be
dated to the establishment of the Law Faculty at Stellenbosch in 1921. which for the
first time focused attention on modern continental legal developments.
Disregarding this important difference in the conceptual apparatus for the resolution
of contractual problems. the understanding of the basic concepts of both offer and
acceptance are in im portant respects the same. The term animus contrahendi, for
instance. is familiar to both legal systems and both require it for effective conclusion
of a contract.
Both offeror and offeree need to share in the animus contrahendi. even if the issue is.
under both systems. generally discussed principally under the heading "offer". Both
systems also distinguish between conduct which serves merely to elicit contracts. such
as the invitatio ad offerendum and request for an offer. and acts which manifest the
actual intention to bind oneself legally.57,)
;7R See above: .lA.
<7" See above:2.2.1.1.3.2.1: 2.2.2.1.1: 2.2.2.1.2: 3.-+.2.
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It is noteworthy that German law provides further subdivisions of the concept animus
contrahendi/'" as part of the elaboration of the complex concept of declaration of
will. In relation to this. the decision of the BGH in 19915x1 resulted in the rejection of
the established requirements of a general transactional intention. Although this
decision might be justified by the result achieved in that case. it is unpersuasive in its
reasoning and contrary to the need for a logical and consistent application of law.
The abolition of the requirements of a general transactional intention
tRechtsbindungswillei in conjunction with the retention of a requirement of an
intention to enter into a particular transaction. is in its indecisiveness as problematic
as the conclusion that although five fingers are required to clench a proper fist. fingers
may in certain conditions be done away with. With respect to the theme of the
intention to be bound and the somewhat more complicated concept of animus
contrahendi which is found in German law. divided as it is into several separate
components. it will at this stage be clear that these sub-divisions are. in certain
respects of dubious practical relevance.
It would seem more useful to return to the unitary concept of animus contrahendi to
which South African law confines itself. This seems particularly apparent in the light
of the decision discussed above. where the campi icated academ ic basis of the German
concept of the will to be bound has arguably led to an illogical decision.
The overview of the precise requirements for the legal effectiveness of offer and
acceptance makes it clear that these are nearly identical in both systems. 'Xc In both
systems. an offer needs to be sufficiently determined and contain all significant
components tessenualia negotiii of the contract. The requirements for a successful
acceptance are held in common by both legal systems. namely:
5S(I See above: 2.2.1.1.3.1.
':;t-:l
See above: 2.2.1.1 ..1.1.
5Rc See above: 2.2.2: .,.-1.
146
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
I. The acceptance must be made by the party to whom the offer was made (or by
his agent).
2. Acceptance must be clear and unambiguous. and must correspond with the
offer made.
3. Acceptance can occur tacitly.
4. Rules relating to silent acceptance are also fundamentally identical in both
systems.
All these elements have been refined by the courts of both countries under discussion
to relative measures and indicate that both legal systems understand contract as
entailing the manifestation of an intention to contract by the parties. This principle.
called the "will theory" in South African literature. is not maintained absolutely in
either of the legal systems examined.
4.2.2.1 The legal consequences of the offer
A fundamental and significant difference between the systems under review regarding
the effects of an offer. which ultimately touches the very foundation at' contract law.
must be addressed as a prelude to a more detailed evaluation of the treatments of
mistake in contract.
4.2.2.1.1 Germany
As has been indicated above, an offer is legally binding on the offeror. As soon as the
offer reaches the correct addressee. the offeror is obi iged to honour an acceptance
thereof and is hence legally committed.
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A revocation is possible only if relayed before or simultaneously with the offer5R3 It
is obvious that this is to the advantage of the recipient of the offer. regardless of
whether he accepts the offer or declines it. and that the offeror is in a relatively
disadvantaged position. subject to safeguards to protect his interests. 5X-l
4.2.2.1.2 South Africa
South African law takes a different position in assuming that the offeror is not bound
by his offer. The offeror's capacity to revoke his offer independent of whether it has
come to the attention of the offeree. but restricted with reference to whether the latter
has already accepted the offer and thereby established a contract. The offeree is
therefore in a weaker position during the formation of contract. He needs to
anticipate and guard against revocation unti I such time that he accepts the offer. and is
thus in a position of uncertainty.
4.2.2.2 Effectiveness of acceptance
Since the binding nature of the offer depends significantly upon the offerees
acceptance thereof the moment at which this is deemed to take place is of
fundamental importance. This consideration. of course. is only relevant if the parties
are contracting inter absentes. Should they be in one another's presence. the offeree
has to react without delay unless otherwise agreed. However. should the parties. for
example. reside in different cities and communicate primarily by mail. the moment
when a letter of acceptance is deemed to take legal effect is extremely significant. In
this regard. there is a marked difference between the two systems.
4.2.2.2.1 The German solution
Under German lawall declarations of will which must be received by the addressee to
become effective are subject to ~ 130 BGB and its interpretation according to the
courts. In consequence. all such declarations of wi II become effective upon their
58:; See abov e: 2.2.2.1.~.
SR ... See above: 2.2.2.1.~
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receipt by the receiver or their expected receipt under ordinary and expected
cond itions. SR:'
This does not affect the principally favourable position of the offeree. but has
implications for the efficacy of a revocation by the offeror.
4.2.2.2.2 The South African solution
Regarding the conclusion of contracts by means of the pOSt.5X6 the expedition theory is
to be applied. This approach might at first seem to strengthen the view that law
protects the offeree at the cost of the offeror. Whether this is indeed the case seems to
be open to question. in view of the following considerations.
Firstly. the expedition theory places the offeror at a disadvantage. He cannot evaluate
whether he is already legally bound. since he normally has no way of determining
whether or when the offeree has posted his acceptance. A further problem resulting
from this approach occurs when the offeree aims to nullify his postal acceptance by
means of a faster medium of communication. This problem has been mitigated with
respect to electronic means of communication. by means of which an acceptance
becomes valid on receipr.f"
4.2.2.3 The duration of the offer
Under German law the question of a statement of intent. and hence an offer. is
unaffected by the passing away of its maker or a change in his mental capacity. so that
the receiver thereof can rely on the validity of the offer made to him. irrespective of
the occurrence of subsequent events.
Not so under South African law. where the death or mental iIiness of the offeror
nullifies any offer not yet accepted by the offeree. This is substantiated on the basis
that consensus can no longer be achieved between the offeror and the offeree. and
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because the offer is intransmissible. This argument becomes suspect in view of the
recognition of a contract under the expedition theory. where. irrespective of the
absence of agreement. a contract comes into being as soon as the acceptance is posted.
Why the offeree who posts an acceptance in the erroneous belief that his contractual
partner is alive and in good mental health should be treated differently. and put at a
disadvantage. is not clear. There are. unsurprisingly. some indications of a critical
response to this rule.
German law regards death or loss of mental health capacity as irrelevant in view of
considerations of legal certainty and good faith. That such an approach militates
against the consensus principle is beyond doubt. The apparently problematic
possibility of being contractually bound to a deceased party is avoided by means of
the fact that the heirs of the deceased step into his position as a result of the laws
relating to succession (~ 1922 BGB) and its principle of universal succession.
Whether this entails a detrimental position for the heirs depends solely on the actions
of the deceased during his lifetime.
4.2.2.4 Offers to the public
As cases such as Bloom" The American Swiss Co and Lee I' American Swiss Watch
Co5RR illustrate. South African law requires that persons whose conduct seemingly
satisfies the requirements of a public offer of reward must have knowledge of such an
offer. Only then can the promised reward be collected by such a person on the basis
of a contract that has been brought into being by acceptance.
This can lead to results which may not conform to a common notion of justice. The
person. for example. who returns a missing dog to its rightful owner. while unaware
of a reward offered publicly. may well be surprised to learn that he is not entitled to
the reward if he only becomes aware of it subsequently. On the other hand. the logic
is consistent. when one considers that a reward oftered to the public in return for
588 See above: 3.4.3.1.
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certain conduct IS a type of offer. with its familiar legal requirements and
consequences.
German law has, for such situations. developed the notion of the Auslobung under 9~
657-666 BGB. Under this regulation. the conduct of an individual alone will qualify
him for a reward, regard less of his awareness of the reward. or lack thereof.
4.2.2.5 Contracts concluded tacitly or silently
Both legal systems recognise that contracts can be conducted tacitly. by non-verbal
. ,Rl)conduct. and even by silence .:
4.2.3 Interpretation of contracts
The field of interpretation of contracts reveals further discrepancies between the two
legal systems under consideration. In this regard. the choice of an objective or a
subjective approach becomes significant.
The interpretation of contracts is. without doubt. a fundamental component of contract
law. The question of interpretation comes to the fore where the parties differ as to the
meaning to be given to their agreement. This places the judge in the difficult position
of having to decide whether the parties intended to bind themselves contractually and.
if so. what the effect of their contract was intended to be. In this manner. a
fundamental problem affecting the application of law as a whole comes to the tore.
Either one evaluates the concerned parties' intentions at the time of contract
formation. or one evaluates their declarations or actions. according to criteria which
are independent of their intentions and which seek to represent the likely
interpretation of a reasonable third party.
The former approach is without doubt a subjective one and al igns itself with the wi II
theory according to which the respective intentions of the concerned parties are
decisive. But this subjective approach contains an inevitable weakness in its practical
SRI.) See above: 2.2.1,1,],2: 3.4.3: ~.4.6.
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application. insofar as the true will of a party is only known to himself and evidence
for the presence of a given state of mind can never truly be determined by a court of
law. As a result a party could. in court. maintain that he never intended to enter into
the particular contract with the other and. according to a strictly subjective method of
interpretation. it may never be possible to prove the opposite. The existence of a
contract would have to be denied.
4.2.3.1 Interpretation of contracts or declarations of will under German law
The creators of the BGB developed a compromise in response to this problem.
Paragraph 157 BGB determines that contracts need to be interpreted according to the
dictates of good faith having regard to business custom. This obviously constitutes an
objective approach. which does not regard the will of the individual parties. but
prefers the impression left on an average person with regard to business custom.
But this is only one side of the coin. since ~ 133 BGB determines that in the
interpretation of the declaration of wi II. the true wi II of the declari ng party shall be
decisive. Since every contract consists of at least two such declarations of will. the
German judge is compelled to consider both concurrently when deciding a case
relating to the content of a contract or even its existence. Further provisions. such as
~ 242 BGB which. like ~ 157 BGB. protects the recipient in case of reliance. also
need to be considered in the evaluation of each individual case.
4.2.3.2 Interpretation of contracts under South African law
Under South African law. the interpretation of disputed contracts is closely
interrelated with the law of evidence. Added to that a number of rules. which often
appear in contliet with one another. exist.)')()
In the final analysis. the determination of frames of reference. insofar as they cannot
be objectively determined from the contract itself (from. for example. terms and
wording) is significant. Generally it can be concluded that essentially objective
;'1(1 See above: 3.5
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criteria dominate the decision. insofar as these are generally taken to be the preferred
method of ascertaining the intentions of the parties at the time of contract formation.
4.2.4 Mistake
What has become clear is that the crucial question is whether the contract is to be
evaluated with reference to predominantly subjective or objective criteria. The topic
of mistake or defective consent make this point key beyond all doubt. Various factual
constellations bring into question the effective conclusion of a contract: the BGB
provides three distinct categories of cases and endeavours to predetermine the legal
consequences of all the various permutations within these categories.Ï" The object is
to categorise all possible constellations and their legal consequences systematically.
according to the evaluation of the interests of the affected parties and their respective
knowledge regarding the mistakes or defects in each case. To this end the creators of
the BGB avoided a commitment to either the will or declaration theory. focusing
instead on the weight of individual party interests.
South African law reveals that. despite numerous decisions and academic discussions.
no final solution has as yet been achieved. What can. however. be ascertained is that
the will theory and the reliance theory are applied to each individual case in order to
reach a just solution. Furthermore. the English principle of estoppel has also been
appl ied in some cases. although. as we have seen. th is is an inherently weak sol ution.
A peculiarity of South African law is the frequent application of the justus error
doctrine. a manifestation of the reliance theory. It requires not only that the error
should be material in order to nullify a contract. but also that it should be reasonable.
This can. of course. also be the case in German law. since not every misrepresentation
is necessarily considered relevant. but the notion that the mistake needs to be
reasonable to exclude contractual liability is basically foreign to German law.
\'11 See above: 2.1.2: 2.3.3.
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German law does not concern itself with the question of whether the mistaken party
was reasonable in making the mistake. If he makes a "material" mistake. he may
rescind his declaration and escape contractual liability but will suffer the
consequences of ~ 122 BGB.592 This differs. of course. in cases in which the recipient
IS proven to have knowingly accepted the misconceived declaration or has initiated
such.593
South African law has attempted to reconcile the direct reliance theory and the/us/uI
error approach in Sonap Petroleum (SA) (PIV) v Pappadogianis :i,).j It remains to be
seen whether this will provide a final answer to the problem. What seems certain is
that German law. with its structured and systematic approach. provides more legal
certainty than its South African counterpart.
Comparing South African and German principles regarding the questions of
misrepresentation. differences manifest themselves in the distinction between
contracts deemed void ah initio and those granting the right to rescind. depending on
whether the error was fundamental due to the misrepresentation and on whether the
misrepresentee can prove that the misrepresentation was made with the actual or
constructive intent of inducing the opposite party to conclude the contract.
The criteria according to which conduct is classified as improper are. however.
virtually identical. Duress is. on the whole, treated equally in both systems. although
German law has never required that the threat should be directed at the party or his
On the whole. it may be asserted that the systems under consideration differ
significantly with respect to certain legal issues and hence reach dissimilar results tor
similar cases. With all due respect. it seems that the South African legal system has
)'J: See above: 2.3.3.-L
5q-; And under S0l11C further circumstances - see above:
')'JJ 19923 SA -+22 (A).
)')5 See abov e: 3.6.3.2.
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yielded decisions that hinder rather than facilitate the clear and efficient regulation of
the various aspects of contract formation.
5 Conclusion
In the course of this thesis I had the opportunity to consider variousjuristic questions
related to contract law and the problems related thereto. Furthermore. I had the task
of illuminating. presenting and comparing these topics from the point of view of both
German and South A frican law. As a German lawyer and a practising attorney. I am
grateful for the insights gained into the case law system of South A frica and its
method of operation. To conclude this dissertation I would like to take the
opportunity to share my own thoughts. insofar as this has not yet been done. about the
problems arising in contract law.
According to Wessel JA:
"The law does not concern itself with the working of minds of the parties to a
contract. but with the external manifestations of their minds. Even therefore if
from a philosophical standpoint the minds of the parties do not meet. yet. ifby
their acts their minds seem to have met. the law will. where fraud is not
alleged. look to their acts and assume that their minds did meet and that they
contracted in accordance with what the parties purport to accept as a record of
their agreement. This is the only practical way in which Courts of law can
determine the terms ofa contract." 5%
His statement addresses a problem concerning contractual law in its entirety. In the
preceding pages it has been indicated that a purely subjective approach to the
resolution of problems related to contractual disputes is just not feasible. unless one
,c)(, SA R & H \ National Bank or South A frica Ltd 1924 AD 7()4 715
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makes contractual liability dependent on the fact that the party against whom a claim
is raised in court concedes that he has. indeed. concluded the contract concerned.
This is an unlikely scenario. since a court would not have to decide that matter. Nor
does the opposite approach. in other words a purely objective evaluation of the
circumstances provide a conclusive solution.
Should one assume. for a moment. that the objective approach is the decisive one. one
would reach absurd conclusions. For example if A offers to sell for 100 and B says: '1
accept". the contract of sale wh ich wi II arise is for 100. even i f A meant 1000 and B
wanted to say: . I accept. but only at 50.' In fact. even if both A and B meant 1000
there will still be a contract for 100.
As can be seen. this approach does not yield acceptable results. This approach could
not be united with the principles of freedom of will and private autonomy since
everybody would be exposed to contractual liabilities without desiring or intending
these in any way.
The case illustrated under 2.2.3. may serve as a relevant example. This decision is
unique in its disregard for the fundamental principles of contract law (and treedom of
will) and is therefore not desirable at all. It is worth noting that. in this case.
contractual liability cannot be assumed even under the objective theory. since the
party concerned indicated clearly and understandably to the other party its desire not
to be contractually bound. Although leading academic authors (including those cited
in the decision of the court) initially welcomed the judgment. even they eventually
concluded that it was not proper to ignore the wi II of the concerned party or even to
disregard the openly declared will of the party who did not want to enter into a
contractual agreement.
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5.1 The combination of subjective and objective criteria and its
risks
The solution to this fundamental problem is sought. in both of the systems under
examination. by a combination of both approaches. General legal certainty and the
protection of good faith with respect to the recipient of a declaration. regardless of
whether this is the offeror or the offeree. are considerations which lead to the
application of objective criteria. These methods may lead tojust verdicts in particular
cases. but in a case law system597 the danger exists that a multitude of decisions might
yield results of unfathomable complexity.
This problem of unpredictability should. in principle. not arise within a legal system
of codified law since the applicable rules have been formulated beforehand. With
regard to this problem. however. this is not entirely the case in German law. since the
fathers of the BGB contented themselves with provisions which afford the judge a
considerable measure of discretion.I" However. for certain constellations. strict
. ~0l)
precepts have been provided."
In general then. the combination of subjective and objective criteria which has
evolved in response to problems of interpretation has led to an over-emphasis on
objective criteria. This in turn has led to the erosion of essential principles of contract
law. particularly the fundamental tenet of consensus of wills. The danger of this
tendency becomes apparent with reference lO the judgment of the BGH (BGHZ 21.
319) discussed above.ï'" In this judgment the will of one party was completely
disregarded although the party clearly expressed its intent. The question which might
arise is whether a person's will with regard to contractual liability will remain legally
relevant.
)'17 As a matter of fact this is also of relevance in the German system - in light or the hinding effect or
decisoris of superieur courts.
:,QR See above: 2.1.1.1.3.3: 2.2.2.4: 2.2.2.5.
""li See abov e: 2.3.3.
""0 See abox e: 2.2.3.
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This problem does not seem to have occurred in South Africa. since there has been no
pertinent case in which the explicitly declared intention nul lO enter into a contract
has. nonetheless. resulted in contractual Iiabi lity.
5.2 A resort to the principles of culpa in contrahendot
Be that as it may. the deciding question now becomes whether the problem can be
considered from another point of view and can be solved with alternative. although
not necessarily new, legal methods.
In order to solve these problems it would be. in my opmion. a sensible move to
strictly distinguish between an existing contract and the resort lO artificial
constructions that merely feign the former. In other words. the decisive issue remains
whether it is really necessary to simulate a contract in order to impose liability on a
party who has acted unreasonably in entering into a transaction on account of a
mistake. A juristic approach. which has almost been forgotten. the doctrine of culpa
in contrahendo. might provide a satisfactory solution.
By way of a preliminary caveat. it must be noted that culpa in contrahendo has been
repeatedly resorted to by outstanding jurists in an attempt to overcome the inherent
problems of this part of contract law.?" It is also well known that their attempts have
met with Iittle success. Nonetheless I consider it premature to reject the principle
underlying this approach as out-dated or impractical.
As we have seen. the combination of subjective and objective approaches appl ied In
both systems has lead to an over-emphasis on objective criteria. and to the erosion of
essential principles, particularly the need to recognize the will of the contracting
individual. Be this as it may. legal certainty is the decisive argument tor giving
weight to objective criteria in addition to a person' s wi II in regard to questions of
hO! Ilutchison "Formation or Contract" Southern Cross 18\. Paragraph 122 BC,B is in facta
provision which grants delictual claims according to culpa in corurahendo.
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contractual liability. Whether the argument based on legal certainty justifies the
actual emphasis on objective criteria in the analysis of contract law to such a great
extent merits further investigation. however.
Generally speaking. everybody entering into a contract without unreasonable
bahaviour on his part. is entitled to seek some form of protection by the law if the
opposing party denies its contractual liability. But should this protection against the
contract denier necessarily entail the imposition of contractual liability" The
consequence of such an approach. as can be seen in the numerous decisions regarding
dissensus and mistake. is that true consensus between the parties mav become
irrelevant.
The imposed contract ultimately rests solely upon the expectation of the party
concerned and upon whether such an expectation is justified in the light of objective
criteria. It is apparent that such definition of contract has strayed substantially from
the direct consensus approach.
A contract. in essence. consists of an agreement between parties. As one moves away
from this subjective requirement (consensus) towards a contract based on objective
criteria. one is confronted with the danger that the actual wi II of the parties wi II begin
to lose its position of importance. Of course. it is illogical in the extreme to suggest
that objective criteria should be ignored. It is nevertheless prudent to suggest that
they may be give effect to not by the imposition of contractual liability. but rather by
means of a corrective liability of a delictual or sui generis kind.
5.3 Possible criteria
As will be clear from the preceding discussion, I consider it eminently reasonable to
consider solving problems of the kind raised by this enquiry independently of contract
law altogether. In my opinion two argumentsjustitv such a strategy
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Firstly. it results in clearer criteria with respect to formation of contract. which should
aim exclusively at true consensus regarding the essentialia negotii of the agreement.
III-founded personal motives or preconceptions should be disregarded unless they are
closely related to both the conclusion and content of the particular contract(,(J2
Secondly. there is every possibility of protecting a party who reasonably relied on the
existence of a contract.
A conceivable approach might be that the contract denier. the party who raised
expectations that a binding contract had been entered into. be required to financially
compensate the frustrated party. With regard to the extent of such compensation ~
122 BGB provides a good exarnpleI''" A further possibility is that the non-mistaken
party be afforded the right to legally enforce the contract as understood by him. In
other words. a legal responsibility to honour the contract would be placed on the
mistaken party. By making these alternatives available to the aggrieved party at his
election. that pany's interest should be protected sufficiently.'?'
Certain prerequisites will have to be fulfilled in order to justify such claims. Should
the contract assertor demand relief from the party denying the contract. the following
requirements should be met:
I. If the contract is denied on the ground of dissensus. it should be investigated
whether the mistakes are at all relevant. In other words. consensus should not
be denied on the grounds of misconceptions due to personal moti ves.
2. The non-mistaken party needs to prove that he relied on the existence of the
contract. This should exclude dishonest or fraudulent persons who have
caused the defect of the mistaken party or have been aware of the mistake.
ilO~ Seeabove:2.J.3.1: 3.6.1.1: J.ó.I.2.
(l()~ See abo. e: 2.3.,),-1..
{,(IJ In both situations wc would have a delictual claim. Hut this is trom Illy point or \ iexv not
insoluble.
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3. The belief of the aggrieved party in the existence of the contract must be
justified on objective criteria. In other words. a reasonable person should
have accepted a binding contract under identical circumstances.
4. The mistaken party must have negligently engendered the reliance in the non-
m istaken party.
Should all these prerequisites be fulfilled. then. in my opinion. nothing stands in the
way of holding the mistaken party liable on the basis outlined above. Of course it
needs to be added that these criteria need to be subjected to further refinement and
interpretation.
The question of requiring negligence on the part of the mistaken party remains a
challenging aspect of the argument. and leads back to the question in how far a
contract denier can claim to be excused of responsibility for his mistake because of
the intluence or conduct of third parties or other external factors. In other words. is it
relevant at all if a reasonable person. supplied with identical information as the
contract denier would have made the same mistake"
From my point of view. negligence on the part of the mistaken party should prima
facie be presumed in all cases in which the mistake was not induced by the non-
mistaken party or persons acting on its behalf. My substantiation for this is that every
person enjoys freedom in the formation of his wi II and the gathering of information to
this end and hence must be responsible for risks that arise during this process which
are not imputable to the non-mistaken party. The consideration of legal certainty
supports this view since the aggrieved person. to the extent that he acts honestly. will
not be able to anticipate every possible mistake or defect of will on the side of his
opposite number. Such a person must therefore be placed in a position where he is
entitled to rely on the objective declaration of the other party. Whether the mistake
was reasonable or not eventually remains a subjective question. and the recipient of a
declaration who acts normally and lawfully will be unaware of defects of will on the
part of his opposite number and whether such was reasonable or not.
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Irrespective of the question whether the fundamental principles of culpa in
contrahendo will ever be taken into consideration by South African courts in deciding
on matters relating to mistakes on contracts. a case law system offers the tlexibility to
redefine and correct the law and its development along these lines. Because of its
inflexibility regarding its fundamental principles. a system of codified law is not
afforded that opportunity
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681
Yates v Dalton 1938 EDL 177
Young v Land Values Ltd 1924 WLD 216
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8 German cases
RGZ 61.86.
RGZ 64.266.
RGZ 66.427.
RGZ 78. 239.
RGZ 99.23.
RGZ 99.107.
RGZ 99.147
RGZ I 14.338.
RGZ 120.249.
RGZ 140,184.
RGZ 166.44
BGHZ 16.54.
BGHZ21.319.
BGHZ 23. 249.
BGHZ 78.221.
BGHZ 91. 324.
BGHZ I09. I 77.
BGH N.lW 1956. 1272.
BGH N.lW 1961.822.
BGH N.lW 1965.580.
BGH NJW 1966.2399.
BGH NJW 1967. 1222.
BGH N.lW 1968.932.
BGH NJW 1968. 1571.
BGH N.lW 1973. 751.
BGH N.JW 1976.710.
BGH N.lW 1980.990.
BGH N.lW 1982.2302.
BAG DB 85. NZA 87.91
BAG N.lW 1986.85.
BGH N.JW 1987.2014.
BAG N.lW 1989.606.
BGH NJW 1990.704.
OLG Bremen DAR 1980.373
OLG Frankfurt VersR 1981.388.
LG Bremen N.lW 1966.2360.
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Stgt OLGz 83. 304
9 Abbreviations
Germany
BAG Bundesarbeitsgericht Federal Labour Court
BGB BUrgeri iches Gesetzbuch Civil Code
BGH Bundesgerichtshof Federal Court of Justice
BGHZ Entscheidungen des BGH in Zivilsachen Decisions of the Federal
Court of Justice in Civil
cases
BRAO Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung Federal Statute on Attorneys
DAR Deutsehes Autorecht (Zeitschrift) German law 0 f autornobi les
EnergieWiG Energiewirtschaftsgesetz energy - Economy Act
GG Grundgesetz Constitution
GUKG G uterkra ftverke hrsgesetz Act of goods traffic
HGB Handelsgesetzbuch Commercial Code
LG Landgericht Regional Court
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LM l.indenmeyer-Mëhring. Lindenmeyer-Mohring.
Nachschlagewerk des BGH Reference book of the
Federal High Court
N.JW Neue .Juristische Wochenzeitschrift New weekly lawjoumal
NZA Neue Zeitschrift fur Arbeitsrecht New labour law journal
OLG Oberlandesgericht Regional Appeal Court
PatG Patentgesetz Patent Act.
PbefG Personenbefórderungsgesetz Person's Transport Act
PtlVersG Ptl ichtvers icherungsgesetz Act of duty to insure
autornobi les
RGZ Entscheidungen des Reichgerichtes
in Zivilsachen
Descisions of the
Empire Court in civil
cases
UrhG Urhebergesetz Copyright Act
VersR Versicherungsrecht Insurance lawïjournal)
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